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ABSTRACT
CHUNXIAO LI: Three Essays in Applied Microeconomics.
(Under the direction of Donna Gilleskie)
This dissertation is comprised of three independent chapters. The first chapter studies the ef-
fectiveness and consequences of exclusionary school discipline. Exclusionary school discipline
techniques, such as out-of-school suspension, are often criticized for their inability to improve
students’ behavior, their adverse effects on students’ achievement outcomes and their dispropor-
tionate use on minority students. Using large-scale administrative data on North Carolina public
school students, I find that harsher disciplinary rules (measured by higher out-of-school suspension
likelihood) significantly deter students from committing first offenses, but that they are less effec-
tive (or ineffective) for repeat offenses. I also find that their adverse effects on offending students’
achievement outcomes, such as end-of-grade test scores and high school dropout probability, are
much smaller than the effects documented in the existing literature. In addition, I find that harsher
disciplinary rules could significantly improve the academic achievement of middle school students
with no offense record. To carefully address endogeneity and selection issues in a large-scale
data context, my preferred identification strategy combines the instrumental variable method and a
machine learning cluster method (k-means). These findings suggest that current policy reform of
exclusionary school discipline should carefully balance its benefits and costs for different student
populations.
The second chapter explores the equity in exclusionary school discipline between black and
white students and among students from families with different economic backgrounds. The exist-
ing literature and popular press report that black students face out-of-school suspension with much
greater frequency than white students. Using administrative data on North Carolina public school
students over eight academic years, I find that the racial disparity depends importantly on the type
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of offenses when black and white students are compared within the same school. While black stu-
dents are more likely to be suspended, for example, for fighting, theft and sexual harassment, white
students are more likely to be suspended for insubordination, disrespect toward faculty, or leaving
class without permission. I also find that Economically Disadvantaged students are consistently
more likely to be suspended out-of-school for different types of offenses, even if the comparison
is within schools.
The third chapter studies the impacts of social contacts, such as spouses, friends, siblings, par-
ents or children on individual smoking behavior. To identify endogenous social interaction effects,
we model an individual and her social contacts’ smoking behaviors as a simultaneous move game
with complete information. We also allow an individual’s smoking behavior to depend on her
previous behavior and unobserved heterogeneity. Using unique data from the Framingham Heart
Study, which includes complementary social network data, we find statistically significant endoge-
nous social interaction effects of spouses and friends on individual smoking behavior. We also find
that endogenous social interaction effects from siblings or parents are not statistically significant
after disentangling them from homophily. In addition, we find that the effects of social contacts’
cardiovascular disease shocks on individual smoking behavior are not statistically significant.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CONSEQUENCES OF EXCLUSIONARY SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE
1.1 Introduction
In U.S. public schools, exclusionary school discipline techniques, such as out-of-school sus-
pension or expulsion, are commonly used methods to address student misbehaviors – ranging from
severe misconduct (e.g., assaults at school) to minor offenses (e.g., disruptive behavior in the class-
room). In the 2013-2014 school year alone, 2.8 million of the 50 million public school students
were suspended out-of-school at least once, and 130,000 students were expelled.1 The high rate
of out-of-school suspension reflects the consequences of policies such as “zero tolerance,” which
emphasize tough punishment, including social exclusion, as a primary response to crime or mis-
conduct (Skiba and Knesting 2001; Losen and Skiba 2010). However, this disciplinary practice is
widely criticized for its inability to improve students’ misbehavior and its adverse consequences
for suspended students and the broader school community.
Some existing literature suggests that suspension does little to discourage misbehavior and may,
in fact, encourage it (Wettach, Owen, and Hoffman 2015; Skiba and Rauch 2015). The literature
also finds that suspension lowers academic achievement and raises school dropout rates of offend-
ing students (Raffaele Mendez 2003; Arcia 2006; Lee, Cornell, Gregory, and Fan 2011; Skiba and
Rauch 2015). Students who are suspended or expelled from school are more likely to be involved
in the justice system; this relationship is often referred to as the “school to prison pipeline” (Wald
and Losen 2003). A recent study shows that high rates of school suspensions actually harm math
and reading scores for non-suspended students (Perry and Morris 2014). Concerns about these ad-
verse effects are amplified by findings of disparities in school disciplinary practices, especially the
1Civil Rights Data Collection, 2016, U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights.
disproportionate representation of students of color in school suspension rolls. In the 2013-2014
academic year, while black students represented 15.5 percent of the public school student popu-
lation, they comprised 39 percent of student out-of-school suspensions.2 This disparity suggests
that the disciplinary practice is particularly harmful to minority groups. Morris and Perry (2016)
document that school suspensions produce a racial achievement gap, which accounts for approxi-
mately one-fifth of black-white differences in school performance.3 These findings have motivated
the U.S. Department of Justice and Education to release a school discipline guidance package in
2014 to reform discipline policies and practices, several states to enact new legislation, and many
schools to consider ongoing school discipline policy reform.4
Despite concern expressed in the literature and in the popular press, the effectiveness and conse-
quences of exclusionary school discipline techniques remain controversial. Several issues inherent
in identifying “causal effects” in this context, such as endogeneity and selection issues, have not
been fully addressed in the literature, which mostly uses descriptive statistics or regressions with
limited sets of observables. For example, the negative correlation between out-of-school suspen-
sion and suspended students’ achievement may reflect the following causal relationships. First,
principals may be more likely to suspend less-engaged students or students who commit more se-
rious offenses (even for the same observed type of offense). The lower achievement outcomes of
suspended students may not be explained by the consequences of suspension but just simply re-
flect that these students are “bad apples.”5 Second, students who choose to commit offenses under
the threat of suspension may have different personality traits, such as lacking self-control, com-
pared to students who commit offenses under no threat of suspension (the “selection on students’
2Civil Rights Data Collection, 2016, U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights.
3Black-white academic achievement gap is of great importance for understanding black-white gaps in economic
outcomes. For example, Neal and Johnson (1996) document that a test score (AFQT) explains nearly three-quarters
of the racial wage gap for young men and all of the gap for young women.
4See the following websites for the guidance package: http://www.ojjdp.gov/enews/14juvjust/140109.html;
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/index.html. There is new related legislation in several states;
for example, California (AB 420, 2014) and Illinois (SB 100, 2015).
5I refer to this issue as the “endogeneity issue” caused by principals’ decisions.
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unobservables”).6 Therefore, the lower achievement outcomes of suspended offending students
may be due to the lack of self-control but not the suspension itself. These issues cannot be fully
addressed using regressions with limited sets of observables because the engagement levels of stu-
dents, the severity of offenses and the personality traits are typically not observed by researchers.7
Furthermore, they cannot be fully addressed with student- or school-level fixed effects (or simi-
lar methodologies) because some of the unobservables, such as the severity of offenses or other
life-changing circumstances of students, are time-varying factors.8
While attempting to carefully address the identification issues, this essay studies the causal
effects of exclusionary school discipline on students’ in-school behaviors and achievement out-
comes, such as end-of-grade test scores, dropout probability and ACT scores.9 With regard to
students’ in-school behaviors, I separately identify a “general deterrence effect” and a “specific
deterrence effect” of the discipline. As punishments, these discipline techniques may serve as
threats to students who intend to commit offenses and deter them from infractions. I refer to this
mechanism as “general deterrence effect” following the economics of crime literature.10 In addi-
tion, the experience of a specific punishment may serve as an effective “wake-up call” and decrease
students’ likelihood of re-offending in the future. I refer to this mechanism as a “specific deterrence
6Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) discuss how personality traits affect risky behaviors of children.
7Even if we observe the type of offense (e.g., fighting), we typically do not observe additional details about the
offense (e.g., severity).
8A fixed effect approach uses differences in punishment across the same type of offenses for the same student or
in the same school to identify the effect. However, the fact that the same type of offenses may be punished differently
for the same student or in the same school over time is likely to reflect that some unknown sources that determine
the punishment have changed, such as the severity of offenses. There are also other limitations for applying the fixed
effect approach in this context. For example, the student fixed effect is not applicable when the student’s outcome,
such as ACT score, is not observed repeatedly.
9Specifically, I focus on the effects of out-of-school suspension (including expulsion) in this essay because it is the
major controversy in policy making.
10The standard economic model of criminal behavior with the discussion of deterrence is introduced by Becker
(1968). There is a large empirical literature that estimates deterrence effects of police or sanctions on criminal activ-
ities. Comprehensive reviews include, for example, Levitt and Miles (2006), Durlauf and Nagin (2011) and Chalfin
and McCrary (2017).
3
effect.”11
I also examine the impact of exclusionary school discipline on students’ achievement out-
comes. When a principal faces a decision to out-of-school suspend an offending student or not,
an important effect under consideration is whether the suspension will lead to worse (or better)
achievement outcomes for the offending student.12 Furthermore, since one reason for suspending
offending students is to benefit “well-behaved” students, an important question is whether harsher
disciplinary rules (i.e., with higher probability of out-of-school suspension) can benefit achieve-
ment outcomes of those “well-behaved” students. In addition, for principals to make disciplinary
rules or decisions and governments to decide related policies, it is important to know the total
effects of the exclusionary school discipline on achievement outcomes of all students. Therefore,
I separately identify the effect of exclusionary school discipline on the achievement outcomes of
offending students, students with no offense record, and all students.13
Using linked administrative data with detailed misbehavior records for all North Carolina pub-
lic school students in grades 3-12 from the 2008-2009 to 2014-2015 academic years, this research
makes several contributions to the literature. First, I find statistically significant “general deter-
rence effects” of harsher discipline rules (measured by out-of-school suspension likelihood) on
students’ first offenses. The effects are heterogeneous for different types of offenses and different
student subpopulations. For example, while a 10 percentage point increase in the out-of-school
suspension likelihood reduces the mean rate of first offenses for most categories or types of of-
fenses by 7 to 40 percent, this effect is not statistically significant for some types of offenses, such
as “fighting.” In addition, I find that the effect is generally smaller for students’ repeat offenses
11The general and specific deterrence effects can be with opposite signs since the exclusionary school discipline
may encourage students to commit offenses and the experience of out-of-school suspension may be a “bad lesson” to
students and increase their likelihood of re-offending instead.
12In North Carolina, as in most U.S. states, local boards of education establish their own disciplinary policies
following the broad principles in the state statutes. However, the disciplinary policies often list a broad range of
punishments for each type of misbehavior and, thus, school principals or assistant principals may, at their discretion,
determine appropriate punishment for each student infraction instance.
13A student with no offense record means that she does not have an offense record in my sample period. I use them
to represent “well-behaved” students.
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and not statistically significant for students who have already had an out-of-school suspension ex-
perience. I also find suggestive evidence that the “specific deterrence effect” is either small or not
statistically significant.
Second, and contrary to the existing literature, I find that the effects of suspension experience
on offending students’ achievement outcomes are either small or not statistically significant. For
example, an OLS regression with a limited set of controls suggests that a suspension is associated
with lower end-of-grade math test scores of offending students by as much as 0.2 standard devi-
ations, but estimates using my preferred empirical strategy suggests that this effect of suspension
is not statistically significant. Furthermore, while the OLS regression suggests that suspension
experience is positively associated with an offending high school student’s dropout probability
with increases as high as 18 percentage points, my preferred estimator suggests no statistically
significant causal effect. Since the major argument of “school to prison pipeline” theory is that
suspension increases the probability of dropping out of high school, and high school dropouts are
more likely to be involved with the justice system, this invalidation of the first premise suggests
that the “school to prison pipeline” argument is questionable. In addition, these results do not
support the argument that the black-white suspension disparity creates a black-white achievement
gap.
Finally, I find that harsher disciplinary rules have statistically significant positive but small
effects on end-of-grade math scores of students with no offense record.14 For example, I find that a
10 percentage point increase in the out-of-school suspension likelihood in a school could increase
the end-of-grade math scores of middle school students with no offense record by about 0.02
standard deviations. I also find that they have an overall positive effect on all middle school white
students’ end-of-grade math scores. However, I find that the effects are not statistically significant
for other student populations or other achievement outcomes.
My preferred estimation procedure identifies the causal effects by a strategy that combines the
instrumental variable (IV) method with a method (two-step grouped-fixed effects) that addresses
14This result is contrary to Perry and Morris (2014).
5
the “selection on students’ unobservables” in a large-scale data context. The identification strategy
exploits important features of the data; namely, students and principals are followed across aca-
demic years and across schools.15 The IV is a measure of out-of-school suspension propensities of
principal teams, which is constructed by principal team members’ out-of-school suspension deci-
sions in other schools. It is assumed to affect students’ misbehavior or achievement outcomes only
through the principal teams’ discipline decisions in the school of concern.
A problem with directly applying the IV strategy is that the “selection on students’ unobserv-
ables” is not addressed and it may jeopardize the validity of IV. Since traditional approaches to
address this issue are quite computationally expensive given the sample size (to be detailed in
section 1.3), my preferred model uses an empirical framework that combines the IV method with
recent approaches (i.e., two-step grouped-fixed effects) that address the unobserved heterogeneity
problem. Following the literature (Lin and Ng 2012; Bonhomme and Manresa 2015; Bonhomme,
Lamadon, and Manresa 2016b), I model the student unobserved heterogeneity in a flexible yet par-
simonious way, which allows it to vary across different groups (types) of students, across different
types of misbehaviors and across different academic years. I estimate the causal effects by iden-
tifying group memberships of students in the first step, and then applying the IV strategy with an
imputation of the group memberships of students in the second step. The step identifying students’
group memberships applies the k-means clustering algorithm, which is widely used in machine
learning and other related fields (Forgy 1965; Steinley 2006). Since the model also includes school
fixed effects, the second step identifies the causal effects by comparing outcomes of otherwise
identical students in the same identified unobserved heterogeneity groups in the same schools but
assigned to principal teams with different out-of-school suspension propensities.
In addition to the literature mentioned above, the work of Kinsler (2013) is most closely related
to my research. Using data on middle school students in the three largest school districts in North
Carolina in one academic year (2000-2001), Kinsler (2013) studies the effects (and mechanisms) of
15The feature that principals transfer across schools is used to construct the IV. The feature that students are followed
across academic years is used to identify the student unobserved heterogeneity.
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racial disparities in school discipline on the racial achievement gap in end-of-grade test scores. This
work documents significant “general deterrence effects” of out-of-school suspension.16 It also doc-
uments that out-of-school suspension has an overall positive influence on middle school students’
end-of-grade test scores. The study attempts to address the endogeneity and selection issues by
including permanent unobserved student heterogeneity while jointly estimating structure parame-
ters of student behavior, end-of-grade test score production, and principals’ punishment decisions.
It assumes, conditional on the observed student characteristics and the permanent unobserved stu-
dent heterogeneity, that discipline punishments are exogenous; that is, they are predetermined by
principals with identical preferences by their forward-looking evaluation of different parties’ wel-
fare at the beginning of the academic year. Using this assumption, the study achieves identification
without an exclusion restriction that affects principals’ punishment decisions but does not affect
students’ misbehaviors. However, a concern is that there might be unobservables that determine
principals’ decisions other than permanent unobserved student heterogeneity, such as school-level
unobservables, time-varying environmental shocks, student level time-varying unobserved factors
or the unobserved severity of offenses. My analysis shows that the exclusion restriction (or IV)
I construct, which stems from heterogeneous preferences of principals (in contrast to Kinsler’s
identical preferences assumption), is important to recover the causal effects.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I describe the data used in
estimation. In section 1.3, I present the empirical framework. Section 1.4 discusses important
estimation details. Section 1.5 offers results. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data Description
1.2.1 Data Sources
This study uses administrative data from North Carolina public schools provided by the North
Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC). The data were originally collected by the
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) and the National Center for Education
16Comparing the magnitude of the general deterrence effects between my research and Kinsler (2013) is not straight-
forward because it uses days of suspension to construct the discipline measure.
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Statistics (NCES). They include all North Carolina public school students’ disciplinary infraction
records, academic records and other administrative information. They also include teachers’ and
other licensed personnels’ information, and other school-level statistics.17
The students’ disciplinary infraction records were collected by the NCDPI through each local
education agency’s (LEA) superintendent’s office (Director/Principal’s office in the case of charter
schools). They were first reported by the school disciplinary data coordinator, but the principal
is ultimately responsible for the data elements. Due to state and federal statutes and state Board
of Eduction policies, a record of offense incidents involving the following must be reported: 1.)
any of 17 criminal acts committed on a school campus or in connection with a school function;18
2.) any act resulting in an out-of-school suspension or expulsion; 3.) any in-school suspension
received by an exceptional student;19 4.) any of the following acts, regardless of consequences
assigned: fighting (or affray), bullying, discrimination, harassment, a violent assault not resulting
in serious injury, communicating threats, gang activity, extortion, property damage, and possession
or use of tobacco products. In addition to the offense incidents required to be reported by statutes
and policies, other routine disciplinary incidents were also recorded and reported for analysis or
administrative purpose. Guidelines have been created to ensure consistent reporting.
The academic records were collected by the NCDPI, and include end-of-grade test scores, end-
of-course test scores, ACT scores and other academic record information of all North Carolina
17Additional information on perceptions of school environments is obtained from a survey (NCTWCS) of all teach-
ers, principals and other licensed personnel in North Carolina public and charter schools conducted by the North
Carolina Professional Teaching Standards Commission (NCPTSC) and the Governor’s office. Additional information
on Positive Behavior Intervention and Support (PBIS) school recognition is collected from the NCDPI website.
18The 17 reportable acts are: homicide, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault involving the use of a
weapon, rape, sexual offense, sexual assault, kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, robbery without a dan-
gerous weapon, taking indecent liberties with a minor, assault on school personnel, bomb threat, burning of a school
building, possession of alcoholic beverage, possession of controlled substance in violation of law, possession of a
firearm or powerful explosive, and possession of a weapon. Robbery without a dangerous weapon was removed from
this category (moved to category 5) after the 2009-2010 academic year. The 17 (or 16) criminal acts are required to be
reported to law enforcement before the 2011-2012 academic year. Since the 2011-2012 academic year, possession of
alcoholic beverage, bomb threat, and burning of a school building are no longer required to be reported to police.
19Guidelines in later years (e.g., 2014/2015) require reporting any act resulting in-school suspension. I do not find
evidence in the data used for this project, that exceptional students are more likely to be reported than other students
for in-school suspension.
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public school students. In North Carolina, students in grades 3-8 are required to take end-of-grade
tests in reading and math, and students in grades 9-12 are required to take end-of-course tests for
Algebra I and English 1 when they are enrolled for credit in these courses.20 In addition, beginning
in the 2012-2013 academic year, every 11th grader is required to take the ACT college entrance
exam as part of the new North Carolina Standard Course of Study. These test scores are used as
academic achievement measures in this essay.21
The disciplinary infraction records were matched with the academic records and all other in-
formation by NCERDC.22 Each student and licensed school personnel was assigned an unique
identifier (a randomized number). This identifier allows me to follow a student or school personnel
(e.g., principals or assistant principals) over time and across schools, which is important for my
identification strategy.
1.2.2 Sample Construction
The disciplinary infraction data provided by NCERDC span academic years from 2000-2001
to 2014-2015. Beginning in the 2007-2008 academic year, reporting requirements for offenses
have been greater, and the matching rate of infraction data with other data has largely increased.23
However, in the 2013-2014 academic year, there may be a data imputing problem caused by an
upgrade of the data system of the N.C. public schools.24 Therefore, for most of the empirical
20An End-of-Course test in English 2 instead of English 1 has been required since the 2012-2013 academic year.
The data also include records of students who were absent or exempt from the tests.
21Other academic records provided by NCERDC, such as end-of-grade or end-of-course test scores for writing,
computer skills, biology, Algebra 2, Civics and Economics, U.S. History, Chemistry and Physics, and SAT scores are
not used in this essay because they are not available for all the academic years (or only available for a subset of the
students).
22The detail of the matching process is on the website of NCERDC:
http://childandfamilypolicy.duke.edu/research/nc-education-data-center/list-files-variables/.
23The matching rate is greater than 99 percent since the 2007-2008 academic year.
24Since the 2013-2014 academic year, N.C. public schools have upgraded from an NC WISE to a Pearson’s Power-
School product to report suspension data. There were reports that the new system experienced crashes and technical
issues.
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work, I use data from the 2007-2008 to 2012-2013 academic years. I use the 2013-2014 and 2014-
2015 academic year data mostly for robustness checks, except that the ACT score information and
dropout information in these academic years are used for the main estimation.25
The data for charter schools are not used in this essay because the offense reporting requirement
and rates can be different and school administrator information is largely unavailable. In addition,
I use student observations in grades 3-12 since several common explanatory variables, such as
economically disadvantaged status and limited English proficiency status, are not available for
grades K-2.
In the data, there are 1,909,831 distinct public school students in grades 3-12 from the 2007-
2008 to 2012-2013 academic years, who contribute 6,559,362 student-year observations.26 For
most of the empirical work, lagged student or school offense statistics are used as explanatory
variables; in these cases, the 2007-2008 academic year data are used for explanatory variables but
not dependent variables. Further, I drop schools missing one or more years of data. These deletions
result in 1,687,330 distinct students and 5,271,039 student-year observations. I use this sample to
calculate the summary statistics in the next subsection. Depending on the empirical work, there
may be additional data selections. For example, for estimating the effects of suspension on end-
of-grade test scores, I use students in grades 3-8. For estimating the effects on ACT scores, I
mainly use disciplinary data of students in grade 9-10 from the 2009-2010 to 2012-2013 academic
years, with their ACT scores from the 2012-2013 to 2014-2015 academic years. For the effects on
dropout probability, I mainly use grade 9 students’ disciplinary data with the information that they
finally graduate or dropout from high school.27
25The IV is constructed by using punishment records from the 2007-2008 to 2014-2015 academic years. The 2013-
2014 and 2014-2015 academic year data are used to ensure enough observations to construct the IV.
26A student-year observation is calculated as one yearly observation per student if the student is ever enrolled and
assigned an identifier in the data. The student might have several offenses or transfer to different schools within
one year, but they are all regarded as one observation in this calculation. Students who are not matched between
disciplinary data and other administrative data (less than 1%) are not in this calculation and not used for this essay.
27In the dropout analysis, only first time grade 9 students (no students who repeat grade 9) are included in the
sample. As discussed later, I use grade 9 students to avoid the dynamic selection problem. I drop grade 9 students
in the 2012-2013 academic year because I only observe the dropout information until the 2014-2015 academic year.
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1.2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Data Issues
There are 3,951,754 recorded offense instances in the constructed sample, which were com-
mitted by 651,040 distinct students with 1,236,497 student-year observations. That means about
23 percent of student-year observations have at least one offense in the academic year, and about
38 percent of distinct students have at least one offense record in the sample period. In addition,
about 56 percent of offending students re-offended in the same academic year.28 About 20 percent
of distinct students (349,611 distinct students) had at least one out-of-school suspension record in
the sample period.29
The NCDPI classified offenses using about 90 offense types.30 There were nearly 40 conse-
quence types that were assigned to the offenses. The most commonly used consequence types
were out-of-school suspension and in-school suspension, each representing about 30 percent of all
consequences in the data. Most of the out-of-school suspensions were short-term (≤ 10 days);
only one percent of out-of-school suspensions were long-term (> 10 days).31 There were only 146
cases of expulsions in the sample. Most other consequence types were less severe punishments
than suspensions, such as lunch detention or a warning.32 Since controversy in policy making
surrounds out-of-school suspension, my empirical work simplifies the punishment as either out-
of-school suspension (including expulsion) or not, where the “not” category includes in-school
Since there might still be censored information for students who repeat grades, I do robustness checks by only using
students from the 2008-2009 to 2010-2011 academic years.
28The calculation is based on student-year observations but not distinct students.
29About 10 percent of student-year observations (577,886 student-year observations) were out-of-school suspended
at least once in the academic year.
30Each offense instance may be described by multiple offense types. Since only about one percent of offenses have
associated with them more than one offense types, I use the first (typically most serious) offense type to represent
the offense. The number of offense types and the definition of each type changed across years. They only changed
slightly, however, from 2007 to 2015 and most of the changes only involve adding new types.
31According to the North Carolina state statute, a long-term suspension must be assigned by the superintendent
under a principal’s recommendation (115C-390.7).
32One percent of offenses were assigned the consequence of “alternative learning program.” Of these, about 40
percent were assigned out-of-school suspension at the same time. This analysis ignores “alternative learning program”
as a type of punishment.
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suspension or other less severe punishments.33
To simplify the discussion, I provide two classifications of the offense types based on their
similarities.34 The first classification contains six categories - “violence,” “drug,” “disrespect,”
“truancy,” “property” and “other offenses.” This classification is used to discuss deterrence effects
by category. A more detailed classification further divides the “violence” and “other” categories
into four sub-categories respectively, resulting in twelve categories. This classification is used for
constructing explanatory variables and identifying student unobserved heterogeneity. Appendix A
shows the offense types in each category by classification. One concern for estimating the deter-
rence effects of out-of-school suspension is that additional punishments assigned by the juvenile
justice system for criminal acts are not observed. Very few violent offenses (less than 4 percent)
and property offenses (less than 0.5 percent) required reporting to law enforcement. Most of the
offenses in the “drug” category, however, required such reporting and might have resulted in addi-
tional punishment; results from this specification should be interpreted with caution.
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for different categories of offenses and several types of
offenses within categories.35 The percentages of offenses punished by out-of-school suspension
(Column 3-4) show that out-of-school suspension was frequently used even for minor offenses,
such as disruptive behavior and excessive tardiness.36 The generally higher rates of out-of-school
suspension for students’ second offenses than for their first offenses reflect that escalating pun-
ishment rules are commonly used in education practices. This finding motivates my empirical
framework that separately specifies the first and second punishment in order to more fully evaluate
the deterrence effects.
33Additional inquiry into the effects of in-school suspension on students’ misbehavior or achievement outcomes
would complement this analysis.
34The classifications also take into account the number of observations.
35“Excessive tardiness” and “disruptive behavior” are from “other” category, which account for more than 53 per-
cent of offense cases of the category.
36The percentages also show that the sample includes a large portion of offenses that were assigned less severe
punishments than out-of-school suspension.
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According to the data reporting requirement, almost all types of offenses in the “violence,”
“drug” or “property” categories must be reported regardless of the consequences assigned. How-
ever, one concern is whether other minor offenses, such as from the category “truancy,” are well
reported. To get a sense of the reporting requirement, Column 5 lists the percent of schools with at
least one reported offense in the academic year for each type of offense. The percentages suggest
that “violence” and “disrespect” offenses are widely reported in many schools.37 Furthermore,
although schools were required to report most of the “drug” and “property” offenses, there was a
relative low percentage of schools that actually reported them. This low percentage is likely due to
lower offense or catching rates. Note that some less severe offenses, such as “disruptive behavior,”
are also widely reported. For other less severe offenses, such as “truancy” and “excessive tardi-
ness,” the percentages are relative low. A further check by different school levels shows that the
reporting rate of these offenses changes largely by school levels. More than 84 percent of middle
school or high school school-year observations reported at least one “truancy” case, and more than
50 percent of middle school or high school school-year observations reported at least one exces-
sive tardiness case. However, it is likely that many minor offenses were not reported. Therefore,
in addition to the econometric effort I will make to address this issue, results from these offenses
should be interpreted with caution.
To further illustrate the data, Table 1.2 separately reports sample means of student characteris-
tics for the student-year observations with and without any offense record in the academic year. For
the observations with any offense record, I further divide them into those who were not punished
by out-of-school suspension in the academic year and those who were punished by out-of-school
suspension ever in the academic year. The table shows that the three groups differ considerably
along all the dimensions, which indicates possible selection of students into the offender group and
into the out-of-school suspended group. While the ratios of white students decrease from the no
offense group to the offender group, and from the not out-of-school suspended offender group to
37Since, intuitively, the likelihood of being caught committing these offenses should be high, I use these offenses to
construct my main instrumental variable.
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the out-of-school suspended group, the ratios of black students differ in these groups in an opposite
direction. Black student-year observations account for 23 percent of the no offense group and 33
percent of the not out-of-school suspended offender group, but they account for 51 percent of the
out-of-school suspended group, which indicates the over-representation of black students in out-of-
school suspension rolls. Female students make up a smaller percentage of the offender group and
an even smaller percentage of the out-of-school suspended group. Economically disadvantaged
students account for a higher percentage of the offender group and an even larger percentage of
the out-of-school suspended group.38 The offender group and the out-of-school suspended group
were more likely to be physically or intellectually disabled, less likely to be academically and in-
tellectually gifted, and more likely to be above typical age in the grade or be repeating the grade in
the academic year than the no offense group. They also had lower lagged test scores. Grade 9 was
the grade with the highest offense and out-of-school suspension percentages.
1.3 Empirical Framework
In this section, I introduce the empirical framework used to estimate the “general deterrence
effects,” the “specific deterrence effects,” and the effects of exclusionary school discipline on stu-
dents’ achievement outcomes. I also discuss the motivation for the empirical models and the
econometric issues that must be addressed in order to obtain causal effects.
38Economically disadvantaged students are students receiving free or reduced price meals. Eligibility for free
or reduced lunch is determined by family size and family income. The most recent criteria can be found on
http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/newsroom/news/2015-16/20150814-01.
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1.3.1 The Model for Students’ Behavior
Let D1ist (D2ist) indicate whether or not student i in school s committed a first (or second)
offense in academic year t. I assume the following linear-in-the-parameters model:
D1ist = β10 + α11P
∗
1ist + β11Dist−1 + β12Gist−1 + β13X
std
ist + β14X
sch
st + β15X
std
−ist + φ
sch
1s + 1ist
(1.1)
D2ist = β20 + α21P
∗
2ist + α22P1ist + β21Dist−1 + β22Gist−1 + β23X
std
ist + β24X
sch
st + β25X
std
−ist
+ β26D
type
1ist + β27N1ist + φ
sch
2s + ϑ1ist + 2ist if D1ist = 1
(1.2)
where P ∗1ist (P
∗
2ist) is the potential punishment for the student if she commits the first (second)
offense; P1ist is the actual punishment (out-of-school suspension or not) received for her first of-
fense (i.e., if D1ist = 1); Dist−1 is a vector that captures a student’s misbehavior in academic
year t − 1;39 Gist−1 denotes the student’s test scores in academic year t − 1;40 Xstdist is a vector
of student’s observed characteristics (see variables in Table 1.2); Xschst is a vector of time-varying
school observables (see variables in Table 1.3); Xstd−ist is a vector of the student’s peers’ observed
characteristics;41 Dtype1ist is the type of her first offense; and N1ist is a variable that captures the re-
maining number of in-school days for the student in the academic year after her first offense. φschs
represents school time-invariant factors, which are not observed by the researcher. ϑ1ist represents
39For these variables, I use the student’s offense frequencies of each misbehavior category (twelve categories) in the
previous academic year.
40I use the student’s lagged math and reading scores from end-of-grade tests (grades 3-8) or end-of-course tests
(grades 9-12) for these variables.
41I use same-grade peers’ characteristics in estimation. The variables include the ratios of black students (to the
whole student population), other minority students, female students, exceptional students, AIG students, students with
limited English proficiency, students who repeated grades this academic year, students who are above the typical age
in the grade, and economically disadvantaged students, and the means of peers’ last year math standard scores and
peers’ last year reading standard scores.
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unobserved (by the researcher) shocks that were not observed by the student when she chose her be-
havior (D1ist), but were observed by administrators when they assigned the punishment (P1ist); for
example, it could be the realized severity of the student’s first offense that was not expected by her
when she made the first offense decision. The error term ist captures the student’s unobservable
(by the researcher) characteristics or other environmental shocks (or misbehavior opportunities)
that are observed by the students when they make offense decisions and by administrators when
they assign punishments.
The model aims to recover consistent estimates of α11, α21, and α22. The coefficients α11 and
α21 measure the average “general deterrence effects,” which describe the effects that result from
the threat of a punishment for misbehavior. The coefficient α22 measures the average “specific
deterrence effect,” which describes the role of a previous punishment (as one’s punishment expe-
rience) on re-offending.42 The equation 1.1 captures the general deterrence effect of out-of-school
suspension on “ever misbehaving or not” in the academic year, and the equation 1.2 isolates the
general and specific deterrence effects on “recidivism or not” in the academic year.43
The statistical model can be regarded as an approximation to an economic model of a student’s
decision, in which the student chooses to commit an offense or not (Dist) based on her “tastes”
for current behaviors and her expectation on potential punishments.44 Her “tastes” for current
behaviors are determined by her past behaviors (Dist−1, D
type
1ist , ϑ1ist) through habit formation (or
“criminal capital” accumulation), the punishment for her past offense (P1ist) through learning, her
past grades (Gist−1), other observables (Xstdist , X
sch
st , X
std
−ist), and student- and school-level unob-
servables (ist, φschs ). Theoretically, the effectiveness of the potential punishments (the size of
the “general deterrence effects”) will depend on students’ knowledge of or beliefs about potential
42While beyond the scope of this analysis, the model can be expanded to include correlated random coefficients (in
which students sort into suspension status on the basis of heterogeneous gains from the suspension).
43As a robustness check, I also estimate a specification that defines the outcome variables as the student’s first
(second) offense in middle school or high school, instead of the first (second) offense in an academic year.
44A forward-looking student may consider the punishments for the second or further offenses when she chooses
the first offense. Therefore, an interesting question for a further study would be how the potential punishment for the
second or further offenses deter students’ first offense choices.
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punishments, their forward-looking ability, their expected probability of being caught, and their
expected utility loss from punishments (e.g., physical or emotional unhappiness directly due to
out-of-school suspension or indirectly due to consequences of out-of-school suspension).45 For
example, potential punishments may not effectively deter students from committing offenses if
students are fully myopic, or they do not know (or do not correctly understand) the disciplinary
rules, or they do not care about the consequences of out-of-school suspension.46
The variable, “remaining number of in-school days” (N1ist), is calculated by subtracting the
days of out-of-school suspension for the first punishment from the total remaining days in the
academic year after her first offense. Inclusion of this variable addresses a potential concern when
estimating the specific deterrence effect. That is, if a student was out-of-school suspended (or
expelled) for the first offense, then she would not be able to re-offend (in-school) during her out-
of-school suspension. The “incapacitation effect” might confound the “specific deterrence effect”
because a lower re-offending likelihood may be due to less available time for another offense
during the academic year and not due to the “wake-up call” effect of the suspension.47 Using
the additional variable to control for the “incapacitation effect,” I identify the “specific deterrence
effect” by comparing students who have the same remaining number of days to commit the second
offense.
For these equations, I also separately estimate the effects by categories (or types) of misbehav-
ior, where for category c misbehavior, for example, the outcomes are defined as “ever committing
a category c misbehavior or not in the academic year,” and “re-offending a category c misbehav-
ior or not in the academic year.” Punishments (or potential punishments) for these specifications
45To discuss the policy-relevant effects, I define the deterrence effects as the effects of objective punishments. See
Apel (2013) for a detailed discussion of perceptual-deterrence and actual deterrence.
46They may even prefer to be punished (i.e., the general deterrence effect is with an opposite sign) if out-of-school
suspension provides greater relative enjoyment than staying in the classroom (studying or not studying). This phe-
nomenon is described as “negative reinforcement” in the education literature, which describes that out-of-school sus-
pension may offer students an incentive to misbehave.
47A discussion on the relationship between the “specific deterrence effect” and the “incapacitation effect” may be
found in, for example, Ehrlich (1981), Marvell and Moody (1994), Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger (1993) and Levitt
(1998).
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are defined by the punishments for the corresponding categories.48 If we regard punishments as
“prices,” these specifications assume different categories of misbehaviors (demand) operate in dif-
ferent markets and are priced separately.49 Therefore, an interesting research question that is not
explored in this essay is the substitution patterns of general (and specific) deterrence effects (cross-
price elasticities) among different types of misbehaviors; for example, whether harsher punishment
for violent behaviors would deter students from truancy.
Note that potential punishment variables (P ∗1ist, P
∗
2ist) are not directly observed in the data.
While ex-post realized punishments might be regarded as a good approximation for ex-ante poten-
tial punishments for those who misbehaved (and have records of resulting punishments), ex-ante
potential punishments for those who did not misbehave need to be carefully defined.50 To address
this issue, I use variables P˜1st and P˜2st, to approximate P ∗1ist and P
∗
2ist, and to define potential
punishments for all students (misbehaved and not misbehaved).51 For misbehavior category c, for
example, P˜1st (P˜2st) is defined by a “normalized” (by offense types) rate of out-of-school suspen-
sion assigned to the first offense (the second offense) of c category misbehavior of all the students
in school s in academic year t.52 I refer to these variables as “Disciplinary Punishment Indexes
48For these specifications, I include the number of her offenses in other categories before the first offense in the given
category as controls for equation 1.2. I also include her same-grade peers’ offense rates of other offense categories in
the current academic year as controls for both equations 1.1 and 1.2. I carefully choose to not control for the peers’
offense rates of the same offense category model in order to allow the general deterrence effect for violent behavior, for
example, to include both its direct effects on a students’ violent behavior and its indirect effects through the student’s
peers’ violent behavior. I control for offense rates of other categories because one concern for my IV estimates
(introduced later) by category of offense is that the IV may change the discipline decisions for other categories as well.
This response might be another channel that through which the IV affects the misbehavior outcomes in the discussed
category if the discipline rule for the category is not representative for other categories. Robustness checks are done
with controls for peers’ offense rates in all offense categories to achieve the direct effects (not through peer effects)
of the discipline. Robustness checks are also done without controlling for peers’ misbehavior rates to address the
concern that controlling for the peers’ offense rate in other categories may cause an additional endogeneity problem
for estimating the deterrence effects.
49Cross-market criminal capital accumulation is allowed since past offenses of all categories are controlled for,
although cross-market specific deterrence effects are not studied.
50Punishments for those who misbehaved but were not caught or reported by the administrators are also not ob-
served.
51The reason for using these variables to define potential punishments for all students but not only for non-
misbehaved students is to avoid non-classical measurement error problems that may confound estimation results.
52I use current year (instead of past year) punishment decisions to construct the proxy variables because punishments
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(DPI)” of the school. I discuss the details of their construction in section 1.4.2.
To recover the general and specific deterrence effects, an important issue is the endogeneity of
the punishment variables caused by principals’ decisions (P1ist, P˜1st and P˜2st); that is, principals’
punishment decisions may depend on unobservables in equation 1.1 and 1.2.53 A related concern
for recovering the specific deterrence effect is the selection of students into committing a first
offense (D1ist = 1) (the “selection issue”). From equation 1.1, we know that if α11 6= 0, we have
Cov(P˜1st, 1ist|D1ist = 1) 6= 0. Therefore, since P1ist is correlated with P˜1st by construction, we
might have Cov(P1ist, 2ist|D1ist = 1) 6= 0 if Cov(1ist, 2ist) 6= 0.54 Additional concerns include:
student misbehaviors are not observed if they were not caught or reported and endogeneity of
past behaviors, test scores, and remaining number of days variables (Dist−1 Gist−1, N1ist) in these
equations, which might affect identification of deterrence effects. I discuss how I address these
concerns in the subsequent subsections.
1.3.2 Administrators’ Punishments and Identification Strategies
A principal or an assistant principal’s punishment rules or decisions may depend on misbe-
havior frequencies and severity and other observable or unobservable characteristics of students or
schools since these factors may affect their beliefs on the optimal rules or decisions that maximize
the welfare of students and other stakeholders. In addition, it is also possible that some principals’
punishment decisions are affected by their prejudice toward students with particular observed or
unobserved characteristics. The inclusion of the comprehensive set of controls in the student mis-
behavior equations (Dist−1, Gist−1, Xstdist , X
sch
st , X
std
−ist, D
type
1ist , φ
sch
s ) partially addresses the concern
assigned for the current year offending students should exactly be the potential punishments they would get when they
make offense decisions, and these punishments should also better reflect the current year disciplinary policy for other
students. The idea of not using past year data to construct the measure also follows the spirit of the “Lucas Critique.”
The problem in this context could be, for example, if the ineffectiveness of past year lenient punishments had led
the principals to change to a harsher discipline rule in new academic year, which was announced to (or expected by)
students and changed their behavior, using past punishments would lead to a false conclusion that the lenient discipline
changed students’ behavior.
53The issue is similar for P ∗ist and P˜st, assuming that P˜st is a good approximation for P
∗
ist. Therefore, I do not
distinguish them in the discussion that follows.
54The selection problem might also be an issue for estimating the general deterrence effect in equation 1.2 if
forward-looking students consider the punishment for the second offenses as well when they choose to initially offend.
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that an administrator’s punishment decisions depend on the observables and time-invariant school
unobservables. However, it does not address the problem that an administrator’s punishment de-
cisions may also depend on other unobservables; that is, P1ist, P˜1st, and P˜2st may be correlated
with ϑ1ist, 1ist, and 2ist.55 The first empirical strategy I use to address this issue is an instru-
mental variable (IV) method. I specify the following reduced-form equations for the punishment
variables:
P˜1st = γ10 + γ11Z1st + γ12Dist−1 + γ13Gist−1 + γ14Xstdist + γ15X
sch
st + γ16X
std
−ist
+ φp,sch1s + 
p
1st
(1.3)
P˜2st = γ20 + γ21Z1st + γ22Z2st + γ23Dist−1 + γ24Gist−1 + γ25Xstdist + γ26X
sch
st + γ27X
std
−ist
+ γ28D
type
1ist + γ29N1ist + φ
p,sch
2s + 
p
2st if D1ist = 1
(1.4)
P1ist = γ30 + γ31Z1st + γ32Z2st + γ33Dist−1 + γ34Gist−1 + γ35Xstdist + γ36X
sch
st + γ37X
std
−ist
+ γ38D
type
1ist + γ39N1ist + φ
p,sch
3s + 
p
3ist if D1ist = 1
(1.5)
where the instrumental variables (Z1st, Z2st) describe the out-of-school suspension propensity for
the first or second offense of a principal team, which are constructed as the “normalized” out-of-
school suspension rates in other schools in which the team members worked. That is, for each
principal team (i.e., principals and assistant principals) in each school in each academic year, if
there were members who had principal experience in other schools, I calculate a “normalized” out-
of-school suspension rate for these schools. I use it to construct the IV for suspension decisions
in the school of concern.56 The underlying assumption is that principals who were more likely
to use out-of-school suspensions in other schools might be more likely to use them in the current
school because it may reflect their preferences or beliefs about the effectiveness of out-of-school
suspension (or harsher discipline rules). I do not include any out-of-school suspension decisions
55Recall that P˜1st and P˜2st are constructed by actual punishments P1ist and P2ist for offending students in school
s; therefore, they might be correlated with the individual level observables or unobservables.
56The IV is defined at the school level but not at the principal level because for each case I do not observe which
principal or assistant principal assigned the consequence.
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(for any types of offenses in any academic years) in the current school in construction of the IV
because they may have direct effects on the students’ outcomes in the current school, which would
violate the IV assumption. Additional detail about construction of the IV is presented in section
1.4.1. The idea of constructing the IV by using the “punishment propensity” of people is similar
in spirit to Kling (2006) and Aizer and Doyle (2015) for the identification of causal effects of
incarceration, and Doyle (2007) for the identification of causal effects of foster care.
Suppose ∗2ist = ϑ1ist+2ist, the IV strategy is supposed to address the problem thatCov(
p
1st, 1ist) 6=
0, Cov(p2st, 
∗
2ist|D1ist = 1) 6= 0 and Cov(p3st, ∗2ist|D1ist = 1) 6= 0, which is due to the en-
dogeneity or selection issues discussed before. However, the problem in IV estimation is that,
if selection plays a role, the exclusion restriction assumptions for the IV might not be satisfied.
The exclusion restriction assumptions are Cov(Z1st, 1ist|Ω1ist, φschs ) = 0, Cov(Z1st, ∗2ist|D1ist =
1,Ω2ist, φ
sch
s ) = 0 and Cov(Z2st, 
∗
2ist|D1ist = 1,Ω2ist, φschs ) = 0, where Ω1ist (Ω2ist) is the vector
of control variables, which include Gist−1, Dist−1, Xstdist , X
sch
st , X
std
−ist (and D
type
1ist , N1ist). How-
ever, from equation 1.1, we know that if α11 6= 0 and γ11 6= 0, we have Cov(Z1st, 1ist|D1ist =
1,Ω1ist, φ
sch
s ) 6= 0. Therefore, if Cov(1ist, ∗2ist) 6= 0, the assumption Cov(Z1st, ∗2ist|D1ist =
1,Ω2ist, φ
sch
s ) = 0 might not be satisfied.
57 That is, if students react to the threat of punishment
when they make first offense decisions, principals with different out-of-school suspension propen-
sities may end up with students with different unobserved characteristics in the offending group
(D1ist = 1) and, if these unobserved characteristics affect students’ recidivism decisions, the IV
assumption would not be satisfied for equation 1.2.
To address this problem, I propose an empirical strategy that combines the IV method with
a method that recovers student unobserved heterogeneity. The method that addresses student un-
observed heterogeneity follows the recent “two-step grouped-fixed effects” literature (Lin and Ng
2012; Bonhomme and Manresa 2015; Bonhomme et al. 2016b). Specifically, I assume that there
are a relatively small number of distinct groups of students. The subscript gi ∈ {1, . . . , G} rep-
resents the student i’s group membership, which is estimated from the data, and is assumed to
57This argument is not based on correlation properties; it is based on underlying intuition.
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not change across time (and across misbehavior categories or types when estimation is for differ-
ent categories or types of misbehaviors). Using n = 1, 2 to represent the equation 1.1 and 1.2, I
decompose the error terms nist as follows:
nist = θngist + vnist (1.6)
where the component θngist captures student i’s unobserved heterogeneity.
58 One way to interpret
θngist is to regard it as a product of some permanent student unobserved characteristics and the
coefficient on these characteristics (the effects of the student unobserved characteristics); that is,
θngist = ρntθgis. I assume that the component θngist absorbs all the correlation between 1ist and
∗2ist. That is, I assume that Cov(v1ist, ϑ1ist + v2ist) = 0, where vnist may capture, for example,
transitory environmental shocks.
Modeling the student unobserved heterogeneity may help to addresses the endogeneity of pun-
ishment variables and the selection problem discussed above. In addition, it may also help to ad-
dress endogeneity of the student’s past offense history (Dist−1), past test scores (Gist−1) and “the
remaining days variable” (N1ist) for estimating both equation 1.1 and 1.2, if the endogeneity bias is
assumed to be due to the correlation between the identified student unobserved heterogeneity and
these student-level explanatory variables (i.e., if we assume Dist−1 and Gist−1 are not correlated
with v1ist or v2ist, and we assume N1ist is not correlated with v2ist).59 I use this empirical strategy
to estimate equations 1.1 and 1.2.
The estimation proceeds in two steps. The first step is to partition all students into G groups.
Partitions are determined by an application of the k-means clustering algorithm, which is widely
used in machine learning and other related fields (Forgy 1965; Steinley 2006). In the second
step, the group-specific unobserved heterogeneity (θngist) is estimated with equations 1.1 and 1.2
58When the estimation is for different categories of types of misbehaviors, the θngist term is also different for
different misbehavior categories (or types), i.e., it is θcngist, where c represents a specific category (or type).
59Dist−1, Gist−1, N1ist are also assumed to be uncorrelated with ϑ1ist. In reality, N1ist might be correlated with
ϑ1ist, which is not addressed in this essay.
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by imputing the estimated group memberships of students, gˆi. This step amounts to adding the
group membership indicators of students into the new estimation. Details about this procedure are
discussed in section 1.4.3.
While I show results using the “two-step grouped-fixed effects” without the IV strategy, my
preferred model combines the IV strategy with the “grouped-fixed effects” of students. The IV
strategy is important for estimating the general and specific deterrence effects even after condi-
tioning on the student unobserved heterogeneity: P˜1st (P˜2st) might be correlated with v1ist (v2ist)
and P1ist might be correlated with ϑ1ist (i.e., principals’ punishment rules or decisions might de-
pend on environmental shocks and the severity of students’ offenses).60 After conditioning on
θngˆist, the exclusion restriction assumptions for the IV become Cov(Z1st, v1ist|Ω1ist, φschs , θgˆist) =
0, Cov(Z1st, ϑ1ist + v2ist|D1ist = 1,Ω2ist, φschs , θgˆist) = 0, and Cov(Z2st, ϑ1ist + v2ist|D1ist =
1,Ω2ist, φ
sch
s , θgˆist) = 0.
The information I use to identify the unobserved heterogeneity is students’ misbehavior de-
cisions for different types of offenses across all academic years (Dis = {Dis1, Dis2, ..., Dist¯})
conditional on observables and school fixed effects. I assume that the student unobserved group
is reflected by her misbehavior decisions across time and across different types of misbehaviors.
Conditional on all observed factors, students who have different unobserved characteristics, for
example, might more (or less) frequently commit offenses across different types of misbehaviors
or across time although the punishment rules change across these dimensions.61 Following As-
sumption 4 in (Bonhomme et al. 2016b), I assume that vnist are independent across students i,
across time t, across n, and across different types of misbehaviors and assume that the groups of
students are large and well-separated in the population. The assumption allows the product of the
60Principals may change the severity of overall punishments in response to students’ behaviors and the realized
offense rate within a school/academic year. This reaction creates a problem, called “reverse causality,” for estimating
the “general deterrence effects,” i.e., observed high (low) rates of out-of-school suspension might be the consequences
of, but not the reasons for, high (low) misbehavior rates. “Reverse causality” is another way to interpret the correlation
between the punishments and the environmental shocks.
61I use this information because, intuitively, it closely reflects the unobserved factors that cause the selection issue
discussed above. Note that D1ist or D2ist should not be directly used since D2ist = 1 has positive probability only
when D1ist = 1.
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number of students’ misbehavior types and the number of academic years to grow polynomially
more slowly than the number of students. According to (Bonhomme and Manresa 2015), the as-
sumption can be relaxed to allow weak dependence of vnist across types of offenses, academic
years or individuals (i.e., assumptions 1 and 2 in Bonhomme and Manresa (2015)).62 However, the
assumption that there are only a relatively small number of distinct groups of students in terms of
unobserved heterogeneity is critical for achieving consistent estimates using this estimation strat-
egy. If the population students’ unobserved heterogeneity is a continuous variable, the method will
generate biased estimates and a bias reduction method should be applied (Bonhomme, Lamadon,
and Manresa 2016a).
1.3.3 Students’ Achievement Outcomes
For a student who has committed an offense, a principal needs to make a decision on either
out-of-school suspending her (i.e., the treatment) or not. An important effect under considera-
tion for such a decision is whether the treatment would lead to worse achievement outcomes for
the offending student. To study such an effect, I estimate the following linear-in-the-parameters
models:
Yist = β30 + α31Pist + β31Dist + β32Gist−1 + β33Xstdist + β34X
sch
st + β35X
std
−ist + β36D−ist
+ φsch3s + ϑist + 3ist if D1ist = 1
(1.7)
Yist = β
′
30 + α
′
31P1ist + β
′
31Dist−1 + β
′
32Gist−1 + β
′
33X
std
ist + β
′
34X
sch
st + β
′
35X
std
−ist + β
′
36D−ist
+ β′37D
type
1ist + φ
′sch
3s + ϑ
′
1ist + 
′
3ist if D1ist = 1
(1.8)
where Pist is an indicator of whether the student was ever suspended out-of-school in academic
year t and P1ist is an indicator of whether the student was suspended out-of-school for her first of-
fense in academic year t; Dist is a vector of her offense frequencies of each misbehavior category
in academic year t; D−ist is a vector of her same-grade peers’ average offense frequencies of each
62This assumption can capture a theoretical model in which environmental shocks are allowed to be weakly corre-
lated with each other across different “misbehavior markets.”
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misbehavior category in the current academic year; ϑ′1ist represents unobserved (to the researcher)
shocks that were not observed by the student when she chose D1ist, but were observed by adminis-
trators when they assigned the punishment P1ist, such as the realized severity of the student’s first
offense that is not expected by her when she makes the first offense decision. ϑist represents, for
example, unobserved severity of all her offenses in academic year t.
The equations are estimated using students who have ever committed an offense in academic
year t (D1ist = 1) since these students are students at risk for receiving out-of-school suspension
treatment. An out-of-school suspension may directly affect an student’s achievement outcomes be-
cause, for example, it may reduce the student’s classroom learning time. In addition, it may change
the student’ subsequent misbehavior (through the specific deterrence effect) or her peers’ behav-
iors and, thus, indirectly affects the student’s achievement outcomes by such behavioral changes.
The coefficient α31 captures the direct effect of out-of-school suspension on offending students’
achievement outcomes since students’ behaviors (Dist, D−ist) are in the controls. The coefficient
α′31 captures both the direct and indirect effects of out-of-school suspension for students’ first of-
fenses on their achievement outcomes.
Yist in these equations generally represents different types of achievement outcomes. The out-
comes I study include end-of-grade math scores of students (GMathist ), ACT composite scores of
students (GACTis ), and an indicator of whether the student dropped out or graduated (Qis). When
the outcome variable is end-of-grade math scores of students, GMathist , the scores for students in
grades 3-8 are observed at the end of each academic year and thus the model estimates the short-
run effect of the punishment within an academic year. The model has a value added structure since
the past outcome (Gist−1) is included and multiple observations across academic years are used for
each student. ACT composite scores of students (GACTis ) and the indicator of high school dropout
or graduate (Qis) are observed only once for each student. Therefore, I estimate, for example, how
the punishment to a student in grade 9 affects her final dropout or graduation from high school or
her final ACT score.
Following the discussion in the last subsection, to recover the causal effect, α31 (α′31) of the
25
punishment variable Pist (P1ist), we must consider its possible correlation with ϑist or 3ist (ϑ′1ist or
′3ist). I use the IV strategy to address this endogeneity problem first. The IV, Zst (Z1st), is the out-
of-school suspension propensity for all offenses (the first offenses) of a principal team. However,
as discussed before, the selection issue of students who enter into the group D1ist = 1 might not be
addressed by the IV strategy and causes problems for the validity of the IV. An additional problem
is that the explanatory variables Dist, Gist−1, and D−ist are endogenous as well. To address these
issues, I decompose the error terms 3ist = θ3gist+v3ist and 
′
3ist = θ
′
3gist
+v′3ist. The grouped-fixed
effects θ3gist (θ3gist) are estimated with other parts of the model in the second step after students’
group membership (gi) is estimated in the first step.63 My preferred model combines both the IV
strategy with the grouped-fixed effects, which allows Pist (P1ist) to be correlated with ϑist (ϑ′1ist)
even after conditioning on the grouped-fixed effects.64
Another important question that the existing literature attempts to answer is how exclusion-
ary school discipline affects “well-behaved” students’ achievement outcomes (Perry and Morris
2014). In practice, since exclusionary school discipline removes offending students from the
school, this social exclusion prevents (or incapacitates) offenders from committing additional of-
fenses in school for a period of time (“the incapacitation effect”). In addition, the exclusionary
school discipline may deter potential offending students from committing offenses or change of-
fending students’ subsequent behaviors as discussed before (“general and specific deterrence ef-
fects”). Therefore, if students’ misbehaviors are harmful to peers’ achievement outcomes (i.e.,
they have harmful “spillover effects”), exclusionary school discipline may lead to better average
achievement outcomes for “well-behaved” students if the “general and specific deterrence effects”
and the “incapacitation effect” reduce these harmful “spillover effects” of offending students. To
63The outcomes used to estimate the group membership follow the outcomes in the last section (student misbehavior
frequencies of each type of misbehavior in each academic year). This choice reflects the assumption that the selection
problem is caused by some unobservables that affect students’ misbehavior choices. An alternative approach could
use student misbehavior frequencies and other outcomes, such as student test scores.
64In addition to the outlined econometric concerns, selection plagues estimation of the discipline effects in all
equations discussed in this section when the outcomes are dropout indicator or ACT scores. I discuss this issue in
section 1.5 when presenting the results. I also discuss other limitations in section 1.6.
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answer this question, I define a “well-behaved” student as a student who has never had an offense
record during all (observed) academic years, and use the notationD1i = 0 to represent this group.65
I estimate the following model:
Yist = β40 + α41P
∗
ist + β42Gist−1 + β43X
std
ist + β44X
sch
st + β45X
std
−ist
+ φsch4s + 4ist if D1i = 0
(1.9)
where α41 captures the effect of the harshness of exclusionary school discipline on the achievement
outcomes of students who have never had an offense record. The harshness of exclusionary school
discipline in school s (P ∗ist) is approximated by the “DPI” measure P˜st, which is defined by a
“normalized” rate of out-of-school suspension assigned to all offenses in school s in academic
year t.
Since harsher exclusionary school discipline may benefit some students and harm other stu-
dents, one important concern among principals and policy-makers may be the total effects of the
disciplinary rules on achievement outcomes of all students. To evaluate the total effect, I estimate
the following model:
Yist = β50 + α51P
∗
ist + β51Dist−1 + β52Gist−1 + β53X
std
ist + β54X
sch
st + β55X
std
−ist
+ φsch5s + 5ist
(1.10)
where α51 captures the total effect of the harshness of exclusionary school discipline in a school
on the achievement outcomes of all students in the school.
The problems for recovering consistent estimates of α41 and α51 are similar as discussed be-
fore. For example, the potential punishment variable (or its proxy variable), P ∗ist (P˜st) may be
correlated with 4ist and 5ist since punishments may depend on student unobservables or envi-
ronmental shocks (that may affect “well-behaved” students’ achievement outcomes). In addition,
65Alternatively, a “well-behaved” student in an academic year t can be defined as a student who has never committed
an offense in the academic year t. However, by this definition, estimation of the effects may suffer from a more severe
selection of students.
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variables Dist−1 and Gist−1 may be endogenous in these equations.66
I use the same empirical strategies to recover consistent estimates of α41 and α51. I show the
results (for different achievement outcomes) using an IV strategy, where the IV, Zst, is constructed
by the “normalized” out-of-school suspension rates for all offenses in other schools in which the
principal team members had worked. I also show the results using two-step grouped-fixed effects
estimation. My preferred model combines both the IV strategy and the grouped-fixed effects.67
1.3.4 Discussion
The proposed approach that solves the unobserved heterogeneity problem (two-step grouped-
fixed effects) is related to, but different from, finite mixture models or other “random effect” es-
timation models, which rely on assumptions that restrict the correlation between unobserved het-
erogeneity and the covariates. In contrast, it is in close analogy with fixed effects, which leaves the
correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and other covariates unrestricted (Bonhomme
and Manresa 2015; Bonhomme et al. 2016b). Since the unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be
correlated with several observables discussed above and to be correlated with the school fixed ef-
fects or other school observables due to the non-random sorting of students into schools, a “random
effect” style approach to solve these problems would require modeling all these mechanisms and
jointly estimating the structural equations. The computation would be infeasible given our sample
size and the identification requires distribution assumptions and additional exclusion restrictions.
Furthermore, traditional student fixed effects do not work in this context because of the following
reasons. First, equations 1.2, 1.7 and 1.8 are estimated only for offending students. Students who
do not repeatedly commit offenses across years have no counterfactuals to cancel out the fixed
effects and directly adding individual indicators would result in an incidental parameters problem.
66Although, in estimating equation 1.4, I use the students who had never committed an offense to minimize the
selection issue, these students might still be a selected group that depend on the P ∗ist; for example, students who never
committed an offense might be different in terms of their unobserved heterogeneity in a school that always uses harsh
school discipline compared to a school that always uses lenient school discipline.
67Note that for equation 1.4, there is no variation of historical misbehavior outcomes. However, to define students’
group memberships, since I use the information of misbehavior outcomes conditional on all observables, the variation
still exists for the regression residues that are detailed in section 1.4.3.
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Second, the equations include lagged outcomes as explanatory variables, which requires strong
assumptions to deal with fixed effects. Third, since the school fixed effects are also included, the
transfer of students across schools causes a two-way fixed effect problem.68 The approach used
in this essay solves these problems by reducing the dimensionality of the student fixed effects and
creating the necessary counterfactuals among students in the same group.
The approach also effectively uses the information on students’ numbers of offenses of different
types, and offers a flexibility that allows the unobserved heterogeneity to change across type of
offenses and across time. This flexibility also relaxes the assumption for the validity of the IV,
which is discussed in section 1.4.1.
A problem I have not discussed yet is that student misbehaviors are not observed in the data if
they were not caught or not reported to (or by) the administrators. While it might not be an issue
for misbehaviors such as violent offenses because the catching rate should be high and reporting is
required according to state and federal statutes and state Board of Education policies, it might be
an issue for some minor misbehaviors. In this case, in equations 1.1 and 1.2, for example, when we
haveDist = 1 observed in the data, the actual event isDist = 1 andCist = 1 andRist = 1, whereC
refers to be caught andR refers to be reported. Therefore, to recover the marginal effects of interest
(the general and specific deterrence effects) in equation 1.1 and 1.2, we need to assume that the
unobserved catching or reporting probabilities are not correlated with the punishment variables,
P˜1st, P˜2st or P1ist, conditional on all other explanatory variables and school fixed effects.69 The
identification strategy adopted in this essay relaxes the assumption, which only requires that the
68For some of the outcomes, such as high-school dropout or graduate, there are no repeated outcomes for a student
to cancel out the traditional fixed effect.
69To see this, as an example, suppose we regard P ∗1st as either 1 or 0 and ignore the reporting issue to simplify the
discussion (the idea is similar with the reporting issue and with continuous P ∗1st), we have the following equation:
Pr(Dist = 1 ∩ Cist = 1|P ∗1st = 1,Ω1ist) − Pr(Dist = 1 ∩ Cist = 1|P ∗1st = 0,Ω1ist) = Pr(Cist = 1|Dist =
1, P ∗1st = 1,Ω1ist) ∗ Pr(Dist = 1|P ∗1st = 1,Ω1ist) − Pr(Cist = 1|Dist = 1, P ∗1st = 0,Ω1ist) ∗ Pr(Dist =
1|P ∗1st = 0,Ω1ist), where Ω1ist = {Dist−1, Gist−1, Xstdist , Xschst , Xstd−ist, φsch1s }. Therefore, if Pr(Cist = 1|Dist =
1, P ∗1st,Ω1ist) = Pr(Cist = 1|Dist = 1,Ω1ist), we have the above equation equal to Pr(Cist = 1|Dist = 1,Ω1ist)∗
(Pr(Dist = 1|P ∗1st = 1,Ω1ist)−Pr(Dist = 1|P ∗1st = 0,Ω1ist)), from which we can calculate the general deterrence
effect in terms of percent change: Pr(Cist = 1|Dist = 1,Ω1ist) ∗ (Pr(Dist = 1|P ∗1st = 1,Ω1ist) − Pr(Dist =
1|P ∗1st = 0,Ω1ist))/Pr(Dist = 1 ∩ Cist = 1|Ω1ist) = (Pr(Dist = 1|P ∗1st = 1,Ω1ist) − Pr(Dist = 1|P ∗1st =
0,Ω1ist))/Pr(Dist = 1|Ω1ist).
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unobserved catching or reporting probabilities are not correlated with the IV conditional on the
above variables and the student unobserved heterogeneity. There is an additional issue related to
this; that is, for some students, the observed first offense might actually be her second or third
offense. In this case, the estimated general deterrence effect α11 (α21) might capture the weighted
effects of general deterrence for the first (second) offense and further offenses.
When the treatment effects are heterogeneous, the IV strategy captures local average treatment
effects (LATE) of the specific deterrence on re-offending students’ misbehavior or of suspension on
offending students’ achievement outcomes. Since the IV is capturing the suspension propensity of
administrator teams, we can consider a simplified example with two types of administrator teams:
lenient and tough. The tough team prefers to use out-of-school suspension more than the lenient
team even for the same type of offense committed by identical students in the same school. The
differences in re-offending rates and achievement outcomes between these two teams identifies the
local average treatment effects (LATE) of the specific deterrence on re-offending or of suspension
on offending students’ achievement outcomes (Imbens and Angrist 1994). The LATE measures the
effects of punishments on students who would not be punished by the lenient team but would be
punished by the tough team (the “compliers”). Since my actual IV variable is a continuous variable,
my IV strategy identifies a weighted average of the compliers induced by each marginal change in
the IV values (Heckman and Vytlacil 2005). An important condition for the identification of the
LATE is monotonicity. It suggests that any student who is out-of-school suspended by the lenient
team would also be out-of-school suspended by the tough team, and any student who is not out-
of-school suspended by the tough team would not be out-of-school suspended by the lenient team.
For my continuous IV, the monotonicity should be satisfied for every marginal change of the IV.
While the assumption cannot be fully tested, I show some indirect evidence in the next section to
check the assumption.
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1.4 Estimation Details
1.4.1 Instrument Construction and Validity
For a student in school s in academic year t, the value of the IV is defined as:
Zst = (
1
n(Jst)
)
∑
j∈Jst
[(
1∑
k 6=s
∑
τ 6=t
∑
m
∑
r djkτnkτmr
)
∑
k 6=s
∑
τ 6=t
djkτ (
∑
m
∑
r
nkτmr(P¯kτmr−P¯mr))]
(1.11)
where j denotes jth principal (or assistant principal); Jst is the set of principals in school s in aca-
demic year t;70 n(Jst) is the number of principals in school s in academic year t; djkτ is one if prin-
cipal j has worked as a principal in school k in academic year τ , and zero otherwise; nkτmr is the
total number of m type offenses among students’ rth offenses in the school k in academic year τ ,
where rth refers to first, second, or third offenses. The summation
∑
k 6=s
∑
τ 6=t
∑
m
∑
r djkτnkτmr
represents the total number of offenses in other schools in which principal j has worked. Let P¯kτmr
be the out-of-school suspension rate for the m type misbehavior among students’ rth offenses in
school k in academic year τ , and P¯mr be the total out-of-school suspension rate for the m type
misbehavior among students’ rth offenses in the sample. Thus, P¯kτmr − P¯mr normalizes the pun-
ishments by the most important features (r and m) of offenses and captures the relative harshness
of punishments. With this normalization the IV is less likely to reflect the types of offenses that
the principals faced in other schools and, thus, more likely to reflect their preferences for or beliefs
about the harshness of punishments.71
70For most of the academic years, I do not observe the exact dates that a principal works in a school. I define
principal teams by academic year, which means that principals defined to be on one team could have worked in
non-overlapping periods of the academic year. I use at most two principals and at most five assistant principals per
school/year. If, in the academic year, there were more principals in the school, I use those who have worked the longest
time in the school in the academic year. (I observe an approximate length of time that each principal works in a school
in an academic year.)
71The IV is analogous to the average of all principal team members’ average regression residuals, where the out-
of-school suspension indicator for each offense (in other schools) is regressed on the r × m offense indicators. An
alternative approach to construct the IV is to run a regression (normalization) that also includes all other explanatory
variables and the school fixed effects to eliminate their effects on the IV. I do not take this approach in order to avoid
the “noise” introduced by the functional form of the regression, which weakens the effectiveness of the IV. Therefore,
the IV may also reflect the information found in these explanatory variables rather than the principals’ “beliefs” or
“preferences.” Because of this, I include all of these explanatory variables and school fixed effects in the estimation to
validate the IV.
31
As reported in Table 1.1, some categories (or types) of offenses were detected or reported
in only a small number of schools. I find that these categories (or types) of offenses weaken the
performance of the IV. To achieve better performance, I construct the IV using those data for which
the observed punishment is applied to well detected and reported offenses, namely the “violence”
and “disrespect” category of offenses.72 The IV is missing in some schools in some academic years
(12 percent of all student-year observations) since there were no principals or assistant principals
who had transfer experience. These student-year observations are not used for the corresponding
estimation.
In addition to the IV defined above (henceforth called the main IV), I find that instrumental
variables constructed for specific categories (or types) of offenses may have better first stage per-
formance for these categories (or types) of offenses. Therefore, I use these instrumental variables
for corresponding specifications.73 For estimating equation 1.2, I use two instrumental variables
consisting of the out-of-school suspension rates for only the first offense (r = 1) and only the
second offense (r = 2), respectively.
Conditional on the control variables, the student unobserved heterogeneity and the school fixed
effects, estimation requires that the IV affects the student’s behaviors or achievement outcomes
only through the principal teams’ punishment decisions in the current school. The sorting of prin-
cipals into schools may be a concern. For example, tough principals may be more (or less) likely
to be selected into schools with worse qualities or with more disruptive students. Since I control
for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity of students, school fixed effects and time-varying ob-
served characteristics of schools, the concern stems from time-varying unobserved school factors
that affect both students’ misbehavior decisions and the assignment of the principal teams in the
current academic year.
72The IV is constructed using data from the 2008-2009 academic year to the 2014-2015 academic year. I only use
offenses with r <= 3 to eliminate outliers.
73Using multiple IVs in these situations is typically less effective than using the best one.
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Because the concern cannot be directly tested, I explore indirect evidence, such as the correla-
tion between the IV and the time-varying observed characteristics of the school, to determine the
magnitude of the problem. I regress the main IV on time-varying observed characteristics of the
school and school fixed effects (Table 1.3). The coefficient column shows that there are only three
regressors that are statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. These are “other dis-
ciplinary infraction cases” “total number of classroom teachers,” and “PBIS Exemplar school.”74
The magnitudes of the coefficients are small. The F-statistics of jointly testing the significance of
all the time-varying observed characteristics is 1.55 with p-value 0.0069. The p-value increases
to 0.0974 if the test does not include “other disciplinary infraction cases,” and “total number of
classroom teachers” variables. The correlation between school time-varying observables and the
IV suggests that there is no strong evidence that time-varying unobserved characteristics are cor-
related with the IV. Since the regressors include many school quality measures in the academic
year of concern, the result also suggests that it is less likely that an administrator’s out-of-school
suspension propensity reflects her other abilities that could directly affect students’ behavior or
achievement outcomes. However, the fact that there are some significant correlations indicates that
including the time-varying observed school characteristics is important for the validity of the IV. In
robustness checks, I find, for other constructed IVs used in separate estimations for different cat-
egories (or types) of misbehaviors, the correlation between the IV and the time-varying observed
school characteristics is generally smaller.
I expect the effect of the IV on the out-of-school suspension decision to be positive, since
“tougher” principal teams (proxied by their out-of-school suspension rate in other schools) should
be more likely to use out-of-school suspension in the current school. As discussed in the last
section, the monotonicity assumption of the IV suggests that the effect (of each margin) of the IV
on the punishment for each offense should be non-negative. That is, the “tougher” principal team
would be more likely (or equally likely) to use out-of-school suspension for any offenses. While
74PBIS means positive behavior intervention and support.
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the assumption cannot be directly tested, indirect evidence, such as the effects of the IV on the out-
of-school suspension decisions for different types of offenses, could be used to infer the plausibility
of the assumption. To check the monotonicity assumption and the first stage performance of the
IV, I run the following OLS regressions:
P1ist = γ0 + γ1Zist + γ2Ωist + φ
sch,γ
s + θ
γ
gˆist
+ γist (1.12)
where P1ist is the punishment assigned for the first offense of student i in school s in academic
year t, and Zist is the main IV;75 Ωist is the vector of control variables, which include Gist−1,
Dist−1, Xstdist , X
sch
st , X
std
−ist.
76 To infer the monotonicity of the IV, I separately run the first stage
regression for each type of offense to check the sign of γ1, which I expect to be positive. Table
1.4 shows the coefficients (γ1) for each of the regressions with the type of offense listed in the
first column. I include only the types of offenses with more than 4000 observations, since all
of the coefficients for the types of offenses with less than 4000 observations are not statistically
significant. The coefficient column shows that the IV performs well for most type of offenses,
especially for the types of offenses in the “violence” and “disrespect” categories. At the 5 percent
significance level, the IV has positive effects for twelve types of offenses. There are two types of
offenses with negative effects at the five percent significance level. These variables are “excessive
tardiness” and “late to class.” As discussed in the data section, it is very likely that consequences
for these categories were not well reported. The reporting issue might be the reason that the IV has
negative effects on the rate of out-of-school suspension in these categories. Therefore, to improve
the plausibility of the monotonicity assumption, I do not include students with these two types of
offenses in the offender group in the related specifications. I separately estimate the deterrence
effect for the “excessive tardiness” offense by using the IV constructed using suspension decisions
75I only use the punishment for first offenses because a large part of my first stage regressions only involve the
punishment for the first offense. I find that the results are generally consistent by using the first, the second, and the
third offenses of students in the academic year.
76I also try other specifications of the first stage equations according to the different specifications discussed in the
empirical strategy section. The results are consistent.
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for “excessive tardiness” offenses only, which has a positive first stage coefficient.77 In a robustness
check, I find evidence that instrumental variables constructed using the same category offenses
only have better performance in terms of the monotonicity for these categories. This finding is one
motivation for separately estimating the deterrence effects by offense categories.78
The last row of the table shows the coefficient, γ1, from the regression that uses observations of
all types of misbehaviors, which informs the first stage regression for some of my specifications.79
The F-statistic for testing γ1 = 0 in the regression is 86, which is well above the rule of thumb for
testing weak instruments.80
1.4.2 Disciplinary Punishment Index Construction
Potential punishments for misbehaviors (P ∗1ist, P
∗
2ist, P
∗
ist) are not observed for each student. As
mentioned in section 1.3, I use “normalized” rates of out-of-school suspension within a school/year
(P˜1st, P˜2st or P˜st) to approximate them. I refer to these proxies as “Disciplinary Punishment
Indexes (DPI).” The DPI for the rth (1st or 2nd) offense of a student in school s in academic year
t is defined by:
P˜rst =
1∑
m nrmst
[
∑
m
nrmst(P¯rmst − P¯rm)] (1.13)
where nrmst denotes the number of type m offenses among students’ rth offenses in school s in
academic year t;
∑
m nrmst calculates the total number of rth offenses in school s in academic
year t; P¯rmst is the out-of-school suspension rate for type m offenses among students’ rth offenses
in school s in academic year t; and P¯rm is the out-of-school suspension rate for m type offenses
among rth offenses in the sample. Similar to the construction of the IV, the normalization allows
the measure to reflect the severity of the punishments in the school but not the severity of offenses
77I did not find a valid IV for the “late to class” offenses.
78I also do robustness checks for the effects of suspension on achievement outcomes by separately estimating the
effects using different categories of misbehaviors.
79The estimation is with “type of misbehavior” as an additional control variable. The estimation results only change
slightly between including or not including “excessive tardiness” and “late to class” offenses.
80Since first stage estimations are different across my different empirical models, I report these first stage results
separately with my other estimation results in the following subsections or in the appendix.
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in the school.
P˜st is constructed in an analogous manner by using the out-of-school suspension decisions
for all the first, second and third offenses of students in an academic year.81 The DPI for each
category of offense and some selected types of offenses are also constructed by using the out-of-
school suspension decisions for same category (or type) offenses of students. In addition, I also
separately construct DPI for black and white students by only using the punishments for black and
white students, respectively.82
The DPI is used as a proxy variable for the potential punishment for each student in the school
in the academic year. For the schools without offenses, the DPI is missing. This unobservability
suggests that my estimation results for general deterrence effects might not be applicable to the
schools with no offense cases in the academic year. The DPI may not be a good proxy if it is
constructed by only few observations. Therefore, in most of the estimation specifications, I drop
schools with less than five offenses.
Note that P˜1st, P˜2st and P˜st approximate the actual punishments for would-be offenders with
measurement errors. That is,
P ∗1ist = P˜1st + e1ist (1.14)
P ∗2ist = P˜2st + e2ist (1.15)
P ∗ist = P˜st + eist (1.16)
To achieve consistent estimates, my preferred model assumes that the instrumental variables
are not correlated with the measurement errors (e1ist, e2ist, eist), conditional on the controls, school
fixed effects and student grouped fixed effects.
81As discussed in the last section, the offenses of type “excessive tardiness” and “late to class” are not included in
this calculation.
82The DPI for all offenses or the DPI at the category level typically have a mean close to zero, and standard
deviations from 0.2 to 0.4. Note that the range of DPI could be larger than 1, but the DPI values that are outside a
range of 1 are rare cases.
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1.4.3 Student Unobserved Heterogeneity
As mentioned in section 1.3, I use a two-step approach to capture the student unobserved het-
erogeneity. The first step is to partition all I students into G groups. In the second step, the group-
specific fixed effects are estimated with all other parts of the models by imputing the estimated
group memberships of students into the models.
Specifically, in the first step, the partition problem is:
min
g(1),...,g(I),θ1,...,θG
I∑
i=1
t¯∑
t=1
C∑
c=1
(Dcist − βˆctΩ′ist − φˆsch,cst − θcgist)2 (1.17)
where g(i) indicates that student i is assigned to group g; later, I use gi to denote the assigned
group of student i. The vector θg = (θ1g1, . . . , θ
C
g1, . . . , θ
1
gt¯, . . . , θ
C
gt¯) contains the mean value of each
feature in each academic year among students in group g. The mean value of the cth feature in
academic year t among students in group g is θcgit.
The cth feature of student i in academic year t is defined by the expressionDcist−βˆctΩ′ist−φˆsch,cst .
It requires that I regress the cth outcome of student i in academic year t, Dcist (the frequency of
the cth category offense of student i in academic year t), on a vector of control variables, Ω′ist,
and school-year-category fixed effects in order to obtain estimated values, βˆct and φˆ
sch,c
st .83 The
regressions are run separately for each category of offense, c, in each academic year, t. The
control variables, Ω′ist, includeGist−1, Dist−1, X
std
ist andX
std
−ist.
84 The expression for the cth feature,
Dcist − βˆctΩ′ist − φˆsch,cst , equals the regression residuals, which are used to partition students.
The regressions are similar to the reduced form of equations 1.1 and 1.2, but the dependent
variables (the frequencies of each category of offense of a student within an academic year) ag-
gregate the information of the “first offense” and “second offense” and gains further efficiency
83If student i has transfer experience within academic year t, her school, s, is defined by the one in which most of
her offense records come from.
84School time-varying observables are not included since school time-varying effects are captured by φˆsch,cst .
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by using information on third and more offenses of this student in the academic year.85 The re-
gression residuals reflect the additional factors that influence a student’s misbehaviors (i.e., factors
other than observed characteristics of the student and observed and unobserved characteristics of
the school). Common patterns among these additional factors are used to identify a student’s group
membership. That is, they reflect students’ unobserved types.
The partition problem is solved by a k-means algorithm that proceeds by alternating between
“assignment” and “updating.” The “assignment” step assigns group memberships for all students;
the “updating” step updates the new mean, θ, of each group. The group membership of student i
is solved by:
gˆi = argmin
g∈{1,...,G}
t¯∑
t=1
C∑
c=1
(Dcist − βˆctΩ′ist − φˆsch,cst − θcgt)2 (1.18)
The partition task is designed to classify students by C × t¯ features captured by the regression
residuals. The fact that data are not available for all students in all academic years creates a
complication. Only using students with all years of data may create a selection problem if, for
example, students who were offenders or who were suspended have fewer years of data. Therefore,
I group the students by the number of academic years they contribute, and separately classify
students within the same “observed years of data” group into more groups defined by the algorithm.
The classification may be not fully efficient because it forces students with different numbers of
academic years of data to be classified into different groups. However, following the spirit of
Bonhomme and Manresa (2015), the fact that it generates more groups reduces the biases of the
common parameters that I estimate.86
85Note that the school-year-category fixed effect soaks up all information in the IV in the reduced form estimation
of equations 1.1 and 1.2.
86My sample of students are followed for five academic years. In a robustness check, I find that a partition task that
only uses students with three or more academic years of data produces similar final estimation results to the discussed
task. Bonhomme et al. (2016b) suggest that, based on a set of assumptions, different moments and specifications could
be used as features for the partition when the moments provide information about the student’s group membership.
Therefore, I could also add, for example, academic achievement outcomes of students as additional features. Bon-
homme et al. (2016a) also show that, with bias reduction, the clustering method could achieve satisfying identification
without finite group assumption of the heterogeneity.
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I classify each sample of students (with the same observed years of data) into ten groups.87
Since there are five years of data in the sample, I have fifty groups of students. Because the k-
means algorithm is sensitive to the choice of initial value, I use 500 random initial values to select
the classification with the best performance. About 45 percent of students contribute data all five
academic years; I use this sample to illustrate the classification results. In total, there are twelve
categories of offenses used for the classification; therefore, for students with five academic years
of data, their classification is based on sixty (C × t¯) features.
In Figure 1.1, I show trends of the frequencies of each category of offense across years for each
group of students. Each graph represents each of the twelve categories of offenses. Each line color
represents each of the ten student groups. Students in different groups are observed to behave quite
differently, which shows the efficiency of the classification. The group represented by the yellow
line has low numbers for each category of offense, suggesting that it is a rarely misbehaved group
of students; in contrast, some other groups of students misbehave frequently across each category
of offense or across years. These groups might capture the groups of students that are not sensitive
to punishments. In addition, there are groups of students with offense frequencies that fluctuate
across academic years (or across offense categories).
1.5 Results
In this section, I present estimation results. In addition to the results from my preferred esti-
mation strategy, I also show results from other specifications that incrementally address the endo-
geneity and selection issues so that we can learn about the source of any bias.
1.5.1 Results for Deterrence Effects
Table 1.5 reports estimates of α11 in equation 1.1 – the “general deterrence effects” for the first
offense.88 While the rows show the results for different categories of misbehavior, the columns
compare the results from different estimation strategies. I begin with results for “all offenses” (row
87As a robustness check, I also classify each sample of students into five groups or fifteen groups, which shows that
the major results are robust to these specifications.
88The estimates for other coefficients of equation 1.1 are reported in the appendix.
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1), which should be interpreted with caution for the following reasons.89 First, the estimates may
reflect the effects for some types of misbehaviors that mostly contribute to the variations of the
DPI.90 Second, the estimates may reflect the effects for offense types punished by discipline deci-
sions that are mostly affected by the IV.91 In rows 2-6, I report the results for different categories
of misbehavior.92
The first method (OLS) is an OLS model with all control variables and school fixed effects. The
second method (OLS&GFE) adds controls for student unobserved heterogeneity; I use the term
“grouped fixed effects” (GFE) to represent the student unobserved heterogeneity, which follows
the terminology used by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015). The estimates from these two methods
suggest that the “general deterrence effect” is statistically significant for most of the categories.
The OLS&GFE estimates are slightly, but statistically significantly, different from the OLS esti-
mates for “all offenses,” “violence” and “disrespect,” which shows that the additional controls for
student unobserved heterogeneity may address some biases in estimation. However, as discussed
before, the bias caused by some types of unobserved factors (e.g., environmental shocks) might
not be addressed by these controls. Therefore, I further address these issues by instrumenting for
the DPI variable, the key explanatory variable. The third method (2SLS) instruments for the DPI
variable, but does not include controls for student unobserved heterogeneity; the fourth method
89For “all offense” sample, the key explanatory variable, the DPI, is constructed by the suspension decisions for
students’ first offenses in an academic year; the offense could be any type of misbehavior. The dependent variable is
the indicator that the student committed first offense (any type) in the academic year. As discussed in section 1.4.1, the
offense types “excessive tardiness” and “late to class” are not used for constructing the DPI or the offense indicator.
90Since the DPI reflects weighted deviations of the schools’ suspension rates (for a type of misbehavior) from the
average suspension rates in all schools, some serious offenses that all schools assign suspensions to, for example,
would contribute little to the variation. In addition, the DPI (for all offenses) for different schools is calculated by
different types of misbehaviors due to the different reporting rates, catching rates and offense rates for them across
schools, which means that the estimates should be interpreted with caution.
91Using “all offenses” is also less likely to satisfy the monotonicity assumption. Although my endogenous variable
is continuous, the underlying intuition of monotonicity generalizes to this case.
92The DPI measure for a category of misbehavior is constructed by using only the suspension decisions for students’
first offenses of the category of misbehavior. The dependent variables are whether or not the student committed the
first offense of the category of misbehavior in the academic year.
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(2SLS&GFE) adds controls for student unobserved heterogeneity. The first stage (adjusted) F-
statistics for these estimates are all well above the rule of the thumb for testing for weak instru-
ments, and are reported in the appendix (Stock and Yogo 2005). Note that 2SLS and 2SLS&GFE
estimates all suggest higher “general deterrence effects,” which are statistically different from the
OLS and OLS&GFE estimates.93 The results may suggest that 2SLS and 2SLS&GFE estimation
methods provide additional reductions in bias. Another possible explanation is that these IV es-
timates may capture some “local” effects for some types of offenses or some subpopulations of
students if the IV only affects the discipline decisions for them. The 2SLS&GFE estimates are
different from 2SLS estimates (but the differences are not statistically significant), which shows
that including “grouped-fixed effects” may further address some estimation issues.
The last column shows means of the dependent variables, which capture average (reported)
offense rates in the estimation sample. By dividing the coefficients by the means, my preferred
estimates (from the model 2SLS & GFE) suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the out-of-
school suspension likelihood index could reduce the mean rate of a student committing any type
of offense in a year by about 15.6 percent, “violence” offenses by about 13 percent, “disrespect”
offenses by about 11.5 percent, “truancy” offenses by about 22 percent, and “drug” offenses by
about 18 percent.94 The estimate is not statistically significant for the “property” category. A
possible explanation might be that the low offense rate of this category makes the DPI measure
less precise and identification of the effect more difficult (although the empirical framework may
address part of the measurement error problem).
93Since one way to interpret the correlation between the environmental shocks and the punishments is through
“reverse causality,” and harsher discipline rules are more likely to be used for the school/year with higher offense rates
or more severe offenses, intuitively, OLS and OLS&GFE estimates might understate the improvement achieved by
harsher discipline rules.
94Although I use the average reported offense rate to calculate these percentages, interpretation of them may gener-
alize to percentages of real offense rate reduction (observed and unobserved) under the assumption that my empirical
strategy effectively addresses the related econometric issues. As discussed in the data section, the results for the drug
category should be interpreted with caution because there might be additional punishments for these types of offenses.
A robustness check shows that the estimate is not statistically significant for the drug category after controlling for the
same-grade peers’ drug offense rate, which captures the direct general deterrence effects (without effects that work
through peer effects). The robustness check is also done for other categories.
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To further explore the sources of the effects, I estimate α11 for different types of misbehaviors,
in which the DPI for a type of misbehavior is constructed by using the suspension decisions for
the specific offense type only. In Table 1.6, I show the results for types with the highest offense
rates because the estimate is typically not statistically significant for types with lower offense rates.
The estimates indicate significant “general deterrence effects” for most of the offense types. The
changing patterns of estimates across estimation methods are consistent with the patterns in Table
1.5. My preferred estimation method (2SLS&GFE) shows that the “general deterrence effects”
are heterogeneous across different types of misbehaviors. They are high for offense type “aggres-
sive behavior,” “insubordination,” and “inappropriate language” – a 10 percentage point increase
in the out-of-school suspension likelihood could reduce the mean offense rate for these types by
about 30-40 percent. The percent reduction is about 12 percent for “skipping class,” 20 percent for
“disruptive behavior,” 7.5 percent for “disrespect to faculty,” and 16 percent for “excessive tardi-
ness.”95 It is not statistically significant for the “fighting” offense. The heterogeneity in response
may stem from the differences in motivation, nature, or characteristics of offenders for these of-
fenses. Another possible explanation is that the heterogeneity may be partly due to differences in
average out-of-school suspension rates assigned for these offenses, which are shown in Table 1.1.96
Finally, these results should be interpreted with caution as the offense rate for each offense type is
relatively low, which makes the DPI measure less precise and the identification of the effect more
difficult.
To further explore the potential heterogeneity of the general deterrence effect, I present esti-
mates stratified by student observables (Table 1.7). The DPI measures are constructed by using the
suspension decisions for the students with the corresponding observables. I present only the results
for the well reported “violence” and “disrespect” categories because DPI measures are less precise
95The percent reduction is calculated by dividing the coefficients by the means of dependent variables.
96A 10 percentage point increase in the suspension rate might mean a much harsher discipline when the current
average suspension rate is low; in addition, the reported average suspension rate may also represent the “severity”
of these types of offenses, which may suggest that the heterogeneity partly contributes to the severity of offenses.
However, the correlation between the average suspension rate and the general deterrence effect is not quite clear.
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and the estimates are more likely to suffer from a weak instruments problem after the sample is
conditioned on a particular student characteristic.
The differences between OLS&GFE and 2SLS&GFE estimates are consistent with the pat-
terns discussed in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6. My preferred estimates (2SLS&GFE) find statistically
significant “general deterrence effects” for most of the student subpopulations, and the effects
are heterogeneous. First, I find that “general deterrence effects” are not statistically significant
(and with small coefficients) for high school violent behavior, and elementary school disrespectful
behavior.97 Second, I find that the “general deterrence effects” might be higher (in terms of the per-
cent reduction of mean rate) for white students than black students – a 10 percentage point increase
in the suspension likelihood index reduces the mean offense rate of “violence” and “disrespect”
behaviors for white students by about 16 percent and 24 percent, and by 11 percent and 9 percent
for black students. In addition, I find that, in terms of the percent reduction of mean rate, the ef-
fects are smaller for female students than male students, smaller for economically disadvantaged
students than those not economically disadvantaged, smaller (and not statistically significant) for
“violence” offenses of students with lagged math scores below (or equal) the average than those
with lagged math scores above the average.98
Table 1.8 reports estimates of the general deterrence effect (α21) and the specific deterrence
effect (α22) for students’ second offenses in an academic year (equation 1.2), which are estimated
separately by offense category.99 The table includes results for the better reported “violence” and
“disrespect” categories, and for the “truancy” category. I show the results for other categories
or types of offenses in Table A1 in the appendix. Most of the OLS and OLS&GFE estimates
97A robustness check by controlling for offense rates of all types of peers’ misbehaviors also finds that the effects
are relative low (but statistically significant) for the disrespectful behavior of high school students.
98The percent reduction is calculated by dividing the coefficients by the means of dependent variables (the fourth
number in each cell). Again, the heterogeneity should be interpreted with caution because of the following reasons.
First, some of the differences are not statistically significant. Second, some of them are mostly due to the differences
in the mean offense rates. Third, the DPI variables may less precisely reflect the punishment severity in the school
because they are constructed with less observations.
99The DPI variable, P˜2st, is constructed by only using students’ second offenses of the category in the academic
year.
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suggest statistically significant positive “general deterrence effects” for students’ second offenses.
However, the estimates for α22 suggest that the “specific deterrence effect” is negative for “vio-
lence” offenses and it is positive but small for “disrespect” and “truancy” offenses. The OLS&GFE
estimate suggests that for “disrespect,” for example, the suspension experience itself could only re-
duce the mean rate of the student’s re-offending by less than 2 percent. The 2SLS and 2SLS&GFE
estimates suggest that both “general deterrence effects” and “specific deterrence effects” are not
statistically significant.100 However, one problem with these estimates is that the collinearity be-
tween α21 and α22 is severe because the IV method reduces the variation of P˜2st and P1ist in the
second stage estimation. This reduced variation inflates the standard errors and the magnitude of
these estimates; therefore, the inference is less precise and the results should be interpreted with
caution.101
I further explore the efficacy of “general deterrence,” α21, by estimating equation 1.2 separately
for student-observations that were out-of-school suspended for their first offenses (p1ist = 1) and
those that were not out-of-school suspended for their first offenses (p1ist = 0).102 Table 1.9 shows
the estimates of α21 using these specifications for the “violence,” “disrespect,” and “truancy” cate-
gories. I show the results for other categories and types of offenses in Table A2 of the appendix.
My preferred estimates (2SLS&GFE) suggest that the “general deterrence effects” are not sta-
tistically significant for students who were out-of-school suspended for their first offenses in the
academic year. They are also not statistically significant for the “violence” and “truancy” category
offenses for students who were not suspended.103 In addition, I find that the effect is statistically
significant for the second “disrespect” offenses of students who were not suspended for their first
offenses. However, the estimate suggests a smaller effect compared to the effect for students’ first
100F-tests also show that they are jointly not statistically significant.
101Robustness checks, by instrumenting only one of these endogenous variables, yield similar results.
102By this specification, I could estimate the “general deterrence effects” without adding P1ist as an explanatory
variable in the regression, which solves the collinearity problem.
103The large coefficients and standard errors for the “truancy” category for these estimates are because the first stage
performances of the IV are relative weak, with (adjusted) F-statistics of about 7 and 10.
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“disrespect” offenses – a 10 percentage point increase in the suspension likelihood index reduces
the mean rate of re-offending of “disrespect” offenses by about 8 percent.
1.5.2 Results for the Effects on Achievement Outcomes
Table 1.10 reports estimates of α31 and α′31– the effects of out-of-school suspension experience
on offending students’ achievement outcomes. The outcomes (dependent variables) include end-
of-grade math score, a dropout indicator (finally graduate or drop out from high school) and ACT
composite score.104 The “dropout” dependent variable is whether or not the grade 9 student finally
drops out from high school, which may happen in any future grades.105 I estimate how it is affected
by the student’s suspension experience in grade 9. In robustness checks, I find that the results are
robust to the specifications that use students’ suspension experience in grade 9-10 or grade 9-12. I
mainly focus on interpreting the results for grade 9 because adding student observations in higher
grades may create additional dynamic selection problems, which may make interpretation of the
results less clear.106 For estimation using ACT composite scores as the outcome, I use student-year
observations in grade 9-10 who have their final ACT composite scores.107 In a robustness check, I
find that the results are similar when I use student observations in grade 9 only.
Columns 2-6 report results using different estimators (for α31) where the key explanatory vari-
able is an indicator of whether or not the student was ever suspended out-of-school during the
academic year. To compare my methods/results with those from the exiting literature, I begin with
OLS regressions that include controls for school-level observables and school fixed effects only.
The results in Column 2 are from a regression using all students (not only offending students);
104The end-of-grade math scores are normalized to have a zero mean and standard deviation of one among students
who took the same tests across the state.
105In North Carolina, students can drop out of high school at 16 years old.
106The problem is that the offending students in grade 10 who did not drop out at the end of grade 9 may be a selected
group, such as a relatively better behaved group in the offending student population. Although by assumption, my
preferred estimation strategy may address the problem for estimating α31 and α′31 for observed offending students in
grade 10 (or higher grade), but the concern that they may be the relatively better behaved group, for example, suggests
that extrapolating these estimates to all offending students should be done with caution.
107The choice is mainly based on the data availability, which was discussed in section 1.2.
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it compares the achievement outcomes of students who had experienced suspension to a control
group that includes both students who had an offense record but were not suspended and students
who did not have an offense record in the academic year. A suspension experience decreases grade
3-8 students’ end-of-grade math scores by about 0.2 standard deviations. Suspension experience in
grade 9 increases the dropout probability by about 18.5 percentage points. Suspension experience
in grade 9-10 also lowers ACT composite scores by about 1.1 points. One problem with interpre-
tation of these effects is that, among students in the control group, those who did not commit an
offense are not at risk of suspension. To measure the causal effect of suspension on outcomes, we
may desire to focus on students facing the possibility of being suspended. Beginning with Column
3, I limit the estimation sample to students who had an offense record in the academic year and
label them “offending students.”108 Column 3 reports the results with the same controls as column
2 but uses the “offending students” sample. The results indicate smaller negative effects of suspen-
sion for all three achievement outcome measures, which suggests that using a more representative
sample may solve some selection issues. To further reduce the endogeneity and selection biases, I
add all student-level controls discussed in section 1.4 and report the results in the “OLS with full
controls” column. The results indicate much smaller negative effects of suspension – a suspen-
sion experience reduces students’ end-of-grade math scores by about 0.013 standard deviations,
and ACT composite scores by about 0.21 points. It increases the dropout probability by about 7.2
percentage points. These effects fall even more (to 0.012 standard deviations, 0.17 points, and 5
percentage points) after adding an additional control for student unobserved heterogeneity (“OLS
& GFE” column).
When I address the estimation biases by instrumenting for the suspension decision (2SLS and
2SLS&GFE), I find that the effects for all three outcomes are not statistically significant.109 The
108Although the sample of offending students does not include students who committed an offense but did not get a
record, it should be more representative of the “at risk for punishment” students than the “all students” sample.
109The first stage (adjusted) F-statistics for the IV are 65 and 74 for the 2SLS and 2SLS&GFE estimates of end-
of-grade math test scores, 26 for the 2SLS and 2SLS&GFE estimates of dropout indicator, and 17 for the 2SLS and
2SLS&GFE estimates of ACT composite scores.
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estimates for end-of-grade math and dropout probability also change signs. The results should
be interpreted as the effects of suspension on achievement outcomes of students on the margin of
suspension - the compliers. The large standard errors of the estimates also suggest using caution in
interpretation. However, the results from all estimates consistently show that the negative correla-
tion between suspension experience and students’ end-of-grade math scores or dropout probability
become smaller once I further address the endogeneity and selection biases. These findings sug-
gest that the correlation is largely (or completely) explained by the correlation between observed
or unobserved factors of students (or offenses) and these achievement outcome measures.
Some additional information suggest that the results for ACT scores should be undertaken with
caution. First, since the ACT is required for students in grade 11, offending students who drop out
before the test do not generate observed test scores. Therefore, the students who have the scores
may be a selected group and extrapolating the estimates to all offending students should be done
cautiously. An additional concern is that the suspension decision may induce students with differ-
ent unobserved factors to drop out at different rates, which may imply that the offending students
who have both ACT scores and suspension experience have different unobserved factors than of-
fenders who had ACT scores but did not experience suspension.110 Because the student unobserved
heterogeneity is mostly identified by students’ misbehavior information but not dropout decisions
(which cannot be repeatedly observed), the unobserved heterogeneity in this dimension might not
be captured. However, my estimation for the dropout may indicate that this concern is not severe
because the suspension experience might not significantly affect students’ dropout probability.
In the last two columns of Table 1.10, I provide the estimates (for α′31) with the key explana-
tory variable being an indicator of whether the student was suspended for her first offense in that
academic year.111 As introduced in section 1.3, the specification controls for students’ offense fre-
quencies in the previous academic year instead of in the academic year of concern. These estimates
110In this case, the difference of ACT scores between those who have or did not have suspension experience may be
a reflection of these unobserved factors but not the “causal effects” of suspension.
111I find that the results are robust to only using students who were suspended for their first “violence” and “disre-
spect” offenses.
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may capture both the direct effect and the indirect effect of suspension on achievement outcomes
resulting from the offending students’ behavior changes in the current academic year. Estimates
from the preferred model (2SLS& GFE) suggest that the effects are not statistically significant,
which is consistent with the previous findings.112
One interesting question is whether the effects of suspension on achievement are different for
black and white students. Table 1.11 provides results from models estimated separately for black
and white students. Each of the four models (Columns 2-5) uses the full set of control variables
and the indicator of whether the student was ever suspended out-of-school during the academic
year as the key explanatory variable. The OLS&GFE estimates suggest that the negative effects of
suspension on all three achievement outcomes are larger for white students than for black students.
The 2SLS and 2SLS&GFE estimates suggest that the effects of suspension experience on end-of-
grade math scores and dropout probability are not statistically significant for either black or white
students.113 The 2SLS estimate suggests that the negative effect on white students’ ACT scores is
about 3.3 points, which is statistically significant at the 10% confidence level. The 2SLS&GFE
point estimate shows that the negative effect on white students’ ACT scores is about 2.9 points, but
it is not statistically significant.114
While these results illustrate the effects of suspension experience on offending students’ achieve-
ment outcomes, I further explore the effects of exclusionary school discipline on achievement out-
comes of students with no offense record and the overall effects on all students’ achievement.
112The large standard errors and point estimates for ACT scores are likely due to a weak instruments problem. The
(adjusted) F-statistics of the IV in the first stage regression is only about 3.
113The first stage (adjusted) F-statistic for the IV is 50 for black students’ end-of-grade math scores, and 7 for white
students’ end-of-grade math scores. In addition, the first stage (adjusted) F-statistic for the IV is 6 for white students’
dropout probability and 13 for black students’ dropout probability. The IV is relatively weak for white students;
however, I find that the results are robust by using different specifications for white students.
114 A robustness check using student unobserved heterogeneity that does not change across time suggest the estimate
for white students’ ACT scores is statistically significant at 10% confidence level. The same robustness checks are
done for all other estimates, and show that other results are robust. The large standard error for 2SLS and 2SLS&GFE
estimates for black students’ ACT scores is because of the weak instruments problem; the first stage (adjusted) F-
statistic for the IV is only about 1. The F-statistic for white students’ ACT scores are about 22;
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As discussed before, these effects may encompass students’ and peers’ behavior changes result-
ing from the “general or specific deterrence effects” or from the “incapacitation effect.” Table
1.12 reports estimates of α41 and α51.115 Again, I separately report OLS, OLS&GFE, 2SLS, and
2SLS&GFE estimates in different columns.116 Estimates from my preferred model (2SLS&GFE)
show that the effect is not statistically significant for end-of-grade math scores, dropout probabili-
ties and ACT composite scores of “all students.” In addition, the effect is not statistically significant
for dropout probabilities and ACT composite scores of students with no offense record.117 How-
ever, I find that the effect is positive and statistically significant for the end-of-grade math scores of
middle school students with no offense record. A 10 percentage point increase in the suspension
likelihood index could increase the end-of-grade math scores of “well behaved” middle school
students by about 0.02 standard deviations.
To further explore whether the overall effects are heterogeneous by racial group, Table 1.13
reports estimation results for white and black students by splitting the sample. The 2SLS&GFE
estimates suggest that harsher school discipline has a positive overall effect on middle school white
students’ end-of-grade math scores. A 10 percentage point increase in the suspension likelihood
index increases the end-of-grade math scores of middle school white students by about 0.028
standard deviations. I do not find such evidence for middle school black students’ end-of-grade
math scores.118
115A student with no offense record means that she does not have any offense record in my sample period. I only
include students with no offense record at least for three academic years to make sure that they are “well behaved.”
For the achievement outcome measures “dropout” and “ACT composite scores,” I also drop students with any offense
record in 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 academic year.
116All of the estimates are with a full set of control variables. The key explanatory variable, P˜st, is constructed by
using “normalized” suspension rates for students’ first, second, and third offenses in the academic year. As discussed
before, “excessive tardiness” and “late to class” are not included into this calculation.
117The larger negative coefficients for ACT composite scores suggest that one should interpret the results for ACT
scores with caution.
118The (adjusted) F-statistics for the IV in the first stage regression is about 7 for middle school black students’
end-of-grade math scores.
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1.6 Conclusions
Exclusionary school discipline techniques are widely criticized for their inability to improve
students’ behavior and for their adverse effects on students’ achievement outcomes. However, I
find that disciplinary rules exhibiting a higher out-of-school suspension likelihood could signif-
icantly deter students from committing first offenses. Estimates from my preferred estimation
method also suggest that the adverse effects of out-of-school suspension experience on offending
students’ end-of-grade test scores and high school dropout probability are not statistically sig-
nificant. Moreover, contrary to Perry and Morris (2014), I find that disciplinary rules with higher
out-of-school suspension likelihood could improve the end-of-grade math scores of “well behaved”
middle school students. The results imply that policies that reduce or remove suspension options
from schools should carefully consider these benefits of the disciplinary practice. Particularly,
policies that focus on reducing out-of-school suspension rates for minority groups may increase
offense rates of these minority groups. The results also suggest that, contrary to the existing liter-
ature (e.g., Morris and Perry (2016)), there is no evidence that the suspension disparity between
white and black students creates crucial black-white achievement gap.
However, my estimates also suggest that the disciplinary practice is less effective or ineffec-
tive for repeat offending students, especially for students who have had suspension experience.
Since repeat offenses account for a large portion of all infractions, the results suggest that it is
important to find a more effective approach to deal with them. I also find suggestive evidence
that the disciplinary practice might be less effective or ineffective for some types of (first) offenses
among certain student subpopulations, such as high school students’ violent behavior. Therefore,
alternative approaches to deal with these offenses are also important.
When interpreting the results, several caveats should be kept in mind. First, when heteroge-
neous effects are in play, my preferred method may be more likely to capture weighted average
effects for “compliers” (the students who were, or would be, punished differently because they
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were assigned to principal teams with different out-of-school suspension propensities).119 Never-
theless, positive general deterrence effects are consistently found for different categories (or types)
of misbehaviors and for different students’ subpopulations. The results also consistently show that
the documented negative effects of suspension experience on end-of-grade math scores or dropout
probability are largely due to endogeneity or selection.
Second, since students’ out-of-school misbehaviors are not observed in my data, the analysis
does not capture the potential effects of exclusionary school discipline in that dimension. There-
fore, my estimates may understate the costs of suspensions (or overstate the benefits of them) if
they lead to increases in these unobserved misbehaviors.120
In addition, since I simplify the punishment as “out-of-school suspension” or not and most of
the out-of-school suspensions are short-term, the results for the effects of suspension experience
on achievement outcomes are more likely to capture the effects from comparing short-term out-of-
school suspensions with other less severe punishments. Therefore, the results may not completely
capture the achievement loss of students who were suspended for a long time, and they might also
not represent the effects of out-of-school suspension compared to no punishment at all.
119The effects on these students may be particularly interesting for policy making, as they may be the student group
for which different policies suggest different punishments.
120One example is that, compared to the alternative punishments (e.g., no punishment, detention, in-school sus-
pension), out-of-school suspension might be more likely to lead students to commit offenses off-campus. Then, my
estimation does not capture this part of social costs. If these off-campus offenses substitute the students observed
(detected and reported) in-school offenses, my estimates might also overstate the deterrence effects for in-school mis-
behaviors.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Selected Categories of Offenses
Total Number Percent of Offending Students Percent of Schools
Offense of Incidents who receive OSS with any reported offense
for 1st offense for 2nd offense among academic years
Offense Category
Violence 584,566 63.6 64.3 93.0
Disrespect 902,248 29.4 34.9 86.4
Truancy 343,896 17.8 24.7 48.7
Drug 75,072 59.1 58.1 42.0
Property 63,075 53.1 58.2 71.0
Other 1,981,559 17.2 17.2 91.2
Offense Type
Fighting 198,547 84.9 83.4 77.3
Aggressive Behavior 189,695 44.9 47.2 75.8
Disrespect to Faculty 206,862 34.5 40.8 67.5
Insubordination 435,622 27.5 30.5 62.1
Inappropriate Language 259,337 35.5 41.9 77.3
Skipping Class 204,914 14.4 20.9 38.1
Disruptive Behavior 753,064 23.6 25.2 82.3
Excessive Tardiness 309,018 8.0 8.9 24.3
Note: Column 2 lists the total number of incidents for each category (or type) of offense in the sample. Column 3 (Column
4) lists the percentages of students in the academic year who were punished by out-of-school suspension (or expulsion) for
the first (second) offense in each category. Column 5 lists percentages of schools with any reported offense in each category
among academic year. The total number of school-year observations is 11,425. Type “fighting” and “aggressive behavior” are
in the “violence” category; type “disrespect to faculty,” “insubordination,” and “inappropriate language” are in the “disrespect”
category; type “skipping class” is in the “truancy” category; type “disruptive behavior” and “excessive tardiness” are from the
“other” category.
52
Table 1.2: Sample Means of Student Characteristics
Student-Year Sample with
No Offense Record Any Offense Record
No OSS Any OSS
Race
White 0.574 0.503 0.325
Black 0.228 0.326 0.514
Hispanic 0.118 0.107 0.094
Asian 0.030 0.010 0.006
Multi-Racial 0.035 0.038 0.037
American Indian 0.014 0.014 0.023
Other Race 0.001 0.000 0.001
Disability
No Disability 0.875 0.829 0.778
Physical Disability 0.056 0.078 0.088
Intellectual Disability 0.069 0.093 0.133
Other Dichotomous Characteristics
(omitted: alternative group)
Female 0.531 0.390 0.313
Economically Disadvantaged 0.453 0.603 0.735
Limited English Proficiency 0.062 0.049 0.049
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Reading 0.143 0.074 0.032
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Math 0.155 0.081 0.037
Old in the Grade 0.118 0.187 0.301
Repeating Grade in the Academic Year 0.016 0.039 0.104
Mean of Lagged Scores
Lagged Normalized Math Score 0.043 -0.048 -0.202
Lagged Normalized Reading Score 0.064 -0.041 -0.198
Lagged Score Missing Indicator 0.216 0.152 0.178
Grade level
Grade 3 0.122 0.047 0.036
Grade 4 0.120 0.055 0.048
Grade 5 0.115 0.063 0.060
Grade 6 0.098 0.113 0.110
Grade 7 0.093 0.122 0.127
Grade 8 0.092 0.124 0.135
Grade 9 0.098 0.141 0.188
Grade 10 0.091 0.126 0.129
Grade 11 0.086 0.113 0.097
Grade 12 0.086 0.096 0.070
Observations (student years) 4,034,542 658,611 577,886
Note: This table separately reports summary statistics for the student-year samples without offense records, with
offense records but without out-of-school suspension records, and with both offense records and any out-of-school
suspension records. For grade 10-12 students, End-of-Course Test English 1 is used for the calculation of lagged
reading scores; End-of-Course Test Algebra 1 is used for the calculation of lagged math scores. Lagged test scores are
normalized to have a zero mean and standard deviation of one among the students who took the same tests across the
state.
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Table 1.3: Instrumental Variable and Time Varying School Observed Variables
Dependent Variable: Principal Team’s Exclusive OSS Tendency (IV) Coefficient Standard Error
Violent crime cases last year (N) 0.0009 (0.0006)
Students involved in misbehavior last year (N) −0.0001 (0.0001)
Students assigned OSS or expulsion last year (N) 0.0000 (0.0001)
Assault, robbery or sexual offense cases (N) −0.0004∗ (0.0002)
Threat or possession of a weapon cases (N) −0.0003 (0.0004)
Disorderly conduct or harassment cases (N) −0.0001 (0.0001)
Other violent cases (N) −0.0000 (0.0001)
Drug related cases (N) 0.0000 (0.0002)
Disrespect cases (N) −0.0000 (0.0000)
Disruptive behavior cases (N) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Truancy cases (N) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Tardiness cases (N) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Property cases (N) 0.0004 (0.0003)
Other rule violation cases (N) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Other disciplinary infraction cases (N) 0.0001∗∗ (0.0000)
Minor (average OSS days < 0.55) misbehavior cases (N) −0.0000 (0.0000)
Moderate ( 0.55 ≤ average OSS days ≤ 1 ) misbehavior cases (N) −0.0000 (0.0000)
Major (average OSS days > 1 ) misbehavior cases (N) −0.0001 (0.0000)
Ratio of black students 0.0056 (0.0327)
Ratio of Hispanic students −0.0435 (0.0455)
Ratio of other minority students −0.1419∗ (0.0755)
School mean of normalized math score last year −0.0030 (0.0161)
School mean of normalized reading score last year −0.0001 (0.0141)
Proportion of students – math scores 2 sd below state average last year −0.0584 (0.1001)
Proportion of students – reading scores 2 sd below state average last year 0.0799 (0.1011)
Title I eligible school 0.0046 (0.0075)
School-wide title I 0.0131∗ (0.0075)
Ratio of teachers licensed in the school for more than 5 years 0.0132 (0.0168)
Ratio of female personnels 0.0579 (0.0420)
Ratio of black personnels 0.0474 (0.0479)
Ratio of non-white non-black personnels 0.0507 (0.0866)
Magnet School Indicator −0.0044 (0.0167)
Total student number 0.0000 (0.0000)
Students who are economically disadvantaged % 0.0069 (0.0284)
Total full-time equivalent classroom teachers 0.0002 (0.0006)
Total number of classroom teachers −0.0012∗∗ (0.0005)
Fully licensed teachers % −0.0153 (0.0432)
Teachers with experience 4-10 years % −0.0063 (0.0296)
Teachers with experience more than 11 years % −0.0613∗ (0.0316)
Teachers with Advanced Degrees % −0.0220 (0.0314)
Teacher Turnover Rate % 0.0119 (0.0262)
Average daily school attendance % 0.0089 (0.2181)
Students per Instructional Computer (N) −0.0009 (0.0008)
Books per Student (N) −0.0001 (0.0002)
Average age of Books in library or media center −0.0000 (0.0000)
Classes taught by highly qualified teachers % −0.0531 (0.0475)
Adequate yearly progress target met % −0.0120 (0.0120)
Classrooms connected to the Internet % −0.0539∗ (0.0288)
PBIS - Green Ribbon School 0.0059 (0.0072)
PBIS - Model School 0.0029 (0.0079)
PBIS - Exemplar School 0.0229∗∗ (0.0114)
One or more school variables were missing −0.0026 (0.0100)
Number of school-year observations 9210
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Instead of per student numbers, raw numbers of offense cases are used because total number of students is in the controls.
54
Table 1.4: Monotonicity of the Instrumental Variable
Type of Offense Coefficient Standard Error Observations
Assault on student 0.133∗∗∗ (0.039) 16153
Assault on student (no weapon, no serious injury) 0.107∗ (0.056) 10244
Fighting 0.022∗∗∗ (0.009) 156787
Aggressive behavior 0.062∗∗∗ (0.014) 133864
Bullying 0.143∗∗∗ (0.031) 30541
Gang activity 0.122∗ (0.071) 5552
Disorderly conduct 0.057 (0.038) 23297
Communicating threats 0.061∗ (0.033) 20902
Harassment - verbal 0.023 (0.044) 14629
Harassment - sexual 0.077 (0.050) 11803
Disrespect of faculty/staff 0.058∗∗∗ (0.014) 134443
Inappropriate language/disrespect 0.034∗∗∗ (0.011) 181037
Insubordination 0.072∗∗∗ (0.010) 234486
Disruptive behavior 0.020∗∗∗ (0.007) 368301
Possession of marijuana −0.062 (0.045) 10707
Possession of a weapon (not firearms or explosives) 0.055 (0.039) 13295
Possession of tobacco −0.008 (0.041) 11969
Use of tobacco −0.004 (0.030) 19997
Theft 0.022 (0.026) 35716
Property damage −0.075∗ (0.042) 16329
Inappropriate items on school property 0.033 (0.043) 16779
Skipping class 0.019∗ (0.010) 131950
Truancy 0.145∗∗∗ (0.044) 21672
Leaving class without permission 0.044∗ (0.023) 33621
Leaving school without permission 0.004 (0.033) 22644
Skipping school −0.054∗ (0.031) 27448
Late to class −0.075∗∗∗ (0.012) 67915
Excessive tardiness −0.119∗∗∗ (0.009) 128301
Excessive display of affection 0.045 (0.042) 10145
Honor code violation 0.248∗∗∗ (0.030) 16427
Dress code violation −0.016 (0.020) 45371
Falsification of information −0.037 (0.055) 8683
Being in an unauthorized area −0.012 (0.032) 21765
Cell phone use −0.027∗ (0.015) 71203
Bus misbehavior −0.003 (0.006) 131022
Other School Defined Offense 0.093∗∗∗ (0.019) 86391
Other 0.065∗∗∗ (0.019) 64154
Misuse of school technology 0.019 (0.047) 11770
For all types 0.037∗∗∗ (0.004) 1077758
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports OLS regression results of coefficients γ1 for different types of offenses. The dependent variable
is the out-of-school suspension indicator. The key explanatory variable is the (main) instrumental variable. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the student level.
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Table 1.5: General Deterrence Effects for First Offense by Offense Category
Offense OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS Sample Mean of
Category &GFE &GFE Size Dependent Var.
All −0.244∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.397∗∗∗ 4545364 0.250
Offenses (0.001) (0.001) (0.034) (0.028)
Violence −0.041∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ 4372421 0.083
(0.001) (0.001) (0.027) (0.022)
Disrespect −0.064∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ 4003540 0.104
(0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.014)
Truancy −0.061∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ 2984461 0.068
(0.001) (0.001) (0.030) (0.029)
Drug −0.001∗∗ −0.001 −0.038∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ 2321145 0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.014)
Property −0.001∗∗ −0.000 −0.009 0.020 2870740 0.015
(0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.031)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates of α11 in equation 1.1 for different categories of misbehaviors (in differ-
ent rows), estimated separately. Columns 2-5 show the results using different estimation methods. OLS: a
model with all control variables and school fixed effects; OLS&GFE: adds an additional control for student
unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS: instruments the DPI variable but does not include the control for student
unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS&GFE: instruments the DPI variable and controls for student unobserved
heterogeneity. The sample does not include schools with less than 5 observations of students who have com-
mitted first offenses in an offense category in the academic year; that’s why the sample size changes across
different categories. Using a subset of schools with all categories of offenses results in a substantial loss of
observations. In the appendix, I compare the summary statistics of observed characteristics for each above
sample to show that there is no significant selection problem for the sample of each category. The mean
of the dependent variable (offense indicator) is reported in the last column. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the student level.
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Table 1.6: General Deterrence Effects for First Offense by Offense Type
Offense OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS Sample Mean of
Category &GFE &GFE Size Dependent Var.
Fighting −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.017 4009898 0.038
(0.001) (0.001) (0.032) (0.028)
Aggressive −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ 3493914 0.037
Behavior (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.032)
Disrespect −0.024∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ 3239179 0.040
to Faculty (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.009)
Insubordination −0.051∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ 3365506 0.068
(0.001) (0.001) (0.038) (0.033)
Inappropriate −0.016∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ 3833696 0.046
Language (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.017)
Skipping −0.037∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.054 −0.056∗ 2807283 0.047
Class (0.001) (0.001) (0.034) (0.034)
Disruptive −0.085∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.242∗ −0.203∗∗∗ 3813508 0.096
Behavior (0.001) (0.001) (0.128) (0.074)
Excessive −0.071∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗ 1513515 0.073
Tardiness (0.001) (0.001) (0.059) (0.061)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates of α11 in equation 1.1 for different types of misbehaviors (in different rows),
estimated separately. Columns 2-5 show the results using different estimation methods. OLS: a model with all
control variables and school fixed effects; OLS&GFE: adds an additional control for student unobserved hetero-
geneity; 2SLS: instruments the DPI variable but does not include the control for student unobserved heterogeneity;
2SLS&GFE: instruments the DPI variable and controls for student unobserved heterogeneity. The sample does
not include schools with less than 3 observations of students who have committed first offenses in an offense
type in the academic year; that’s why the sample size changes across different types. Offense type “fighting” and
“aggressive behavior” are from the “violence” category; offense type “disrespect to faculty,”“insubordination,”
and “inappropriate language” are from the “disrespect” category; offense type “skipping class” is from the “tru-
ancy” category; offense type “disruptive behavior” and “excessive tardiness” are from the “other” category. The
mean of the dependent variable (offense indicator) is reported in the last column. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the student level.
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Table 1.7: General Deterrence Effects for First Offense by Student Characteristics
Sample Violence Disrespect
OLS &GFE 2SLS &GFE OLS &GFE 2SLS &GFE
Elementary School -0.027∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.024
(0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.023)
1146718 1146718 854611 854611
0.069 0.069 0.048 0.048
Middle School -0.046∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.062) (0.001) (0.045)
1461682 1461682 1433382 1433382
0.124 0.124 0.111 0.111
High School -0.013∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.070∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.047) (0.001) (0.019)
1880429 1880429 1879421 1879421
0.056 0.056 0.117 0.117
White Students -0.024∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.025) (0.001) (0.021)
2241355 2241355 2040484 2040484
0.054 0.054 0.072 0.072
Black Students -0.054∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.059) (0.002) (0.032)
1229951 1229951 1150650 1150650
0.149 0.149 0.180 0.180
Female -0.016∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.050) (0.001) (0.015)
1896881 1896881 1744554 1744554
0.055 0.055 0.077 0.077
Male -0.050∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.033) (0.001) (0.021)
2279396 2279396 2106486 2106486
0.113 0.113 0.135 0.135
Econ Disadvantage -0.042∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.036) (0.001) (0.024)
2231892 2231892 2060519 2060519
0.121 0.121 0.146 0.146
Not Econ Disadvantage -0.018∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.029) (0.001) (0.017)
2040170 2040170 1854851 1854851
0.045 0.045 0.060 0.060
Lagged math ≤ 0 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.133 -0.086∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.082) (0.002) (0.045)
832128 832128 794255 794255
0.135 0.135 0.184 0.184
Lagged math > 0 0.028∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.026) (0.001) (0.016)
2654784 2654784 2454586 2454586
0.073 0.073 0.082 0.082
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates of α11 in equation 1.1 for the “violence” and “disrespect” categories
by student characteristics, estimated separately. OLS&GFE: a model with all control variables, school
fixed effects and student unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS&GFE: additionally instruments the DPI vari-
able. Lagged math score is normalized to have a zero mean and standard deviation of one among the
students who took the same tests across the state. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clus-
tered at the student level. The third number in each cell is the sample size. The fourth number in each
cell is the mean of dependent variable (offense indicator). The sample for each estimation does not in-
clude schools with less than 3 students’ first offense observations from the category in the subpopulation
in the academic year.
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Table 1.8: General and Specific Deterrence Effects for Second Offense
Offense OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS Sample Mean of
Category &GFE &GFE Size Dependent Var.
Violence
α21 −0.028∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −2.437 −2.489 351829 0.280
(0.005) (0.005) (3.594) (4.660)
α22 0.008
∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 2.515 2.582
(0.002) (0.002) (3.901) (5.081)
Disrespect
α21 −0.064∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ 1.951 2.122 407292 0.419
(0.005) (0.005) (2.498) (3.028)
α22 −0.000 −0.008∗∗∗ −1.780 −1.915
(0.002) (0.002) (2.096) (2.572)
Truancy
α21 −0.008 −0.011∗ 1.228 −0.529 195544 0.314
(0.007) (0.006) (5.099) (2.598)
α22 −0.002 −0.006∗ −1.670 0.751
(0.003) (0.003) (7.187) (3.755)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates of the general deterrence effect (α21) and the specific deterrence effect
(α22) in equation 1.2 for different categories of misbehaviors, estimated separately. Columns 2-5 show
the results using different estimation methods. OLS: a model with all control variables and school fixed
effects; OLS&GFE: adds an additional control for student unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS: instruments
the DPI variable but does not include a control for student unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS&GFE: in-
struments the DPI variable and controls for student unobserved heterogeneity. The sample for each
category does not include schools with less than 5 students’ first offense observations in the category
or without second offense observations in the category in the academic year; that’s why the sample size
changes across different categories. The mean of the dependent variable is reported in the last column.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the student level.
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Table 1.9: General Deterrence Effects for Second Offense by OSS Experience
Offense Category
Sample with OSS Experience Sample without OSS Experience
OLS & GFE 2SLS & GFE OLS & GFE 2SLS & GFE
Violence -0.054∗∗∗ -0.117 -0.068∗∗∗ -0.264
(0.006) (0.117) (0.009) (0.206)
226697 226697 125132 125132
0.260 0.260 0.310 0.310
Disrespect -0.057∗∗∗ -0.206 -0.121∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.410) (0.007) (0.116)
119209 119209 288115 288115
0.404 0.404 0.425 0.425
Truancy 0.014 0.854 -0.022∗∗∗ -1.231
(0.013) (0.883) (0.008) (0.909)
33936 33936 161203 161203
0.301 0.301 0.315 0.315
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates of α21 (general deterrence effects on students’ second offense) in
equation 1.2 by separately using the student-observations that were out-of-school suspended (OSS) for
their first offenses (p1ist = 1) and the student-observations that were not out-of-school suspended for
their first offenses (p1ist = 0). The third number in each cell is number of observations. The third number
in each cell is the sample size. The fourth number in each cell is the mean of the dependent variable (the
offense indicator). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the student level.
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Table 1.11: Effects of Suspension Experience on Achievement by Race
Achievement
Outcome by Race OLS OLS & GFE 2SLS 2SLS & GFE Sample Size
End of Grade Math Test Score
White -0.018∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.328 -0.242 212389
(Grade 3-8) (0.003) (0.003) (0.702) (0.526)
Black -0.008∗∗ -0.008∗∗ 0.300 0.305 241130
(Grade 3-8) (0.003) (0.003) (0.223) (0.227)
Dropout
White 0.074∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ -0.289 -0.383 47751
(Grade 9) (0.005) (0.005) (0.422) (0.413)
Black 0.066∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.113 -0.033 47750
(Grade 9) (0.004) (0.004) (0.260) (0.249)
ACT Composite Score
White -0.205∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -3.345∗ -2.886 43385
(Grade 9-10) (0.042) (0.042) (1.813) (1.839)
Black -0.180∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ 0.029 1.565 38894
(Grade 9-10) (0.033) (0.033) (6.906) (6.008)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates ofα31 for white and black students – the effects of out-of-school suspen-
sion experience on white or black offending students’ achievement outcomes. The achievement outcomes
include end-of-grade test math score (normalized), a dropout indicator (finally graduate or dropout from
the high school) and an ACT composite score (points). The estimation for dropout and ACT composite
scores uses suspension experience of students in grade 9 and students in grade 9-10 respectively. OLS: a
model with all control variables and school fixed effects; OLS&GFE: adds an additional control for student
unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS: instruments the DPI variable but does not include the control for student
unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS&GFE: instruments the DPI variable and controls for student unobserved
heterogeneity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the student level.
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Table 1.12: Effects of Discipline on Achievement of Well-Behaved Students and All Students
Achievement Outcome
by Student Group OLS OLS & GFE 2SLS 2SLS & GFE Sample Size
End of Grade Math Score (Grade 3-8)
All Students 0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.029 2711053
(0.003) (0.003) (0.054) (0.050)
Students -0.001 -0.003 0.103∗ 0.074 1225598
with no offense record (0.003) (0.003) (0.061) (0.055)
End of Grade Math Score (Grade 6-8)
All Students 0.002 0.001 0.168 0.116 1433766
(0.003) (0.003) (0.126) (0.111)
Students -0.001 0.002 0.222∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 649423
with no offense record (0.004) (0.004) (0.105) (0.101)
Dropout
All Students 0.003 0.001 0.068 -0.041 400444
(Grade 9) (0.004) (0.003) (0.087) (0.084)
Students 0.005 0.004 0.019 0.050 153684
with no offense record (0.003) (0.003) (0.049) (0.045)
ACT Composite Score
All Students 0.025 0.076∗ -0.545 -0.138 444065
(Grade 9-10) (0.046) (0.046) (0.988) (1.046)
Students -0.025 -0.008 -1.320 -1.394 197375
with no offense record (0.067) (0.067) (1.008) (1.042)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates of α41 and α51 – the effects of out-of-school suspension on “never offend-
ing” students or all students’ achievement outcomes. The achievement outcomes include an end-of-grade test
math score (normalized), a dropout indicator (finally graduate or dropout from the high school) and an ACT
composite score (points). The estimation for dropout and ACT composite scores uses suspension experience
of students in grade 9 and students in grade 9-10 respectively. OLS: a model with all control variables and
school fixed effects; OLS&GFE: adds an additional control for student unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS: in-
struments the DPI variable but does not include the control for student unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS&GFE:
instruments the DPI variable and controls for student unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the student level.
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Table 1.13: Overall Effects of Discipline on Achievement by Race
Achievement Outcome
White Students Black Students
OLS & GFE 2SLS & GFE OLS & GFE 2SLS & GFE
End of Grade Math Test Score
(Grade 3-8) 0.000 0.084 0.004 -0.239
(0.003) (0.054) (0.005) (0.153)
1420134 1420134 735245 735245
(Grade 6-8) 0.002 0.282∗∗∗ 0.004 2.058
(0.004) (0.099) (0.007) (1.891)
765241 765241 392171 392171
Dropout
(Grade 9) -0.003 -0.017 0.007 0.107
(0.004) (0.060) (0.007) (0.344)
217395 217395 114156 114156
ACT Composite Score
(Grade 9-10) 0.147∗∗ -1.059 -0.142∗ 1.343
(0.063) (0.799) (0.074) (2.254)
256441 256441 115083 115083
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates of α51 for black and white students, estimated separately. The second
and third columns show the results for white students; the fourth and fifth columns show the results for
black students. The estimation for dropout and ACT composite scores uses the suspension experience of
students in grade 9 and students in grade 9-10 respectively. OLS&GFE: a model with all control variables,
school fixed effects and student unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS&GFE: additionally instruments the DPI
variable. The third number in each cell is sample size. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
clustered at the student level.
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Figure 1.1: Estimated Student Group and Offense Numbers
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Note: This figure shows the frequencies (in units of hundreds) of each category of offense across years for each
estimated group of students. The ten colors represent ten different estimated groups of students.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EQUITY OF EXCLUSIONARY SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
2.1 Introduction
Exclusionary school discipline, which refers to school suspension or expulsion, is a disciplinary
practice that punishes misbehaving students by isolating them from their classroom environments.
It is widely used in U.S. public schools; for example, in the 2013-2014 school year alone, 2.8 mil-
lion of the 50 million public school students were suspended out-of-school at least once.1 However,
in the past few years, the popular press and policy makers express an increasing concern about
racial disparity in its implementation. For example, in the 2013-2014 school year, black students
represented 39 percent of student out-of-school suspensions, but they only comprised 15.5 percent
of the public school student population. While 5 percent of white boys and 2 percent of white girls
were suspended out-of-school at least once, the numbers for black boys and black girls were 18
percent and 10 percent.2
The racial disparity in school discipline is troubling especially because some literature docu-
ments that school suspension is harmful to suspended students - it lowers their academic achieve-
ment and raises school dropout rates (Raffaele Mendez 2003; Wald and Losen 2003; Arcia 2006;
Lee et al. 2011; Skiba and Rauch 2015). Therefore, racial disparity in school discipline may cre-
ate black-white academic achievement gaps, which may further create black-white gaps in future
economic and life outcomes.3 This evidence has motivated the U.S. Departments of Justice and
1Civil Rights Data Collection, 2016, U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights.
2Civil Rights Data Collection, 2016, U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights.
3Morris and Perry (2016) show that racial disparity in exclusionary school discipline may account for approxi-
mately 20 percent of black-white differences in school performance. Black-white academic achievement gap is of
great importance for understanding black-white gaps in economic outcomes. For example, Neal and Johnson (1996)
document that a test score (AFQT) explains nearly three-quarters of the racial wage gap for young men and all of the
Education to release a school discipline guidance package in 2014 to reform discipline policies
and has motivated several states to enact new legislation.4
There is new evidence that the negative causal effects of school suspension on students’ aca-
demic achievement and school dropout rates are actually small or not statistically significant (Li
2017). In addition, school suspension can statistically significantly deter students from commit-
ting offenses (Kinsler 2013; Li 2017). However, even if there are no negative effects of school
suspension on suspended students, it is still important to study the racial disparity in school sus-
pension. An important question is whether black students are more likely to be suspended than
white students for the same type of offenses in the same circumstance, which is generally regarded
as discrimination towards black students regardless of the consequences of the punishments. A
large amount of literature documents that the racial disparity in out-of-school suspension persists
even after accounting for offense types and other observable characteristics of students and ob-
servable environmental measures of schools (e.g., Skiba, Michael, Nardo, and Peterson (2002),
Mendez and Knoff (2003), Wallace Jr, Goodkind, Wallace, and Bachman (2008), Skiba, Chung,
Trachok, Baker, Sheya, and Hughes (2014), Anyon, Jenson, Altschul, Farrar, McQueen, Greer,
Downing, and Simmons (2014)). However, using administrative data on North Carolina public
school students in one school year (2000-2001), Kinsler (2011) found that the racial disparity
documented in the literature is primarily generated by cross-school disparity of principals’ pun-
ishments. It disappears entirely when black and white student suspensions are compared within
schools. This evidence suggests that the disparity can be explained by a higher proportion of black
students in the schools with more severe discipline. Furthermore, Kinsler (2013) documents that
the cross-school disparity of principals’ punishments is consistent with their punishment strategies
that focus on maximizing students’ academic achievements. Therefore, the evidence suggests that
racial discrimination plays no role in out-of-school suspension decisions.
gap for young women.
4There is new related legislation in several states, for example, California (AB 420, 2014) and Illinois (SB 100,
2015).
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Using rich administrative data on North Carolina public school students from the 2008-2009
to 2014-2015 school years, this study provides new evidence on the racial disparity of school
suspension between black and white students, as well as punishment disparities among students
from families with different economic statuses. Compared to the 2000-2001 school year data used
in Kinsler (2011), the data in this study document many more types of students’ offenses. The
students’ offenses are classified into about 90 types, which allows for a more detailed study of
punishment disparities for different types of offenses. The panel feature of the data in this study
also provides important controls for students’ offense histories in estimation.
Similarly to Kinsler (2011), I find that the average punishment disparity (for “out-of-school
suspension or not”) between black and white students for all types of offenses disappears (and
even slightly favors black students) when suspensions are compared within the same school in the
same academic year (i.e., when offenses are more likely to be punished by the same principals).5
However, when estimation is conducted separately for each type of offenses, I find that racial dis-
parities exist but the direction depends importantly on the types of offenses when suspensions are
compared within the same school in the same academic year.6 While black students were more
likely to be suspended for fighting, sexual harassment, aggressive behavior, dress code violation,
theft, and excessive display of affection, white students were more likely to be suspended for com-
municating threats, verbal harassment, inappropriate language, insubordination, disrespect toward
faculty, truancy, leaving class without permission and skipping class. I do not find evidence that
these racial disparities are correlated with principals’ or assistant principals’ race. In addition, I
find that Economically Disadvantaged students are consistently more likely to be suspended out-
of-school for almost all types of offenses, regardless of the comparison restricted to be within
schools or not.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data for this research.
5The estimation is conditional on types of offenses.
6The results are similar when the comparison is only restricted to be within the same school.
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Section 2.3 discusses the empirical framework and provides estimation results. Section 2.4 con-
cludes.
2.2 Data Description
The administrative data of North Carolina public schools are provided by the North Carolina
Education Research Data Center (NCERDC). They were originally collected by the North Car-
olina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) and the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES). The data include students’ disciplinary infraction records, demographic information, and
academic records, and information on teachers and schools.
The disciplinary infraction records span from the 2000-2001 to 2014-2015 academic years. I
use data from the 2007-2008 to 2014-2015 academic years since the matching rate of infraction
data with other data has largely increased since 2007-2008 academic year and reporting require-
ments for offenses have been greater.7 Furthermore, since lagged student offense records are used
as control variables, the 2007-2008 academic year data are not used to construct dependent vari-
ables in estimation. In addition, I use student observations of grades 3-12 since several explanatory
variables, such as economically disadvantaged status and limited English proficiency status, are not
available for grades K-2.
There are 5,249,004 recorded offense instances committed by 800,484 distinct grade 3-12 stu-
dents from the 2008-2009 to 2014-2015 academic years.8 Table 2.1 reports sample means of
student characteristics for all offenses, for offenses that were not punished by out-of-school sus-
pension, and for offenses that were punished by out-of-school suspension. The table shows that
black students account for 47 percent of total offenses, but they account for 56.8 percent of offenses
that were punished by out-of-school suspension (including expulsion). While Economically Disad-
vantaged students comprised 72.2 percent of total offenses, they represented 77 percent of offenses
7The matching rate of infraction data with other data is higher than 99 percent since the 2007-2008 academic year.
The infraction records are not used for this project if they are not matched with other data.
8The sample does not include offense instances missing some important information, such as type of offense.
These offense instances are less than 1 percent of total offense instances.
69
that were punished by out-of-school suspension.9 For all offending students, their average lagged
math and reading scores are below average by about 0.181 standard deviations. For suspended stu-
dents, their average lagged math scores are below average by 0.247 standard deviations and their
reading scores are below average by 0.245 standard deviations.
The NCDPI classifies offenses using about 90 offense types. Table 2.2 provides percentages
of offenses that were punished by out-of-school suspension for several of the most common of-
fense types.10 The table also reports percentages of offenses that were punished by out-of-school
suspension for white students, black students, Economically Disadvantaged students and Non-
economically Disadvantaged students.11 Note that for all types of offenses, the percentages of
out-of-school suspensions were higher for black students than white students. For almost all types
of offenses, the percentages of out-of-school suspensions were higher for Economically Disadvan-
taged students than Non-economically Disadvantaged students (except for “possession of mari-
juana”).
2.3 Estimation and Results
Student infractions are commonly caught by teachers or other school personnel, and referred
to principals’ offices. Then, school principals or assistant principals determine appropriate punish-
ments for them.12 In this section, I estimate whether students’ race or economically disadvantaged
status affects principals’ punishment decisions on “out-of-school suspension (including expulsion)
or not.” Note that the analysis does not answer the question of whether there is racial bias in
9Economically disadvantaged students are students receiving free or reduced price meals. The eligibility for
free or reduced lunch is determined by family size and family income. The most recent criteria can be found on
http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/newsroom/news/2015-16/20150814-01.
10Each offense instance may be described by multiple offense types. The statistics in Table 2.2 only use offenses
with a single offense type. The offenses described by multiple offense types are only about one percent of total
offenses.
11Those offenses that were not punished by out-of-school suspension (including expulsion) were typically assigned
less severe punishments, such as in-school suspension, lunch detention, or a warning.
12According to the North Carolina state statute, a long-term suspension must be assigned by the superintendent
under a principal’s recommendation (115C-390.7). Only about 1 percent of out-of-school suspensions were long-term
(> 10 days).
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teachers’ referral decisions.
Let Suspensionoist indicate whether or not student i’s oth (reported) offense in school s in
academic year t was punished by out-of-school suspension. I use the following OLS model for
estimation:
Suspensionoist = β0 + β1Xist + β2Recordoist + Typeo + φ
sch
st + oist (2.1)
where Xist is a vector of student observable characteristics (variables in Table 2.1); Recordoist is
a vector of control variables that describe student i’s offense records before offense o in academic
year t in school s (variables in Appendix B); Typeo is a categorical variable specifying the type of
offense; φschst represents school-year fixed effects;
13 oist is the error term.
I begin by estimating equation 2.1 for all offenses in the sample. That is, while I control for
offense type, I do not allow the other coefficients in the model to vary by offense type. Table 2.3
reports estimated coefficients of vector β1. To compare with the existing literature, I also report
estimated coefficients without controlling for school-year fixed effects φschst (in the left panel).
14
The results indicate that without controlling for school-year fixed effects, black students were 8.6
percentage points more likely to be suspended than white students (holding all other characteristics
the same). After controlling for school-year fixed effects, the racial disparity almost disappears and
white students were even 0.3 percentage points more likely to be suspended that black students.
This result is largely consistent with Kinsler (2011), which indicates that the black-white disparity
in “out-of-school suspension or not” is mostly from cross-school variation in punishment. In addi-
tion, it shows that when the comparison is within the same school in the same academic year, the
punishment may slightly favor black students on average.
13For each of the specifications in this essay, I also estimate a model using school fixed effects instead of school-year
fixed effects. All of the results are consistent.
14I control for year indicators for the specification without school-year fixed effects.
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Furthermore, I find that, without controlling for school-year fixed effects, other minority stu-
dents, such as Hispanic, Asian, Multiracial and American Indian, were more likely to be out-of-
school suspended than white students, but the punishment differences become much smaller or
not statistically significant after controlling for school-year fixed effects. In addition, I find, that
without controlling for school-year fixed effects, Economically Disadvantaged students are 1.9 per-
centage points more likely to be suspended than Non-Economically Disadvantaged students. The
result is similar after controlling for school-year fixed effects, which suggests that Economically
Disadvantage students were more likely to be suspended than Non-economically Disadvantaged
students even if the comparison is within-school. I also find that, with or without school-year fixed
effects, disabled students were less likely to be out-of-school suspended; students who were old
in the grade or who were repeating grade in the year were more likely to be suspended;15 students
with better past academic achievements or who were academically and intellectually gifted were
less likely to be out-of-school suspended.
I also estimate equation 2.1 using students’ first offenses only, and report the estimates for
β1 in Table 2.4.16 The results show that, without controlling for school-year fixed effects, black
students were 9.6 percentage points more likely to be suspended than white students for their first
offenses. The racial impact drops significantly to 0.4 percentage points after controlling for school-
year fixed effects, but remains statistically significant. Since standard errors for these estimates are
small, the results suggest that the black-white disparity is mostly due to cross school variation. In
addition, Economically Disadvantaged students were more likely to be out-of-school suspended
(2.2 percentage points or 1.7 percentage points) with or without controlling for school-year fixed
effects.
To explore whether the disparities change across school levels and time, I separately estimate
equation 2.1 using offenses in each school level (i.e., elementary, middle and high school) in each
15 “Old in the grade” is defined as not typical age in the grade. For example, most of the students in grade 4 are 9
or 10 years old. “Old in the grade” for grade 4 students are those who are older than 10.
16First offenses of students are defined by observed first offenses of students in the sample. Students in the sample
have at least one lagged year offense records.
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school year. Table 2.5 reports estimated coefficients on the black student indicator and Economi-
cally Disadvantaged student indicator. School fixed effects are included in these regressions. The
results indicate that in elementary or high schools, for most academic years, there is no statistically
significant punishment differences between black and white students. In middle schools, since the
2009-2010 academic year, black students were statistically significantly less likely to be out-of-
school suspended than white students; the punishment disparities are 0.7 to 1 percentage points.
The results also indicate that Economically Disadvantaged students were consistently more likely
to be out-of-school suspended than Non-economically disadvantaged students across all school
levels and across all school years.
The three sets of results above measure average punishment disparities for all types of offenses.
An interesting question is whether the punishment disparities are heterogeneous for different types
of offenses. To answer this question, I separately estimate equation 2.1 for different types of
offenses. Estimation results for the marginal effects of being a black student (relative to a white
student) and for the marginal effects of being an Economically Disadvantage student are separately
reported in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7. In Table 2.6, the results suggest that without controlling for
school-year fixed effects, black students are consistently (i.e., across all offense types) more likely
to be out-of-school suspended than white students. However, after controlling for school-year
fixed effects, the racial disparities depend on the type of offense. While black students were more
likely to be suspended for fighting, sexual harassment, dress code violation, theft and excessive
display of affection, white students were more likely to be suspended for communicating threats,
verbal harassment, inappropriate language, insubordination, disruptive behavior, disrespect toward
faculty, truancy, leaving class without permission and skipping class. The estimated punishment
disparities (with statistical significance) range from 0.5 percentage points to 4.7 percentage points
(in absolute value). The results that white students were more likely to be suspended for some
subjective offenses, such as inappropriate language, insubordination, and disrespect toward faculty,
are contrary to some exiting literature (e.g., Smith and Harper (2015)). In Table 2.7, the results
suggest that, without or with controlling for school-year fixed effects, Economically Disadvantaged
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students are more likely to be out-of-school suspended for most types of offenses (for other types
of offenses, the punishment differences are not statistically significant). The estimated punishment
disparities range from 0.1 percentage points to 3.9 percentage points.17
To explore the heterogeneity in racial disparity for students of different genders, I estimate
equation 2.1 for different types of offenses for male and female students separately, and report the
analogous results in Table 2.8. The results are generally consistent with Table 2.6 for both male
and female students, although some estimates become statistically insignificant.
I explore whether there are new findings of different impacts of race by offense type when I
restrict the sample to the first offenses of students.18 Table 2.9 reports the impacts of being a black
student or being Economically Disadvantaged on out of school suspension probabilities. Compared
to the estimates in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7, the signs for the estimates in Table 2.9 are mostly the
same, although some estimates become statistically insignificant due to the smaller sample size.
The differences include, black students are (statistically significantly) more likely to be suspended
for disorderly conduct and aggressive behavior.19
An interesting check is whether the disparities in discipline are different by principals’ race. If
we assume, for example, the estimated black-white disparities are due to racial biases (or overcor-
rection of racial biases), this check may serve as an evidence for whether black and white principals
have different degrees of or directions for racial biases (or overcorrection of racial biases). I es-
timate equation 2.1 with two additional interaction terms that interact a black or white principal
17A concern regarding results in Table 2.6 is that the heterogeneous black-white disparities across offense types
may reflect unobserved differences among schools in which different types of offense occur. Since using a subset of
schools with all types of offenses results in a substantial loss of observations and statistically insignificant results, I
use a subset of schools that reported six or nine of the most common types of offenses (i.e., the largest sample sizes)
among those with statistically significant results in Table 2.6. I report the estimated black-white disparities in Table
B1 and B2 in the appendix. I found that the pattern of heterogeneity of black-white disparities across types remains.
The only difference (among statistically significant results) is that black students are found more likely (rather than
less likely) to be suspended for disruptive behavior.
18First offense is defined by a student’s first offense of any type of misbehavior.
19I also find same evidence in a robustness check when using all offenses (not only first offenses) and school fixed
effects (instead of school-year fixed effects).
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indicator with both the black or white student indicator and the economically disadvantaged stu-
dent indicator. I report the coefficients for the interaction terms in Table 2.10. The results show
that there is no evidence that the estimated black-white disparities or disparities by economically
disadvantaged status are systematically different between offenses that were punished by black
principals and white principals. Note that these results do not rule out the possibility that black and
white principals have similar directions of racial biases for different types of offenses.
In addition, I use a black or white assistant principal indicator instead of the principal indicator
in Table 2.10 to run the same regressions and report the results for interaction terms in Table 2.11.20
The results are generally consistent, except that for some type of offenses, I find that the disparities
between economically disadvantaged and not disadvantaged students are smaller when the offenses
were punished by black assistant principals (compared to white assistant principals).
2.4 Conclusion
Previous literature widely documents that black students face out-of-school suspension with
higher probability than white students, even after controlling for a wide range of covariates, such
as offense types, socioeconomic status and measures of school quality. The disparity is often char-
acterized as a result of racial bias. Using administrative data on North Carolina public students
in recent years, I find that after controlling for school-year fixed effects, the estimated punishment
disparities are heterogeneous for different types of offenses. While black students were more likely
to be suspended for fighting, sexual harassment, dress code violation, theft and excessive display of
affection, white students were more likely to be suspended for communicating threats, verbal ha-
rassment, inappropriate language, insubordination, disruptive behavior, disrespect toward faculty,
truancy, leaving class without permission and skipping class. In addition, I find that Economically
Disadvantaged students are consistently more likely to be out-of-school suspended for different
types of offenses, regardless of conditioning on school-year fixed effects or not.
A possible explanation for the findings that white students are more likely to be suspended
20When multiple assistant principals worked in one school in one academic year, I use the majority race to define
the race of the assistant principals since I do not observe who assigned a punishment for each of the offense.
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for some subjective offenses, such as verbal harassment, inappropriate language, insubordination,
disrespect toward faculty, is that principals’ suspension practices may favor black students for
these types of offenses, which might be driven by efforts that reduce discrimination toward black
students in school discipline or by greater acceptance of different within-race social or cultural
norms.
One caveat is that, although detailed offense types were used to classify offenses, they may
not fully capture the severity of offenses. The estimated disparities might be due to differences
in unobserved severity of offenses (within offense types) committed by students in different racial
groups or economically disadvantaged status. For example, they may reflect differences between
the severity of fighting committed by black students and the severity of fighting committed by white
students. Without more detailed data to describe offenses, it is hard to separate this possibility from
the possibility that principals exhibit bias when assigning punishment.
In our data, suspension decisions are observed only if reported by school administrators, and
they are made by those administrators only if students were caught and referred by teachers to
the principals’ office. Hence, the estimated disparities might reflect differences in unobserved
heterogeneity of students in different racial groups or economically disadvantaged status, which is
caused by the selection of students into observed punishment. Future work may attempt to check
or address this concern using a different empirical strategy with more detailed data. Additional
exploration of racial bias in the catching process or teacher’s referral decisions could be made with
the appropriate data.
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Table 2.1: Sample Means of Offending Students’ Characteristics
All Offenses Punished by
Offenses Not OSS OSS
Race
White 0.373 0.414 0.278
Black 0.470 0.427 0.568
Hispanic 0.094 0.097 0.087
Asian 0.005 0.005 0.004
Multi-Racial 0.039 0.040 0.036
American Indian 0.019 0.016 0.025
Other Race 0.001 0.000 0.001
Disability
No Disability 0.776 0.785 0.755
Physical Disability 0.088 0.087 0.089
Intellectual Disability 0.136 0.128 0.155
Other Dichotomous Characteristics
(omitted: alternative group)
Economically Disadvantaged 0.722 0.701 0.770
Female 0.300 0.310 0.277
Old in the Grade 0.261 0.237 0.317
Limited English Proficiency 0.043 0.043 0.044
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Reading 0.034 0.040 0.023
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Math 0.040 0.046 0.027
Repeating Grade in the Academic Year 0.098 0.083 0.132
Mean of Lagged Scores
Lagged Normalized Math Score -0.181 -0.152 -0.247
Lagged Normalized Reading Score -0.180 -0.153 -0.245
Lagged Score Missing Indicator 0.165 0.158 0.180
Grade level
Grade 3 0.033 0.032 0.032
Grade 4 0.040 0.039 0.042
Grade 5 0.048 0.046 0.051
Grade 6 0.110 0.111 0.109
Grade 7 0.133 0.133 0.132
Grade 8 0.133 0.130 0.140
Grade 9 0.200 0.190 0.219
Grade 10 0.135 0.137 0.130
Grade 11 0.098 0.104 0.086
Grade 12 0.072 0.077 0.059
Observations 5,249,004 3,668,573 1,580,431
Note: This table reports sample means of student characteristics for all offenses, offenses that were not
punished by out-of-school suspension, and offenses that were punished by out-of-school suspension. For
grade 10-12 students, End-of-Course Test English 1 is used for the calculation of lagged reading scores; End-
of-Course Test Algebra 1 is used for the calculation of lagged math scores. Lagged test scores are normalized
to have a zero mean and standard deviation of one among the students who took the same tests across the
state.
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Table 2.2: Percentages of Out-of-School Suspension for Selected Offense Types
Percent Out-of-School Suspended among
Offense Type Number of incidents All Students Black White ED NED
Possession of marijuana 15,429 84.5 85.5 83.2 84.3 84.8
Communicating threats 31,724 72.6 75.9 67.6 72.8 71.7
Disorderly conduct 41,957 49.0 54.0 37.2 51.1 41.3
Fighting 263,069 84.4 86.2 80.4 84.6 83.4
Harassment - verbal 22,451 36.1 40.6 31.3 37.1 33.5
Harassment - sexual 18,234 68.1 72.2 61.2 68.8 66.6
Aggressive behavior 265,033 44.7 51.2 35.3 46.7 38.3
Honor code violation 26,085 12.4 14.4 11.1 13.4 11.2
Dress code violation 79,824 16.7 23.7 8.0 18.9 11.2
Inappropriate language/disrespect 333,039 35.6 41.3 28.3 37.0 31.5
Insubordination 547,936 28.1 32.6 21.0 29.2 24.8
Theft 58,793 57.8 65.4 47.6 58.7 54.7
Disruptive behavior 964,658 24.1 28.8 17.1 25.5 19.7
Assault on student 27,423 77.5 80.9 73.5 78.3 74.8
Disrespect of faculty/staff 254,482 35.5 38.1 31.0 35.9 34.3
Excessive display of affection 15,800 15.7 29.9 9.6 17.9 11.6
Excessive tardiness 392,700 7.9 10.8 5.0 9.3 5.6
Truancy 41,943 21.1 25.9 12.8 22.4 18.6
Leaving class without permission 54,386 14.6 18.4 9.0 16.1 10.9
Skipping Class 267,308 16.2 21.2 10.8 17.7 12.8
Late to class 204,124 2.9 6.0 1.4 3.7 1.7
Skipping school 50,002 30.3 36.6 25.3 32.9 25.9
All offenses 529,004 30.1 36.4 22.4 32.1 24.9
Note: This table reports percentages of offenses that were punished by out-of-school suspension for several most common
offense types (and all offenses). The last four columns report percentages of offenses that were punished by out-of-school sus-
pension for black students, white students, Economically Disadvantaged students (ED) and Non-economically Disadvantaged
students (NED).
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results: Out-of-school Suspension for All Offenses
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: OSS or Not Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Black 0.086∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
Hispanic 0.037∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
Asian 0.020∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.001 (0.003)
Multiracial 0.037∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
American Indian 0.141∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.006∗∗ (0.002)
Other Race 0.170∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.010 (0.009)
Female −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Economically Disadvantaged 0.019∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.015∗∗∗ (0.001)
Physical Disabled −0.015∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.016∗∗∗ (0.002)
Intellectual Disabled −0.007∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.010∗∗∗ (0.002)
Old in the grade 0.035∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.022∗∗∗ (0.001)
Limited English Proficiency −0.002 (0.002) −0.002 (0.001)
AIG Reading −0.011∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
AIG Math −0.015∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.011∗∗∗ (0.002)
Lagged Normalized Math Score −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
Lagged Normalized Reading Score −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
Lagged Score Missing Indicator 0.027∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.018∗∗∗ (0.001)
Repeating Grade in the Academic Year 0.070∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.027∗∗∗ (0.001)
Constant 0.507∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.438∗∗∗ (0.021)
Observations 5249004 5249004
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.338
School-Year Fixed Effect No Yes
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for the effects of student characteristics (β1) (except for the
categorical variable “grade”) in equation 2.1 using the sample of all offenses. Results without (1) or with
school-year fixed effects (2) are separately reported. The dependent variable is the out-of-school suspension
indicator. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the school-year level.
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results: Out-of-school Suspension for First Offense
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: OSS or Not Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Black 0.096∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Hispanic 0.047∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.009∗∗∗ (0.002)
Asian 0.011∗ (0.005) −0.003 (0.004)
Multiracial 0.034∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.004∗ (0.002)
American Indian 0.114∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.005 (0.004)
Other Race 0.194∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.040∗∗ (0.012)
Female −0.006∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.002∗∗ (0.001)
Economically Disadvantaged 0.022∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.017∗∗∗ (0.001)
Physical Disabled −0.007∗∗ (0.002) −0.013∗∗∗ (0.002)
Intellectual Disabled −0.014∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.016∗∗∗ (0.003)
Old in the grade 0.027∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.020∗∗∗ (0.001)
Limited English Proficiency −0.007∗ (0.003) −0.003 (0.002)
AIG Reading −0.013∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.005∗ (0.002)
AIG Math −0.012∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.011∗∗∗ (0.002)
Lagged Normalized Math Score −0.002∗ (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Lagged Normalized Reading Score −0.010∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
Lagged Score Missing Indicator 0.031∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.021∗∗∗ (0.001)
Repeating Grade in the Academic Year 0.096∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.025∗∗∗ (0.004)
Constant 0.779∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.600∗∗∗ (0.040)
Observations 848205 848205
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.424
School-Year Fixed Effect No Yes
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for the effects of student characteristics (β1) (except for
the categorical variable “grade”) in equation 2.1 only using the sample of first offenses of students. Results
without (1) or with school-year fixed effects (2) are separately reported. The dependent variable is the out-
of-school suspension indicator. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the school-year
level.
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results: Out-of-School Suspension by School Level and Year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Coefficients for Black Student Indicator (ref: white student)
Elementary 0.008 0.010∗∗ −0.003 −0.001 0.001 0.006 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
79238 95161 102221 98233 96369 74393 86399
Middle −0.002 −0.009∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
262317 318351 327655 326797 297112 211332 230492
High 0.005∗ −0.001 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
362350 431128 440785 447487 414206 261705 285126
Coefficients for Economically Disadvantaged Indicator
Elementary 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
79238 95161 102221 98233 96369 74393 86399
Middle 0.008∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
262317 318351 327655 326797 297112 211332 230492
High 0.006∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
362350 431128 440785 447487 414206 261705 285126
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for being a black student (relative to a white student) or being an
Economically Disadvantaged student, separately estimated for different school levels in different school years (for
example, “2009” represents school year “2008-2009”). School fixed effects are used for the estimation. Results for
elementary, middle and high schools use samples spanning grades 3-5, 6-8 and 9-12 respectively. The third number
in each cell is number of observations. The dependent variable is the out-of-school suspension indicator. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.6: Estimation Results: Black White Differences in OOS by Offense Type
(1) (2)
Offense Type Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Observations
Possession of marijuana 0.019∗ (0.008) −0.001 (0.007) 15429
Communicating threats 0.053∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.015∗ (0.007) 31724
Disorderly conduct 0.112∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.006 (0.005) 41957
Fighting 0.065∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.002) 263069
Harassment-Verbal 0.080∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.020∗ (0.009) 22451
Harassment-Sexual 0.112∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.025∗ (0.010) 18234
Aggressive behavior 0.117∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.003 (0.003) 265033
Honor Code Violation 0.027 (0.017) −0.004 (0.004) 26085
Dress code violation 0.116∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.009∗∗ (0.003) 79824
Inappropriate language/disrespect 0.094∗∗∗ (0.005) −0.015∗∗∗ (0.002) 333039
Insubordination 0.096∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.007∗∗∗ (0.002) 547936
Theft 0.150∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.033∗∗∗ (0.006) 58793
Disruptive behavior 0.093∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 964658
Assault on student 0.068∗∗∗ (0.008) −0.000 (0.007) 27423
Disrespect of faculty/staff 0.063∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.024∗∗∗ (0.002) 254482
Excessive Display of Affection 0.174∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.047∗∗∗ (0.010) 15800
Excessive tardiness 0.043∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.001 (0.001) 392700
Truancy 0.104∗∗∗ (0.019) −0.013∗ (0.005) 41943
Leaving Class without permission 0.068∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.013∗∗ (0.004) 54386
Skipping Class 0.084∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.005∗ (0.002) 267308
Late to class 0.035∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.000 (0.001) 204124
Skipping School 0.084∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.003 (0.006) 50002
School-Year Fixed Effect No Yes
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for being a black student (relative to a white student), separately
estimated for different types of offenses. Results without (1) or with school-year fixed effects (2) are separately
reported. The dependent variable is the out-of-school suspension indicator. Standard errors are reported in paren-
theses and clustered at the school-year level.
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Table 2.7: Estimation Results: Economically Disadvantaged Students’ Differences in OSS by
Offense Type
(1) (2)
Offense Type Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Observations
Possession of marijuana −0.013 (0.007) 0.006 (0.006) 15429
Communicating threats 0.005 (0.007) 0.016∗ (0.006) 31724
Disorderly conduct 0.059∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.016∗∗ (0.005) 41957
Fighting 0.015∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.002) 263069
Harassment-Verbal 0.017∗ (0.008) 0.006 (0.008) 22451
Harassment - sexual −0.002 (0.010) 0.007 (0.009) 18234
Aggressive behavior 0.043∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.002) 265033
Honor Code Violation 0.010 (0.009) 0.004 (0.003) 26085
Dress code violation 0.016∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.006∗ (0.002) 79824
Inappropriate language/disrespect 0.029∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.018∗∗∗ (0.002) 333039
Insubordination 0.023∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.014∗∗∗ (0.001) 547936
Theft 0.038∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.039∗∗∗ (0.005) 58793
Disruptive behavior 0.020∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.013∗∗∗ (0.001) 964658
Assault on student 0.031∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.021∗∗ (0.006) 27423
Disrespect of faculty/staff 0.015∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.018∗∗∗ (0.002) 254482
Excessive Display of Affection 0.007 (0.007) 0.003 (0.005) 15800
Excessive tardiness 0.013∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.002∗ (0.001) 392700
Truancy 0.007 (0.009) 0.007 (0.004) 41943
Leaving Class without permission 0.010∗ (0.004) 0.004 (0.003) 54386
Skipping Class 0.013∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 267308
late to Class 0.003∗∗ (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 204124
Skipping School 0.025∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.012∗∗ (0.004) 50002
School-Year Fixed Effect No Yes
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for the effects of being Economically Disadvantaged, separately
estimated for different types of offenses. Results without (1) or with school-year fixed effects (2) are separately
reported. The dependent variable is the out-of-school suspension indicator. Standard errors are reported in paren-
theses and clustered at the school-year level.
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Table 2.8: Estimation Results: Black White Differences in OOS by Students’ Gender
Female Students Male Students
Offense Type Coeff. SE Sample Coeff. SE Sample
Possession of marijuana 0.019 (0.020) 2514 −0.004 (0.008) 12915
Communicating threats 0.012 (0.018) 8902 −0.026∗∗ (0.009) 22822
Disorderly conduct −0.000 (0.012) 11681 0.003 (0.007) 30276
Fighting 0.015∗∗∗ (0.004) 76696 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002) 186373
Harassment-Verbal 0.002 (0.020) 6331 −0.022 (0.011) 16120
Harassment - sexual −0.002 (0.055) 1318 0.024∗ (0.011) 16916
Aggressive behavior 0.005 (0.006) 63804 0.003 (0.003) 201229
Honor Code Violation −0.008 (0.007) 9886 −0.002 (0.006) 16199
Dress code violation 0.004 (0.003) 35181 0.011∗ (0.005) 44643
Inappropriate language/disrespect −0.020∗∗∗ (0.004) 90140 −0.015∗∗∗ (0.003) 242899
Insubordination −0.009∗∗ (0.003) 164518 −0.006∗∗ (0.002) 383418
Theft 0.039∗∗ (0.013) 16765 0.030∗∗∗ (0.007) 42028
Disruptive behavior −0.002 (0.003) 242226 −0.006∗∗∗ (0.001) 722432
Assault on student 0.010 (0.018) 7270 −0.001 (0.009) 20153
Disrespect of faculty/staff −0.031∗∗∗ (0.005) 79967 −0.022∗∗∗ (0.003) 174515
Excessive Display of Affection 0.025 (0.014) 7471 0.059∗∗∗ (0.013) 8329
Excessive tardiness 0.001 (0.002) 157007 −0.003∗ (0.001) 235693
Truancy −0.023∗∗ (0.007) 15979 −0.010 (0.007) 25964
Leaving Class without permission −0.015∗ (0.007) 18462 −0.014∗∗ (0.005) 35924
Skipping Class −0.009∗∗ (0.003) 96808 −0.004 (0.003) 170500
late to Class −0.000 (0.002) 83510 0.000 (0.001) 120614
Skipping School −0.003 (0.010) 17060 0.008 (0.008) 32942
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for the effects of being a black student, separately estimated for female
students and male students. Separate estimates for different types of offenses are reported. The dependent variable is the
out-of-school suspension indicator. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the school-year level.
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Table 2.9: Estimation Results: Out-of-school Suspension for First Offense by Offense Type
Black Indicator ED Indicator
Offense Type Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Observations
Possession of marijuana 0.010 (0.017) −0.001 (0.016) 3040
Communicating threats −0.013 (0.022) 0.014 (0.020) 5693
Disorderly conduct 0.042∗∗ (0.014) 0.034∗∗ (0.012) 6654
Fighting 0.015∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.009∗∗ (0.003) 71033
Harassment-Verbal 0.010 (0.022) −0.009 (0.017) 4874
Harassment - sexual 0.007 (0.030) −0.002 (0.027) 3318
Aggressive behavior 0.009∗ (0.005) 0.015∗∗∗ (0.004) 60960
Honor Code Violation −0.009 (0.007) 0.003 (0.004) 9201
Dress code violation 0.003 (0.004) −0.000 (0.003) 14325
Inappropriate language/disrespect −0.003 (0.005) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.004) 49253
Insubordination −0.001 (0.004) 0.012∗∗∗ (0.003) 58889
Theft 0.042∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.034∗∗∗ (0.009) 14100
Disruptive behavior 0.007∗ (0.003) 0.013∗∗∗ (0.002) 127621
Assault on studen −0.001 (0.020) 0.036∗ (0.017) 5626
Disrespect of faculty/staff −0.010 (0.006) 0.026∗∗∗ (0.005) 27732
Excessive Display of Affection 0.061∗∗ (0.022) −0.008 (0.010) 4383
Excessive tardiness 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 49329
Truancy −0.011 (0.009) −0.001 (0.006) 7700
Leaving Class without permission −0.010 (0.009) −0.005 (0.007) 6656
Skipping Class −0.008∗ (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 38846
late to Class −0.002 (0.002) 0.003∗ (0.001) 23351
Skipping School −0.018 (0.010) 0.024∗∗ (0.008) 8416
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS regression results for the effects of being a black student or being an Economically
Disadvantaged student, using a sample of students’ first offenses. Separate estimates for different types of offenses
are reported. The dependent variable is the out-of-school suspension indicator. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the school-year level.
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Table 2.10: Estimation Results: Black White and ED Differences in OOS by Principal’s Race
Black Stud.×Black Prin. ED Stud.×Black Prin.
Offense Type Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Sample
Possession of marijuana 0.006 (0.016) −0.018 (0.016) 11838
Communicating threats −0.002 (0.016) −0.014 (0.017) 26514
Disorderly conduct 0.009 (0.013) 0.006 (0.013) 33898
Fighting 0.002 (0.005) −0.004 (0.004) 214477
Harassment-Verbal −0.034 (0.024) 0.010 (0.021) 18466
Harassment - sexual −0.015 (0.025) 0.000 (0.024) 14688
Aggressive behavior −0.009 (0.006) 0.000 (0.006) 218065
Honor Code Violation −0.014 (0.013) −0.010 (0.012) 20943
Dress code violation 0.009 (0.010 0.014 (0.008) 65071
Inappropriate language/disrespect ) −0.002 (0.006) −0.005 (0.005) 274782
Insubordination 0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 451649
Theft 0.009 (0.014) 0.007 (0.013) 46966
Disruptive behavior −0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 795732
Assault on student 0.016 (0.017) −0.003 (0.015) 22332
Disrespect of faculty/staff 0.005 (0.006) −0.003 (0.006) 210974
Excessive Display of Affection 0.032 (0.034) 0.024 (0.023) 12138
Excessive tardiness −0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 309605
Truancy 0.005 (0.016) −0.001 (0.013) 33305
Leaving Class without permission −0.025 (0.013) 0.019∗ (0.009) 44467
Skipping Class 0.006 (0.006) −0.005 (0.005) 209684
late to Class 0.005 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 169864
Skipping School 0.010 (0.015) 0.002 (0.013) 37207
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS estimates for the coefficients on an interaction term that interacts the black or white stu-
dent indicator with a black or white principal indicator and an interaction term that interacts economically disadvantaged
student indicator with the black or white principal indicator. Separate estimates for different types of offenses are re-
ported. The dependent variable is the out-of-school suspension indicator. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
clustered at the school-year level.
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Table 2.11: Estimation Results: Black White and ED Differences in OOS by Assistant Principal’s
Race
Black Stud.×Black A.P. ED Stud.×Black A.P.
Offense Type Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Sample
Possession of marijuana 0.013 (0.020) −0.003 (0.019) 12070
Communicating threats 0.009 (0.018) −0.020 (0.017) 26832
Disorderly conduct −0.005 (0.013) −0.027∗ (0.013) 34578
Fighting 0.008 (0.005) −0.008∗ (0.004) 216832
Harassment-Verbal −0.016 (0.029) 0.021 (0.024) 18698
Harassment - sexual −0.010 (0.027) 0.031 (0.024) 14901
Aggressive behavior 0.008 (0.006) −0.013∗ (0.006) 220730
Honor Code Violation 0.013 (0.013) 0.005 (0.013) 21355
Dress code violation 0.005 (0.010) 0.007 (0.008) 66838
Inappropriate language/disrespect 0.000 (0.006) −0.009 (0.005) 278903
Insubordination −0.001 (0.004) −0.008∗ (0.004) 460288
Theft 0.001 (0.015) −0.002 (0.013) 47661
Disruptive behavior 0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.003) 807995
Assault on student −0.021 (0.018) −0.014 (0.015) 22637
Disrespect of faculty/staff 0.008 (0.006) −0.008 (0.006) 213456
Excessive Display of Affection −0.017 (0.024) 0.014 (0.016) 12246
Excessive tardiness 0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 316800
Truancy −0.006 (0.017) −0.015 (0.011) 34240
Leaving Class without permission −0.024 (0.014) 0.023 (0.012) 45352
Skipping Class 0.009 (0.006) 0.000 (0.005) 213676
late to Class −0.004 (0.005) 0.013∗ (0.007) 170989
Skipping School 0.013 (0.016) 0.023 (0.014) 37732
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS estimates for the coefficients on an interaction term that interacts the black or white stu-
dent indicator with a black or white assistant principal indicator and an interaction term that interacts the economically
disadvantaged student indicator with the black or white assistant principal indicator. Separate estimates for different
types of offenses are reported. The dependent variable is the out-of-school suspension indicator. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and clustered at the school-year level.
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CHAPTER 3
THE INFLUENCE OF ENDOGENOUS BEHAVIORS AMONG SOCIAL PAIRS: SOCIAL
INTERACTION EFFECTS OF SMOKING (WITH DONNA GILLESKIE)
3.1 Introduction
In economics, social interactions reflect the interdependence among individuals when the char-
acteristics and behaviors of one influences the preferences, beliefs, and constraints of another
(Durlauf and Ioannides 2010). The impacts of social contacts on individual smoking behavior
are of particular interest to public health and health economics researchers (e.g., Clark and Etile´
2006; Christakis and Fowler 2008; Cutler and Glaeser 2010). A common empirical hurdle in this
application, and in the study of social interactions generally, is identification of endogenous social
interaction effects, i.e., the causal effects of social contacts’ smoking behaviors on an individual’s
smoking behavior (Manski 1993). The interest in quantifying endogenous social interaction ef-
fects stems from a desire to better understand smoking behavior as well as to prescribe effective
anti-smoking policy. The existence of endogenous social interaction effects suggests that a policy
intervention with a direct impact on an individual’s smoking behavior will also have an indirect
impact on the individual’s social contacts’ behaviors and may spread through the social network
(Cutler and Glaeser 2010). Reliable measures of endogenous social interaction effects and hence,
the “social multiplier” effects, provide policymakers with an important component involved in
cost-effective analyses of anti-smoking policies.
Studies that attempt to measure endogenous social interaction effects on smoking behavior of-
ten rely on strong assumptions due to the difficulty of disentangling endogenous social interaction
effects from other factors (e.g., Christakis and Fowler 2008). In particular, to identify how social
contacts’ smoking behaviors affect an individual’s smoking behavior, researchers must address
three important considerations that may lead one to misinterpret an observed correlation as causal.
These considerations are: 1.) the simultaneous influence of an individual’s smoking behavior and
her social contact’s behavior on each other; 2.) an observed peer relationship that developed be-
cause of individual characteristics that also influence smoking (non-smoking), such as they both
value health less (more); and 3.) dependence of smoking behaviors on other (exogenous) factors,
such as cigarette prices or smoking advertisements. These problems are documented in the litera-
ture as simultaneity, homophily and confounding, respectively (e.g., Christakis and Fowler 2008;
Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009; De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli 2010).
We identify endogenous social interaction effects on smoking behavior while carefully address-
ing these considerations. To address the simultaneity problem, we model an individual’s observed
smoking behavior as the optimal solution to a discrete choice problem that depends on her own
marginal utility of smoking and her observed social contacts’ smoking behaviors, which are be-
ing chosen by those individuals at the same time. According to this game theoretical model, an
individual and her (one) social contact’s smoking behaviors are jointly described as a 2-player
simultaneous move game (e.g., between the individual and his/her spouse, between two friends,
between two siblings, or between a parent and an adult child) with complete information. The
game is assumed to have a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium, and the player’s decisions are as-
sumed to lead to one of the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria. We address, in estimation, the multiple
equilibria problem by estimating the probability of each equilibrium.1. Identification is achieved
using exclusion restrictions, which differ across different types of relationships, for the individual’s
smoking behavior and her social contacts’ smoking behavior. For example, for spouses, we use
information that affects smoking behaviors of each member of the couple before their marriage
and assume that this information has no effect on their smoking behavior after marriage, once we
control for own past behaviors. Furthermore, to disentangle the endogenous social interaction ef-
fects from homophily and confounding, our model of individual smoking behaviors over multiple
periods allows that behavior to depend on one’s previous smoking behaviors, permanent individual
unobserved heterogeneity, and unobserved time-varying factors.
1The idea follows Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010).
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In addition, we study how social contacts’ health shocks affect an individual’s smoking behav-
ior. The endogenous health shocks (i.e., a cardiovascular disease event) are modeled as a function
of individuals’ past smoking behaviors, one’s history of health shocks, other observed individual
characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity. We use high-normal blood pressure (i.e., systolic
blood pressure between 130 and 139 mm Hg or diastolic blood pressure between 85 and 89 mm
Hg) as an exclusion restriction for onset of cardiovascular disease. The relationship between high-
normal blood pressure and a cardiovascular disease event was not well known during much of the
time span of our data; therefore, we assume that neither the knowledge of nor the experience of
high-normal blood pressure influenced individuals’ smoking behavior directly.
The data we use to measure social interaction effects are from the Framingham Heart Study
(FHS) with its complementary social networks data (FHS-Net). A unique feature of these data is
that researchers followed individuals and identified social contact relationships, such as spouses,
friends, siblings, or parents, over time, which is important for our identification strategy. While
previous users of these data have studied social interactions in the context of smoking (Christakis
and Fowler 2008), our research is distinct from their research because we explicitly address, in
estimation, concerns about simultaneity and homophily in order to identify endogenous social
interaction effects.
We summarize our findings here. First, we find statistically significant endogenous social inter-
action effects for some paired contacts, namely spouses and friends. Our results suggest that a wife
who does not smoke decreases her husband’s propensity to smoke by 7.8 percentage points relative
to a smoking wife; a husband who does not smoke decreases his wife’s propensity to smoke by 8.5
percentage points relative to a smoking husband; and a friend who does not smoke decreases her
friend’s propensity to smoke by 4.2 percentage points. A sibling’s or parent’s smoking behavior
does not have statistically significantly effects, but the parent of a non-smoking child (of adult
age) is less likely to smoke.2 We find that the estimates for endogenous social interaction effects
exhibit a large positive bias when we fail to control for simultaneity or homophily. For example,
2The marginal effects are simulated assuming the focal individual (or ego) smoked last period.
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the marginal effect of a wife on a husband is inflated by about 50 percent if simultaneity is not
addressed. With no controls for homophily due to unobserved heterogeneity (even after control-
ling for past smoking behavior), the estimates would suggest statistically significant (yet upwardly
biased) marginal effects (7.5 and 4.4 percentage points) of a parent’s smoking behavior on a child’s
behavior or a sibling’s smoking behavior on another sibling’s behavior when a causal effect does
not exist.
In addition, we find that the effects of social contacts’ cardiovascular disease shocks on indi-
vidual smoking behavior are not statistically significant for each of the types of relationships we
study. These results are consistent with Khwaja, Sloan, and Chung (2006), who find no statisti-
cally significant effects of spousal health shocks on own smoking, and consistent with Darden and
Gilleskie (2016), who find no statistically significant effects of parents’ health shocks on children.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the basic empirical model
that solves the 2-person simultaneous move game. In Section 3.3, we describe the FHS and FHS-
Net data and replicate the findings in Christakis and Fowler (2008). Section 3.4 provides and
discusses our empirical results.
3.2 Basic Empirical Model
3.2.1 Basic Setup
In this section we describe a model of smoking behavior with social interactions. Consider
a set of individuals i= 1, 2, . . . , It at time t. Individuals simultaneously choose smoking actions;
each individual i chooses a smoking action yit from the action space Yit. For simplicity, we let
Yit = {−1, 1}, where yit = −1 denotes the action “Not Smoke” and yit = 1 denotes the action
“Smoke” in period t. Each period, the individuals are embedded in a social network, which in-
dicates different types of relationships (or ties) between individuals; ties are fixed (for biological
relationships) or pre-determined (for non-biological relationships) before individuals choose a pe-
riod t smoking action. We do not explicitly model the network formation in this paper to keep the
91
model parsimonious.3
At each period t, an individual i chooses her smoking action to maximize her current period
utility. While we allow past behavior to influence current utility and we assume that current be-
havior is maximized each period based on updated information, we avoid modeling expectations
of future unknowns by assuming individuals are myopic.4 We use −i to denote the set of i’s social
contacts (i.e., the individuals linked with i), and we use y−it to denote i’s social contacts’ smoking
actions at time t. A utility function, Vi(yit, y−it,Ωit,Ω′−it, µit, 
yit
it ), describes the individual’s pay-
off of each smoking action. Following Brock and Durlauf (2001), utility is decomposed into three
additive parts such that
Vi(yit, y−it,Ωit,Ω′−it, µit, 
yit
it ) = Ui(yit,Ωit, µit) + Si(yit, y−it,Ω
′
−it) + 
yit
it (3.1)
where Ui(yit,Ωit, µit) captures the individual’s private utility; Si(yit, y−it,Ω′−it) captures her social
utility (i.e., utility impacted by social interactions); and yitit represents choice-based unobserved
(by the econometrician) utility, which might be unobserved private or social utility. Information
available at the point of decisionmaking is denoted by the vector Ωit = [Ait, Hit, Xit, ξi]. The
variable Ait measures individual i’s smoking stock at time t and, in our empirical estimation, we
use yit−1 and ever smoked before last period to summarize Ait.5 The vector Hit is a set of i’s
observed endogenous characteristics that affect her utility gain (or loss) from smoking at time t; in
the empirical analysis, Hit represents i’s current health status or occurrence of an unhealthy event.
3See Gilleskie and Zhang (2010), Badev (2013) and Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) who jointly model
network formation as an identification strategy. In the empirical estimation section, we explain how our empirical
results are not biased by the effects of endogenous network formation (homophily) given our carefully controlled
empirical estimation strategy.
4Dynamic games that involve forward-looking decisionmaking are beyond the scope of this paper.
5Theoretically and biologically, the additive stock encompasses the amount of cotinine (i.e., metabolized nicotine)
in the body at time t. Economists have approximated this stock by one’s observed history of smoking behavior.
For example, Darden, Gilleskie, and Strumpf (2017) use years of experience, years of continuous duration, years of
cessation, and age of initiation. Given the lag between observed behaviors in our data, we choose to summarize one’s
history of smoking behavior by the last observed smoking status and ever smoked before last period.
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The vectorXit is the set of observed exogenous individual and environmental covariates. This vec-
tor includes demographic variables as well as exogenous variables that may affect an individual’s
utility gain (or loss) from smoking at time t or an individual’s stochastic health evolution (to be
described below).6 The information vector also includes individual time-invariant characteristics
(ξi) that are unobserved by the econometrician but are known by individuals. Additionally, some
time-varying environmental factors, such as anti-smoking policies, are captured by µit and are un-
observed by the econometrician but known by individuals. Similar to Ωit, Ω′−it is a subset of i’s
social contacts’ information variables and may affect i’s social utility of choosing to smoke or not.
The endogenous characteristic Hit (e.g., an unhealthy event, in our case) is a function of an
individual’s exogenous characteristics and health and smoking stocks entering period t and is ob-
served prior to making the current period smoking decision. It represents the flow of health in
period t. One’s health status entering period t is
Hit = Fi(H
e
it, Ait, y−it−1, X
H
it , ξi, 
H
it ) (3.2)
and depends on the individual’s health stock (Heit) which is summarized (in estimation) by an
indicator of whether or not the individual has “ever had a chronic health condition”. This health
status in t also depends on one’s own lagged smoking behavior and smoking history (Ait) as well
as the most recent smoking behavior of one’s social contacts (y−it−1). We also allow health to
depend on observed exogenous variables and unobserved individual time-invariant characteristics.
Conditional on these variables, health evolution is uncertain; Hit is an unanticipated health shock
to individual i at time t.
Timing in this model is summarized as follows:
1. entering period t, an individual knows the smoking history (or smoking stock, At) and the
6Theory suggests avenues through which particular variables (e.g., cigarette prices) may impact behavior. Other
variables may impact health production exclusively. When relevant, we use vectors XSit and X
H
it to differentiate these
exogenous variables, assuming that either vector always includes the individual demographic variables.
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health stock (Het ) of herself and her potential social contacts.
7 She also knows the exogenous
characteristics (Xt) and individual unobserved heterogeneity (ξ) of all players;
2. after experiencing the uncertain health shock (Ht ), the health statuses of all individuals (Ht)
for period t are realized;
3. theoretically, non-biological relationships of the social network are formed at this point;
4. unobserved utility of each smoking action (ytt ) and environmental factors (µt) are realized;
5. knowing one’s social contacts who may directly impact utility, all individuals simultaneously
choose a smoking action.
Note that, at the point of decisionmaking, the stochastic terms (t and µt) and permanent hetero-
geneity (ξ) are unobserved by the econometrician, but observed by the individuals. Therefore,
individuals play complete information games within their network each period. A pure-strategy
Nash Equilibrium at time t is a profile of actions yt ∈ Y, Y = Y1t × Y2t × . . . × YIt , such that for
all i at time t, and for y′it 6= yit, Vi(yit, y−it,Ωit,Ω′−it, µit, yitit ) ≥ Vi(y′it, y−it,Ωit,Ω′−it, µit, y
′
it
it ).
When we take the model to the data for estimation, we assume observed smoking decisions in the
data are pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium outcomes. Multiple equilibria are a typical feature of this
game. We discuss our identification strategy for addressing multiple equilibria in Section 3.2.6.
3.2.2 Model Specification
We specify an individual’s private utility of smoking as:
Ui(yit,Ωit, µit) = (α1i +α2iAit +α3iHit +α4iX
S
it +ρ
S
i ξi +µit)1[yit = 1] +α5iAit +α6iA
2
it (3.3)
where the indicator function, 1[yit = 1], takes on the value one when an individual chooses to
smoke and zero when an individual chooses not to smoke. The specification has some standard
7In the empirical model, we include the health status of the social contact as a determinant of own utility. Individual
smoking behavior may respond to the smoking behavior of a spouse (or relative or friend) as well as to their health (or
death). Such responses may indicate learning (about the risks of smoking) or altruism (Darden and Gilleskie 2016).
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features of the addictive goods literature (Becker and Murphy 1988). The coefficient α1i captures
the unconditional (average) utility gain of smoking, which is forsaken if the individual chooses
not to smoke (i.e., withdrawal effects); α2i describes how one’s history of smoking affects utility
gain (or loss) from smoking (i.e., reinforcement effect); α3i and α4i are coefficients on endogenous
variables Hit and exogenous covariates XSit that shift preferences for smoking; ρ
S
i is a coefficient
(i.e., factor loading) on the unobserved factor ξi = [ξi1, ξi,2, . . . , ξi,M ] where the distribution of ξi is
estimated discretely byM mass points (explained later); and α5i and α6i capture the current impact
of one’s history of smoking independent of the current smoking action (i.e., tolerance effects).8
To compare with the existing literature and to keep the estimation strategy parsimonious, we
separately estimate social interaction effects for spouses, friend pairs, sibling pairs, and parent-
child pairs. We parameterize an individuals’ social utility as:
Sij(yit, yjt,Ω
′
jt) =
1
2
(β1ijyityjt + β2ijyitHjt + β3ijyitX
S
jt) (3.4)
where coefficient β1ij captures effects on i from social contact j’s current smoking action (i.e.,
“endogenous” or peer effects) and coefficient vectors β2ij and β3ij capture effects on i from social
contact j’s health status given i’s action, reflecting either learning or altruism effects and exoge-
nous characteristics (i.e., exogenous effects), respectively. Recall that the smoking action indicator,
ykt, k = i, j, takes on the values 1 and -1 rather than the typical 0/1 indicator function. Theoreti-
cally, the sign of β1ij should not be restricted; β1ij > 0 means that i’s and j’s actions are strategic
complements, and β1ij < 0 means that they are strategic substitutes.9 Since existing empirical
results indicate a positive sign (i.e., conformity), we assume that this coefficient is non-negative in
our empirical estimation part. Identification could also be achieved when the coefficient is nega-
tive, but this scenario is beyond the scope of this paper.
8The estimated coefficients have an i subscript, suggesting that there is individual heterogeneity in returns (i.e.,
estimated as random coefficients, perhaps). In practice, we allow the coefficients to vary by observed position in a
relationship (i.e., husband or wife), and restrict the notation appropriately in Section 3.2.3.
9See Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), or Bramoulle´, Kranton, and D’amours (2014).
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3.2.3 Smoking Outcomes for Relationship Pairs
Suppose the utility gain (or loss) of choosing to smoke is
y∗it = Vi(yit = 1, y−it,Ωit,Ω−it, µit, 
1
it)− Vi(yit = −1, y−it,Ωit,Ω−it, µit, −1it ).
Then, the observed smoking behavior of individual i at time t can be explained by P (yit = 1) =
P (y∗it > 0). Specifically, for each pairwise relationship where position in the relationship (e.g., hus-
band or wife, parent or adult child) is denoted by subscripts a and b, the simultaneously-determined
latent constructs are:
y∗it = α1a + α2aAit + α3aHit + α4aX
S
it + β1ayjt + β2aHjt + β3aX
S
jt + ρ
S
a ξi + µt + 
S
it
y∗jt = α1b + α2bAjt + α3bHjt + α4bX
S
jt + β1byit + β2bHit + β3bX
S
it + ρ
S
b ξj + µt + 
S
jt
yit =
 1, if y
∗
it > 0
−1, otherwise
and yjt =
 1, if y
∗
jt > 0
−1, otherwise
(3.5)
and Sit = 
1
it − −1it , Sjt = 1jt − −1jt .
We point out three areas where our empirical specification differs from its theory-based frame-
work. First, we retain the individual-specific subscripts on dependent and independent variables,
yet acknowledge that we consider pairs of social contacts. That is, we do not model the simultane-
ous actions of numerous social contacts. We also use subscripts a and b on coefficients to indicate
the mean effects on each “type” of individual (e.g., husband or wife, parent or adult child) within
the social pair. We offer no explicit notation to indicate that two individuals are in the same net-
work (i.e., are a pair) in order to avoid confusion. The effects of one’s different social contacts may
vary by the pair relationship (e.g., spouses, friends) as well as one’s type within that relationship.
Thus, in this paper, we identify mean effects for each relationship pair (i.e., “the spouse effect” or
“the friend effect”) and we do not restrict the effects to be symmetric within the pair. That is, the
effect of husbands on wives (“the husband effect”) may be different from the effect of wives on
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husbands (“the wife effect”).10 Second, theory suggests that time-varying environmental factors
such as the price of cigarettes or the sentiment toward smoking in a particular location may impact
smoking decisions. In estimation, variation in such variables is often used to identify smoking be-
haviors. We cannot rely on this source of variation since individuals in our sample are (generally)
in the same town over time. We assume that the same, time-varying unobserved environmental
factors, µt, impact all individuals at each period t; the associated terms amount to year indicators.
Third, we allow the permanent individual unobserved components (ξi and ξj) to be correlated with
each other. Thus, our estimation strategy addresses biases from homophily when measuring social
interaction effects by controlling for social contacts’ exogenous characteristics, by controlling for
(and modeling) their endogenous observables, such as their lagged smoking status, and by allowing
individual unobservables to be correlated.
3.2.4 Health Transitions and Mortality
The probability of an adverse health event for individual i is:
Pr(Hit = 1|Heit, Ait, yjt−1, XHit , ξi)
=
exp(γ1a + γ2aH
e
it + γ3aAit + γ4ayjt−1 + γ5aX
H
it + ρ
H
a ξi)
1 + exp(γ1a + γ2aHeit + γ3aAit + γ4ayjt−1 + γ5aX
H
it + ρ
H
a ξi)
(3.6)
where one’s histories of smoking (Ait) and of health (Heit, ever had a chronic health condition)
impact health transitions. We also allow the recent smoking behavior of one’s social contact to
influence own health events. The vector of exogenous individual variables are superscripted by H
(XHit ) to indicate the inclusion of an exogenous, time-varying health-related variable.
Since the average age of individuals in our data sample is high and attrition is mostly explained
by death, we explicitly model mortality (jointly with the smoking behaviors and health events) to
address non-random attrition. We define an indicator for death by period t+ 1 (Dit+1) conditional
on being alive in period t, where the probability of death depends on current adverse health events,
one’s health history, and past and current smoking behaviors. We also allow one’s social contact’s
10As specified, the coefficients are free to vary in these aforementioned ways, but can be restricted in estimation (by
the econometrician) to be the same depending on the context or what type of mean effects we want to achieve.
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current smoking behavior to influence mortality. Specifically, the probability of death is
Pr(Dit+1 = 1|Hit, Heit, Ait, yit, yjt, XHit , ξi)
=
exp(ω1a + ω2aHit + ω3aH
e
it + ω4aAit + ω5ayit + ω6ayjt + ω7aX
H
it + ρ
D
a ξi)
1 + exp(ω1a + ω2aHit + ω3aHeit + ω4aAit + ω5ayit + ω6ayjt + ω7aX
H
it + ρ
D
a ξi)
(3.7)
where the vector of exogenous individual variables (XHit ) is potentially the same set of variables
that impact adverse health events, despite the dependence of mortality on those events them-
selves.11
3.2.5 Initial Conditions
Theory suggests that smoking behaviors and health outcomes depend on lagged variables in
important ways. To test this relationship empirically, we must observe the actions and health
events of individuals over time. The FHS data allows us to observe individuals eight times (over
approximately 38 years).12 Accompanying this wealth of data is the common occurrence that indi-
viduals in the survey have non-zero values of the lagged variables when we initially observe them.
Because we initially observe individuals at an age when they may have already engaged in smok-
ing behavior (i.e., have a non-zero addictive stock) or have experienced a chronic health condition,
we must account for the endogeneity of these initially-observed values. That is, initially-observed
smoking and health may be correlated with time-invariant determinants of subsequent smoking ac-
tions and health events even conditional on one’s smoking history. For example, individuals who
value health less may be more likely to smoke at any age, to experience an adverse health event
at any time t, or to die with higher probability than someone who values health more. To address
this endogeneity, we jointly model (with the dynamic smoking, health event, and death probabil-
ities) static probabilities for the initial conditions. Importantly, we condition the initial response
11Identification is achieved through variation in the history of exogenous time-varying variables facilitated through
mortality’s dependence on observed current adverse health events and smoking behaviors (Arellano and Bond 1991).
12The Original cohort of the FHS is surveyed almost every two years since 1948; in 2013, almost 100 participants
were still alive. We use only those exams from the Original cohort that overlap with exams from the Offspring cohort.
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probabilities on individual unobserved heterogeneity.13
We model the initial smoking state (i.e., ever smoked up to t = 1 or age of smoking initiation)
for i as follows:
y∗i0 = α
0
1a + α
0
2aX
S
i0 + α
0
3aX
S
j0 + ρ
S0
a ξi + 
S
i0
yi0 =
 1, if y
∗
i0 > 0
−1, otherwise
(3.8)
and, for the other individual in the pair (j), the initial equation is analogous. Note that characteris-
tics of one’s social contact may influence initial smoking behavior.14 Proper identification of these
initial conditions requires that the vector of exogenous individual characteristics (XSi0) include a
variable that affects initial smoking, but does not affect subsequent smoking conditional on one’s
smoking history.15
The probability of the initial health state of individual i (i.e., an adverse health event entering
period t = 1) is:
Pr(Hi1 = 1|XHi0 , yi0, yj0, ξi) =
exp(γ01a + γ
0
2aX
H
i0 + γ
0
3ayi0 + γ
0
4ayj0 + ρ
H0
a ξi)
1 + exp(γ01a + γ
0
2aX
H
i0 + γ
0
3ayi0 + γ
0
4ayj0 + ρ
H0
a ξi)
. (3.9)
and depends on the initial smoking status of the individual as well as that of her social contact.
Analogous functions are used to define health state probabilities for individual j of the relationship
pair.16 Similarly, identification requires a variable inXHi0 that is excluded from the vector of exoge-
nous individual characteristics that affect subsequent health events and mortality. Dependence of
13We detail assumptions necessary for estimation in Section 3.2.6. Modified methods of Wooldridge (2005) could
be used for an unbalanced panel such as ours, but finite sample bias was found under some situations (e.g., Akay 2012;
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2013).
14Because we model initial smoking prior to age 19 as the initial condition and we drop couples who were married
before age 19, we do not include spouse characteristics in the initial smoking probability. We do, however, allow
spouse’s lagged smoking behavior to impact initial health since it represent health events in the recent past.
15We return to this discussion when we introduce our empirical solution for multiple equilibria.
16We assume one’s prior history of health shocks is zero when we first observe them (i.e., Hei1 = 0).
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these initial conditions on individual unobserved heterogeneity (ξi) addresses potential endogene-
ity bias in estimated effects of lagged smoking behaviors and health events in the jointly estimated
dynamic probabilities of smoking and health transitions.17
3.2.6 Additional Considerations for Estimation
Multiple Equilibria
The likelihood function, comprised of the probabilities defined in equations 3.5-3.9 and the
observed individual outcomes over time, is an “incomplete” discrete econometric model according
to the existing econometrics literature (Tamer, 2003). Directly applying a maximum likelihood
method produces inconsistent estimates (Heckman 1978; Maddala 1983). In a game theory frame-
work, the “incompleteness” is caused by the existence of multiple equilibria in the model. That is,
the relationship between the covariates and error terms and the observed outcome is a correspon-
dence, not a function (e.g., Bjorn and Vuong 1984; Bresnahan and Reiss 1991; Tamer 2003).
To deal with the multiple equilibria problem, several approaches have been proposed in the
existing literature. The first approach is to find a common feature of all equilibria and change the
model into one that predicts this feature (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss 1991). The second approach is
to specify a selection rule for the multiple equilibrium (e.g., Bjorn and Vuong 1984; Soetevent and
Kooreman 2007). The third approach is to use upper and lower bounds of the choice probability
to restrict the parameter estimates to a set and, with this, partially identify the parameters (e.g.,
Ciliberto and Tamer 2009).
Unlike the above mentioned approaches, we leave the probability of equilibrium selection as an
empirical construct to be estimated. The idea is similar to Bajari et al. (2010), who estimate equi-
librium selection mechanisms. To illustrate the idea, Figure 3.1 shows the equilibrium pattern for
different draws of the smoking i.i.d. error terms (ignoring the evolution of health and death for this
example). Suppose β = (α1, α2, α3, α4, β2, β3, ρS, 1) and ~Ωit = (1, Ait, Hit, XSit , Hjt, X
S
jt, ξi, µt)
17The factor loading (ρS) on the permanent individual-level unobserved heterogeneity in the initial smoking proba-
bility (or age of smoking initiation) is normalized to one to satisfy an identification requirement for consistent estima-
tion.
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where an individual’s social contact’s smoking behavior (yjt) is removed from the information vec-
tor and the marginal effect (β1) is similarly removed from the coefficient vector. We see that events
{yit= 1 and yjt= 1} and {yit= −1 and yjt= −1}may happen if−βa~Ωit−β1a ≤ it ≤ −βa~Ωit+β1a
and −βb~Ωjt − β1b ≤ jt ≤ −βb~Ωjt + β1b. Therefore, two equilibria, (1,1) and (-1,-1), exist if Sit
and Sjt are drawn from this region (i.e., the hashed region in Figure 3.1). We assume that in the
multiple equilibria region, outcome (1,1) is selected with probability Pr(o = (1, 1)), and thus out-
come (-1,-1) is selected with probability 1−Pr(o = (1, 1)). According to Bajari et al. (2010), β1a,
β1b and Pr(o = (1, 1)) can be identified if we have exclusion restrictions that shift the smoking
behavior of i (or j) but do not directly shift the smoking behavior of j (or i).18
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium Pattern for Error Space
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Identification
To identify β1a, β1b and Pr(o = (1, 1)), we use different exclusion restrictions for different
types of relationship. For spouses, we use factors that shift the wife’s (or the husband’s) smoking
status before her (or his) marriage as exclusion restrictions. Specifically, we use the proportion of
individuals in the same birth year, same sex cohort of the wife (or the husband) who ever smoked
18 Pr(o = (1, 1)) as an additional parameter is only identified if neither β1a nor β1b is zero. One could also allow
the probability of the equilibrium selection to depend on individuals’ observed or unobserved characteristics, but the
additional parameters are hard to identify in our model.
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before age 19 to capture the effect of cohort-specific factors, such as values toward smoking or the
cost of smoking for the specific age-sex cohort. Since the husband and the wife belong to different
age-sex groups, the values are different for the husband and the wife, and they separately shift
initial smoking status (i.e., ever smoked before age 19) of the husband and the wife, which leads to
different smoking stocks that separately shift their smoking behaviors after marriage. We dropped
a small portion of the sample who married before 19 to guarantee that the factors shift behavior
before marriage.19 For siblings and friends, since it is more likely that they belong to the same
cohort, we use smoking status of excluded social contacts as an additional exclusion restriction.
The idea is similar to the literature that uses characteristics of excluded peers as instruments to deal
with identification problems (Bramoulle´ et al. 2009; De Giorgi et al. 2010). Age of the individual
also serves as an exclusion restriction, with the assumption that it does not directly shift the social
contact’s smoking behavior.
Identification of the effect of health status on smoking behavior requires a variable that alters
health events but does not directly shift smoking behavior conditional on the observed health sta-
tus. Since our measure for health status is a cardiovascular disease shock, we use an indicator for
high-normal blood pressure as an exclusion restriction. The risk of high-normal blood pressure on
cardiovascular disease events was not well known at the time most of our data were collected.20
Since individuals with high-normal blood pressure are unaware of their increased risk for an ad-
verse cardiovascular health event, we assume that it does not directly affect own smoking behavior.
Distributional Assumptions
We use a full-information maximum likelihood method to jointly estimate the probabilities (in
equations 3.5-3.9) of the behaviors and outcomes we observe. We assume Sit, 
S
jt (t= 0, 1, . . . , T )
are i.i.d. idiosyncratic errors conditional on observed exogenous and health variables as well as
19We assume the proportion measure is not correlated with unobserved permanent heterogeneity of the individuals
since it represents a population feature (i.e., no homophily for the entire age-sex cohort).
20See the research milestones of FHS and Vasan, Larson, Leip, Evans, O’Donnell, Kannel, and Levy (2001).
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unobserved permanent individual and time-varying environmental factors, and each follows a nor-
mal distribution N(0, 1). By assumption, the health transitions and mortality error terms Hit , 
D
it
(t= 1, 2, . . . , T ) are i.i.d. and follow standard logistic distributions. These errors are not correlated
with each other and other error terms in the system, conditional on observable characteristics,
permanent individual unobserved heterogeneity ξi, and common unobserved heterogeneity µt.
Following an approach proposed and used by Heckman and Singer (1984), Mroz and Guilkey
(1992) and Mroz (1999), we assume the joint distribution of ξi and ξj can be approximated by
a set of discrete mass points and associated weights without imposing a specific distribution. A
Monte Carlo analyses demonstrates that this flexible approach performs better in simultaneous
equations than assuming, for example, a joint normal distribution for error terms that may not be
normally distributed (Mroz 1999). Having been specific about assumptions made for distributions
of unobservables, identification, and equilibrium selection, we specify the likelihood function in
Appendix C.1.
3.3 Data and Construction of Variables
3.3.1 Framingham Heart Study
The data we use to estimate social interaction effects are from the Framingham Heart Study
(FHS) with its complementary social network data (FHS-Net). This ongoing longitudinal study
began in 1948 under the direction of the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute (NHLBI) and
has attained iconic status in epidemiological research. Much of the now-common knowledge con-
cerning heart disease and detrimental effects of smoking were first discovered by this study.21 The
study follows several cohorts of residents (or former residents) of the town of Framingham, Mas-
sachusetts with periodic in-person health examinations and survey measures of other health-related
information. The complementary social network data link the study participants by their social ties.
The network information was organized and first used by Nicholas A. Christakis, James H. Fowler,
and their co-authors. In this paper, we focus on spouses, friends, siblings, and parent-child pairs.
One limitation of these data is that friendship ties were collected from handwritten tracking sheets,
21See texttthttps://www.framinghamheartstudy.org/about-fhs/research-milestones.php.
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which were designed for the purpose of facilitating follow-up. Since a majority of individuals nom-
inate only one friend, and many of the nominated friends are not participants in the FHS study, the
friend ties are relatively sparse. Yet, missing network ties is a common problem for most network
datasets.
The FHS surveys individuals from several different cohorts, labeled Original, Offspring, Third
Generation, New Offspring Spouse, and Omni 1 and 2. The social network data focus mostly on
the Offspring cohort and some of the waves (called Exams in the FHS) of the Original cohort. The
exams we use span years 1971 to 2008. Exams are not performed annually. In our data, the average
gap between two adjacent exams of an individual is 5 years (for the Offspring cohort) and 2 years
(for the Original cohort), and the longest gap is 11 years.22 In this paper, based on the availability
of social network data, we use Exams 1-8 of the Offspring cohort and Exams 12, 16, 19, 21, 23,
24, 26, and 28 of the Original cohort, in which exam dates most closely correspond to those of
the Offspring cohort.23 For simplicity, we re-label the chosen exams of the Original cohort as
Original Cohort Exam 1 to Exam 8, respectively. Because of the addictive nature of smoking and
the infrequent fluctuation in smoking behavior, we assume the exam-specific observed smoking
behavior is representative of behavior over the exam period and, based on this assumption, we
treat observed smoking behaviors across individuals (pairs) as concurrent.24
The total number of distinct individuals among the original and offspring data with overlapping
exams is 8533. We drop those individuals who never report a smoking status or only report smoking
status in one exam, which results in 7090 distinct individuals. We also drop individuals who enter
the study below age 19, who are older than age 70, or for whom information on initial smoking
22Additionally, within an exam wave, individuals are not examined or surveyed at the same time.
23Original Cohort Exam 29 is closer to Offspring Cohort Exam 8, but we do not have access to it. Instead, we
use Original Cohort Exam 28. Although the Third Generation cohort and other Omni cohorts can be linked with
the network data to some extent, we do not use them because either most of the relationships we explore cannot be
identified or there are only one or two exams for these cohorts.
24Darden et al. (2017) report that, among the Original cohort, one quarter of men never smoke, a little over a quarter
always smoke, and three-quarters of the men who smoke and quit do not restart. In fact, just over a third of men who
smoked and quit after age 30 begin smoking again. The average length of cessation prior to relapse is a little over three
years.
104
status is not available. These deletions result in 6480 distinct individuals with eight exams. In
addition, some individuals may not report their smoking status in some of the exams; we drop these
individual-exam observations.25 Finally, some individuals die. Our estimation sample consists of
an unbalanced panel with 37906 individual-exam observations.26 We use these observations to
construct social contact pairs.27 The social interactions that we examine are among spouse, friend,
sibling, and parent and adult child pairs. The number of paired exams (i.e., exams for which we
observe the behaviors and outcomes of both individuals in the pair) are 9394, 4796, 15346, and
10044, respectively.
3.3.2 Construction of Key Variables
We seek to measure the influence of endogenous smoking behaviors among social pairs. To
that end, we require an analogous description of smoking behavior at frequent intervals. In the FHS
exams, participants were asked variants of the question “Have you smoked cigarettes regularly in
the last year?” We use responses to these questions to define smoking actions (i.e., yes as 1, no
as -1).28 Initial smoking status (i.e., ever regularly smoked before age 19) is constructed using
retrospective questions from Exams 7, 12 and 17 for those in the Original cohort and from Exam
1 for the Offspring cohort.29
Our time-varying health indicator is constructed using information on cardiovascular disease
events that occurred at least one year prior to each examination and since one year prior to the last
25Non-response rates of participants to smoking questions are less than one percent.
26We impute some other explanatory variables by a multiple imputation method. Observations with any imputed
explanatory variable are less than 10 percent of the sample.
27If one person has multiple same type social contacts, such as multiple friends, at the same time, they are regarded
as different observations for the estimation. This happens very infrequently.
28It is possible to use responses to other smoking-related questions in subsequent exams to reconstruct smoking
behavior in a missed exam. However, we do not perform such imputations in order to avoid potential bias. We do
impute the smoking action for individuals in Original Cohort Exam 16 using retrospective questions from Exam 17
because smoking status was not asked in Exam 16.
29Some relationships (links) were initiated in the later exams (e.g., married in Exam 2 or new friendship in Exam
3). The initial smoking statuses of those individuals are coded as the smoking status in the exam that preceded the
linkages.
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examination. The cardiovascular disease events include: Myocardial Infarction, Angina Pectoris,
Coronary Insufficiency, Cerebrovascular Accident (e.g., Atherothrombotic Infarction of Brain,
Transient Ischemic Attack, Cerebral Embolism, Intracerebral Hemorrhage, Subarachnoid Hem-
orrhage), and Congestive Heart Failure. Blood pressure is recorded by two numbers: systolic
(SBP) and diastolic (DBP) blood pressure readings. For our purposes, we define an indicator for
high blood pressure if the individual has SBP>140mmHg or DBP>90mmHg or is under hyper-
tension treatment. High-normal blood pressure indicates the individual does not have high blood
pressure but pressure readings are 130mmHg>SBP>139mmHg or 85mmHg>DBP>89mmHg.30
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the endogenous and exogenous variables used in the sub-
sequent estimation section. The table also specifies (with an asterisk) which endogenous variables
define the dependent variables in equations 3.5-3.9.
3.3.3 Replication of Previous Findings
The original assembler’s of the network data (Christakis and Fowler, henceforth CF) reported
their findings regarding whether an individual’s social contact’s quit behavior influenced own
smoking behavior (Christakis and Fowler 2008). They found that a person’s likelihood of smoking
decreased by 67 percent if their spouse did not currently smoke versus smoked currently, by 25
percent among siblings, and by 43 percent among mutual friends.31 In an effort to compare our
findings from a more comprehensive econometric model with those of CF, we first must repli-
cate their estimation sample of network pairs. Replication is often difficult because details of
researcher decisions regarding sample construction are scarce. Our attempt to replicate the CF
sample revealed that those authors used the responses to a question about an individual’s smok-
ing that asked “Usual number of cigarettes smoked (now or formerly)” to construct the smoking
indicator at the first exam. They coded any positive response as one; zero otherwise. Because
this question contains responses about former smoking behavior, it is likely to overstate smoking
30The American Heart Association defines prehypertension as a SBP between 120 and 139 mm Hg or a DBP
between 80 and 89 mm Hg.
31CF arrive at these values by simulating smoking behavior of the egos at the mean values of the explanatory
variables when the alter does and does not quit smoking.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Individual-Exam Observations
Variable Mean SD
Endogenous Variables
Smoke in t * 0.227 0.419
Smoke in t− 1 0.266 0.442
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 0.417 0.493
Cardiovascular Disease Event between t− 1 and t * 0.054 0.227
Ever Cardiovascular Disease before t− 1 0.071 0.257
Death between t and t+ 1 * 0.064 0.244
Ever Regularly Smoked before age 19 (t = 0) * 0.374 0.484
Cardiovascular Disease Event entering t = 1 * 0.031 0.174
Exogenous Variables
Demographics
Female 0.551 0.497
Married 0.744 0.437
Age in years at t [range: 19,102] 57.353 15.134
Age in years at t = 1 [range: 19,70] 44.005 13.667
Education
No High School 0.055 0.228
Some High School 0.073 0.261
High School Graduate 0.336 0.472
College 0.402 0.490
Post-College 0.133 0.340
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.360 0.480
High-Normal Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.138 0.345
Proportion who Smoked before age 19 0.390 0.140
in Same Birth-year Same Sex Cohort
Individual-Exam Observations 37,906
Note: * indicates variable is also modeled as a dependent variable.
All variables in the table, except “Age in years”, are indicator
variables (0 or 1) .
107
in the current (first exam) period. Figure S1 of CF’s supplementary appendix depicts the average
smoking probabilities at each exam of individuals in their sample.32 Figure 3.2a below depicts the
smoking probabilities for our replicated sample when we make the same assignment mistake for
first exam smoking behavior. Figure 3.2b depicts the smoking probabilities for our sample.
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Figure 3.2: Smoking Incidence Using Replicated Sample and Our Sample
A few additional differences between their sample and our sample exist. CF used up to seven
observations on an individual while our sample includes eight. They also restricted their sample
to individuals between age 21 and age 70 while we include individuals aged 19 and above. Their
estimated smoking equations use only the “offspring cohort” as egos (i.e., the focal individuals).
The linked individual (“alter”) can be from any of the “Original Cohort,” “Offspring Cohort,”
“Omni Cohort” and “Generation 3 Cohort.” We use individuals from the “Original cohort” and
“Offspring Cohort” to construct both egos and alters.
We now attempt to replicate CF’s results. In estimation we use our replication of their sample,
including the assignment error. We also provide results from estimation using our corrected, or
preferred, sample. Their main reported findings regarding the behavioral impact of social con-
tacts are derived from a logistic regression of ego’s smoking status on alter’s previous and current
32The supplementary appendix cited in Christakis and Fowler (2008) is available at http://
www.nejm.org/doi/suppl/10.1056/NEJMsa0706154/suppl file/nejm christakis 2249sa1.pdf.
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smoking status as well as ego’s previous smoking status, ego’s exogenous demographic charac-
teristics, and exam indicators. They consider social pairs of the types: spouse, friend, sibling,
co-worker, and neighbor. While CF account for clustering of standard errors since individuals are
observed multiple times, they do not model the endogeneity of own previous smoking status or
that of the social contact’s current and previous smoking behavior. They claim that the inclusion of
own lagged smoking behavior addresses serial correlation and that the inclusion of alter’s smoking
behavior addresses homophily. They also report impacts of a social contact’s smoking behavior on
own smoking using the estimated model’s predictions of own behavior at the average values of the
explanatory variables. As such, while they sometimes describe their findings as the ego’s quitting
response to an alter’s “smoking cessation,” their main findings, highlighted in their abstract, do not
condition the alter’s previous smoking to one and do not condition the ego’s previous smoking to
one. Hence, it is our opinion that the results do not reflect quit responses to social contact’s quitting.
Rather, from the best we can tell, their main reported results are percent changes in the ego’s prob-
ability of smoking (unconditional on ego’s previous smoking status) when an alter smokes and
does not smoke currently (unconditional on alter’s previous smoking status). We estimate their
model using our replication of their miscoded sample and calculate marginal effects evaluated at
the average values of all explanatory variables except for alter’s current smoking behavior. We
then report percent changes as CF do, rather than reporting the percentage point change. Because
CF do not report the averages of ego’s smoking probabilities when alter does and does not smoke,
we cannot compare percentage point changes.
Table 3.2 provides the percent change in smoking behavior of the ego when the alter smokes
versus does not smoke (i.e., p(yit=1|yjt=1)−p(yit=1|yjt=0)
p(yit=1|yjt=1) ) for spouse, mutual friend, and sibling pairs.
We reproduce the CF results in the first panel. Panel two details results using our replication of
their sample, including its error, and CF’s estimation and calculation procedure. The third panel
of the table reports the percent changes using our preferred sample in estimation. Here, we use
their estimation model and predict smoking probabilities as CF do. Finally, we report the percent
changes using the same estimation procedure as CF on both our replicated CF sample and our
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preferred sample with calculations of the ego’s smoking probabilities (when the alter does and
does not smoke) conditional on the ego smoking in the previous period.
Table 3.2: Percentage Change in the Likelihood of Ego Smoking when Alter Smokes versus does
not Smoke for Different Social Pairs
Mutual
Sample Spouses Friends Siblings
Christakis & Fowler (2008) 67 43 25
[59,73] [1,69] [14,35]
10,522 1,083 21,097
Replicated results
Evaluated at sample means of all explanatory variables
• Replicated Sample 65 39 30
[59,72] [7,72] [21,39]
10,762 1,338 18,157
• Our Sample 53 38 21
[46,59] [13,63] [13,30]
18,788 2,276 30,692
Evaluated at sample means of explanatory variables
with ego smoking in t− 1
• Replicated Sample 26 16 11
[23,30] [2,29] [8,15]
10,762 1,338 18,157
• Our Sample 24 16 8
[20,27] [5,28] [5,12]
18,788 2,276 30,692
Note: 95% confidence intervals are reported in brackets below the percentage change figures.
Sample size is also reported.
The purpose of Table 3.2 is three-fold. First, a comparison of the results in panels one and two
demonstrate that we do a pretty good job of replicating CF’s results using a sample constructed like
theirs and their estimation and percent change calculations. We calculate confidence intervals using
1000 bootstrapped replications, as CF does. Second, when we use our larger, preferred sample, we
obtain similar, yet slightly smaller, results as CF. Third, because we wish to understand how social
contacts’ behaviors influence quitting behavior, we use our replicated CF sample and our preferred
sample to calculate probabilities of ego’s smoking conditional on the ego smoking in the previous
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period when the alter does and does not smoke contemporaneously. We find that the percent
changes are considerably smaller, but it is difficult to say anything about a social contacts’ influence
on the behavior of previous smokers versus non-smokers because the baseline probabilities are
so different. That is, these figures reflect percent changes and the unconditional probabilities of
smoking are smaller than the probabilities of smoking if one has smoked in the previous year
(i.e., persistence is significant). In the next section we present results from a different estimation
procedure using our preferred sample. Our preferred estimation model addresses several concerns
in the peer effects literature as well as important dimensions of dynamic models of smoking and
health.
3.4 Results and Discussion
In this section, we present the results of our preferred model of the smoking behaviors of
individuals and their social contacts where we specifically account for simultaneity, homophily,
confounding, smoking dynamics, stochastic health, and endogenous initial conditions. We estimate
the equation system (defined by equations 3.5-3.9) for spouse, friend, sibling, and parent-child
pairs. We also discuss these results by comparing them with the results from specifications that do
not fully address these concerns.
3.4.1 Effects of Own Observed Behavior and Characteristics
Table 3.3 provides the estimated effects of variables explaining smoking and health probabili-
ties (equations 3.5 and 3.6) for each member of a spouse pair. We report other estimated parameters
for spouse pairs and all parameters for friend, sibling, and parent-child pairs in the Appendix.33
Models of addiction suggest that current smoking behavior depends on the history of one’s own
smoking behavior, which is summarized in our empirical model by indicators of smoking in the
previous period and having ever regularly smoked. Any history of smoking increases the prob-
ability of smoking currently, which indicates a positive “reinforcement” effect. A recent history
33According to Christakis and Fowler (2013), friend pairs in their papers were defined by the question “please tell
us the name of a close friend, to whom you are not related” with whom “you are close enough that they would know
where you are if we can’t find you.” We believe that this question indicates that once a person reported another person’s
name, they should be mutual friends. Therefore, in our preferred estimation, unlike Christakis and Fowler (2008), we
define friend pairs by nomination in either direction.
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strengthens that relationship. Recall from section 3.2.1 that health shocks entering period t are
observed prior to making a smoking decision. A recent health event (measured by having a cardio-
vascular disease event between t−1 and t) and one’s blood pressure in the previous period capture
health of the individual. Recent poor health decreases the probability of smoking. The effects of
age and education are also provided in the table.
Smoking last period increases the probability of a cardiovascular disease event between period
t− 1 and t. Indicators of either high blood pressure or high-normal blood pressure in the previous
period increase the probability of a health shock. Note that the significance of the high-normal
blood pressure indicator is a necessary condition for identification of the health equation in this
system of simultaneous equations.34
3.4.2 Effects of Social Contact’s Observed Behavior
Important to this analysis, we examine the impacts of a social contacts’ behavior, health, and
exogenous characteristics on one’s own smoking behavior. We find that the current smoking behav-
ior of each spouse significantly affects the current smoking behavior of the other spouse. We find
no evidence that a spouse’s cardiovascular disease event affects one’s own probability of smoking.
However, a wife’s previous smoking behavior does increase the probability of a cardiovascular
disease event among husbands (but not vice versa).
The statistically significant positive estimates of the key parameter, β1, suggest that spouse’s
smoking status leads an individual to choose the same smoking status. Using the estimated model,
we calculate an ego’s probability of smoking (i.e., smoking in the current period, given that he
smoked in the previous period) when his alter smokes in the current period and when she does not
smoke in the current period. Table 3.4 reports the differences in these probabilities (i.e., marginal
effects) for several different versions of the model that successively include important econometric
considerations: simultaneity of the ego’s and the alter’s smoking decision, correlated unobserved
individual heterogeneity, endogeneity of the health shock, and non-random attrition due to death.
34We have verified the other necessary condition that high-normal blood pressure (in t− 1) does not impact current
smoking behavior conditional on the indicator for a health event between periods.
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results: Smoking and Health Probabilities for Spouse Pairs
Husband Equation Wife Equation
Coeff SE Coeff SE
Smoking at t (Equation 3.5)
Smoke in t− 1 1.004∗∗∗ 0.031 0.768∗∗∗ 0.030
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 0.499∗∗∗ 0.039 0.311∗∗∗ 0.041
Cardiovascular Disease Event between t and t− 1 −0.224∗∗ 0.102 −0.563∗∗∗ 0.192
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 −0.104∗∗ 0.056 −0.179∗∗ 0.079
(Age-19)/10 at t −0.116 0.081 0.382∗∗∗ 0.089
(Age-19)2/100 at t 0.001 0.012 −0.087∗∗∗ 0.014
No High School −0.301∗∗ 0.146 0.111 0.210
Some High School −0.035 0.111 0.079 0.155
College 0.026 0.065 −0.113 0.080
Post-College −0.102 0.088 −0.241 0.149
Social Contact:
Smoke in t (β1) 0.160∗∗∗ 0.044 0.188∗∗∗ 0.047
Cardiovascular Disease Event between t and t− 1 0.156 0.155 0.125 0.109
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.000 0.063 −0.037 0.067
No High School 0.085 0.158 −0.062 0.207
Some High School 0.009 0.129 0.290∗∗ 0.129
College −0.084 0.060 −0.259∗∗∗ 0.089
Post-College −0.327∗∗∗ 0.114 −0.253∗ 0.130
ρS −0.572∗∗∗ 0.167 0.267∗∗∗ 0.052
Constant 1.296∗∗∗ 0.179 1.690∗∗∗ 0.174
Cardiovascular Disease Event between t− 1 and t (Equation 3.6)
Smoke in t− 1 0.377∗∗∗ 0.077 0.342∗∗ 0.170
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 −0.121∗ 0.063 −0.123 0.087
Ever Cardiovascular Disease before t− 1 0.981∗∗∗ 0.107 1.245∗∗∗ 0.174
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.527∗∗∗ 0.111 0.927∗∗∗ 0.175
High-Normal Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.369∗∗∗ 0.144 0.540∗∗ 0.237
(Age-19)/10 at t 1.448∗∗∗ 0.298 1.772∗∗∗ 0.515
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.106∗∗∗ 0.032 −0.127∗∗ 0.054
No High School 0.027 0.181 0.036 0.272
Some High School 0.010 0.159 0.418∗∗ 0.216
Some High School −0.093 0.108 −0.334∗∗ 0.156
Post-College −0.399∗∗ 0.156 −0.555 0.377
Social Contact: Smoke in t− 1 0.148∗∗ 0.056 0.076 0.088
ρHa −0.155 0.101 0.011 0.233
Constant −6.943∗∗∗ 0.688 −8.909∗∗∗ 1.256
Number of Pair-Exams: 9394
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The table provides selected estimated parameters from the smoking and health event probabilities as part of a larger joint estimation of
equations 3.5-3.9 for spouse pairs. Estimates for parameters in other equations of the jointly estimated set of equations are in the Appendix.
The specification normalizes one mass point to zero (ξ1(i,j) = 0) and identifies another mass point, ξ
2
(i,j) = −1.911 with standard error
0.070. The joint probabilities for the mass point combinations are P (ξi = 0, ξj = 0) = 0.16, P (ξi = −0.190, ξj = 0) = 0.081,
P (ξi = 0, ξj = −0.190) = 0.479, and P (ξi = −0.190, ξj = −0.190) = 0.280. Time-varying unobserved effects (µt for t= 1, 2, . . . , 8) are
controlled for by including exam indicators. The estimated probability of equilibrium (1,1) is Pr(o = (1, 1)) = 0.185 (when the equilibrium
is either (1,1) or (-1,-1)).
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These specifications (in columns) allow us to evaluate aspects of the econometric modeling that
address bias in estimates of a social contact’s influence. The rows of Table 3.4 present the results
for different relationship types. Specifically, we allow for different effects of a wife’s behavior on a
husband’s behavior (labeled “Wife’s (effect on)→ Husband”) and vice versa (labeled “Husband’s
(Effect on) → Wife”). We also examine the social interaction effects among mutual friends and
siblings, as well as the effects of a parent’s behavior on an adult child’s behavior (labeled “Parent’s
(Effect on)→ Child”) and vice versa (“Child’s (Effect on)→ Parent”).
The first column reports benchmark estimates from probit estimation of equation 3.5 without
the multiple equilibria correction and without controlling for correlated individual unobserved het-
erogeneity ξ.35 We find statistically significant marginal effects for all types of social contacts. For
example, if the wife of a spousal pair does not smoke, her husband (who smoked last period) is
15.8 percentage points less likely to smoke this period.36 To compare to the results in Table 3.2,
this change reflects a 25.0 percent decrease in the husband’s probability of smoking. Analogously,
we measure the impact of a husband’s smoking behavior on that of the wife, as the model allows
for asymmetric effects within a social pair. We find that wives, who smoked in the previous period,
are 14.8 percentage points (or 23.8 percent) less likely to smoke currently if the husband currently
does not smoke versus smokes. These percent changes expand upon the composite spouse effect
summarized in the last rows of Table 3.2.
We continue examining the impacts among spouse pairs across different estimators before dis-
cussing the impacts of other social pairs. The results in column 2 include a correction for multiple
equilibria. This correction requires joint estimation of the two equations in the equation system (5),
and solves the simultaneity problem. Note that the marginal effects are smaller (by a third) and
remain statistically significant, which demonstrates that simultaneity creates significant upward
35This specification is equivalent to estimating the two equations in (5) separately. Note that the results in Table 3.2
reflect the combined estimation where social contact effects are forced to be the same.
36Expressed differently, if the wife of a spousal pair smokes, her husband is 15.8 percentage points more likely to
smoke than if she does not smoked.
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Table 3.4: Marginal Effects: Alter’s Smoking Behavior on Ego’s Smoking Behavior for
All Social Pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wife’s (Effect on)→ Husband 0.158∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Husband’s (Effect on)→Wife 0.148∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Friends 0.064∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Siblings 0.068∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.010 0.011 0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Parent’s (Effect on)→ Child 0.089∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.014) (0.022) (0.277) (0.252) (0.322)
Child’s (Effect on)→ Parent 0.068∗∗∗ 0.023 0.032∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Estimator addresses:
Simultaneity No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unobserved Heterogeneity No No Yes Yes Yes
Endogeneity of the Health Variable No No No Yes Yes
Attrition Due to Death No No No No Yes
Percent Change
Wife’s (Effect on)→ Husband 25.0 17.1 17.3 16.8 16.5
Husband’s (Effect on)→Wife 23.8 16.5 21.9 22.1 21.9
Friends 11.7 7.6 8.6 8.8 8.6
Siblings 11.7 7.8 2.9 2.9 2.8
Parent’s (Effect on)→ Child 14.0 12.0 0.4 0.4 0.3
Child’s (Effect on)→ Parent 14.6 5.3 12.4 16.5 15.5
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The marginal effects of alter’s smoking behavior on ego’s smoking behavior are simulated assuming
ego smoked last period. For friends and siblings, the effects are assumed to be symmetric. Percentage point
changes are reported in the top panel. Standard errors are calculated using 500 random draws from the
variance-covariance matrix of estimated parameters. Percent changes are provided in the bottom panel.
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bias in the marginal effects if not properly dealt with. Column 3 reports a specification that allows
for individual unobserved heterogeneity ξ to address “homophily” and requires jointly estimating
equations 3.5 and (8).37 Column 4 provides results for a specification that adds the health equations
3.6 and 3.9 to the jointly estimated equation system; column 5 accounts for attrition due to death by
adding equation 3.7. Note that the estimates for the marginal effects are robust with these model
specifications. The results from our preferred model (column 5) suggests that a wife who does
not smoke decreases her husband’s probability of smoking by 7.8 percentage points (or 16.5 per-
cent) over a wife who does smoke; a husband who does not smoke decreases his wife’s probability
of smoking by 8.5 percentage points (or 21.9 percent). These impacts, while still suggesting a
conformative social interaction effect, are smaller than those estimated with a less-comprehensive
estimator.38
Having discussed why we prefer the estimator in column 5 of Table 3.4, we examine the esti-
mated marginal effects among other social pairs. We see that the decrease in smoking probabilities
when a friend smokes and does not smoke falls from 6.4 percentage points (or 11.7 percent) to 4.2
percentage points (or 8.6 percent) as the estimator addresses additional econometric concerns. The
decrease in smoking probabilities of siblings (or children) when the other sibling (or parents) does
and does not smoke changes from being statistically significant (yet biased) at a 6.8 percentage
point (8.9 percentage point) to being statistically insignificant. The largest changes happen from
Column 2 to Column 3 (i.e., after addressing “homophily” due to the unobserved heterogeneity),
which is consistent with the intuition that the “homophily” due to permanent unobserved factors
plays a larger role for these types of relationships (siblings and parents/children). Interestingly,
37The best fit of our model (in terms of information criteria) has two latent factors for each person in the pair,
so there are a total of four points of support in the discrete joint distribution. The results indicate that unobserved
heterogeneity plays an important role as the estimated marginal effects decline even more. This finding is consistent
with Clark and Etile´ (2006).
38We also evaluated the marginal effects and percent changes at the observed values of the explanatory variables.
That is, we did not condition on the ego having smoked in the previous period. Our analogous values are 4.2 percentage
points (or 20.4 percent) and 4.8 percentage points (or 25.5 percent) for husband and wife egos, respectively. These
results are presented in Appendix Table C8. We see that addressing simultaneity, homophily, health endogeneity, and
non-random attrition is very important.
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using our preferred model, we find that a non-smoking child statistically significantly decreases
the smoking probability of his or her parents.
117
3.4.3 Effects of Social Contact’s Observed Characteristics
Table 3.5 summarizes the estimated parameters for social contacts’ exogenous characteristics
or health status on one’s smoking behavior (β2 or β3) for all social pairs. We find that an alter’s
education significantly decreases the ego’s probability of smoking for several types of social pairs.
We do not find evidence, for any relationship, that a social contact’s cardiovascular disease shock
affects one’s probability of smoking. These results are consistent with Khwaja et al. (2006), who
find no statistically significant effects of spousal health shocks on own smoking, and consistent
with Darden and Gilleskie (2016), who find no statistically significant effects of parents’ health
shocks on children.
Table 3.5: Estimation Results: Alter’s Characteristics on Ego’s Smoking Behavior for All Social
Pairs
Wife Husband Friends Siblings Parent Child
Social Contact → Husband →Wife → Child → Parent
Female −0.093 −0.011 0.053 0.022
(0.087) (0.038) (0.064) (0.068)
Married −0.037 −0.008 −0.024 0.023
(0.064) (0.038) (0.063) (0.064)
No High School 0.085 −0.062 −0.083 0.233∗∗
(0.158) (0.207) (0.111) (0.100)
Some High School 0.009 0.290∗∗ −0.050 0.039 0.052 −0.875∗∗
(0.129) (0.129) (0.092) (0.070) (0.082) (0.343)
College −0.084 −0.259∗∗∗ −0.098∗ −0.063 −0.148 −0.933∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.089) (0.057) (0.046) (0.097) (0.345)
Post-College −0.327∗∗∗ −0.253∗ −0.161∗ 0.044 −0.096 −0.860∗∗
(0.114) (0.130) (0.091) (0.062) (0.164) (0.349)
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.000 −0.037 0.050 0.051 0.089∗ −0.030
(0.063) (0.067) (0.052) (0.038) (0.050) (0.096)
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 0.156 0.125 −0.061 0.132 0.058 0.209
(0.155) (0.109) (0.109) (0.080) (0.067) (0.300)
Number of Pair-Exams: 9394 9394 4796 15346 10044 10044
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports effects of social contacts’ characteristics on individual smoking behavior (β2 or β3 in equation 3.5) for each social pair
from joint estimation of equations 3.5-3.9.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
Table A1: Offense Categories and Types
Violence
1.Assault, Robbery and sexual offense
001 = Assault resulting in a serious injury
002 = Assault involving the use of a weapon
104 = Physical attack with a firearm or explosive device
003 = Assault on school personnel not resulting in a serious injury
071 = Assault on non-student w/o weapon and not resulting in serious injury
044 = Assault on student
072 = Assault on student w/o weapon and not resulting in serious injury
090 = Violent assault not resulting in serious injury
045 = Assault - other
103 = Robbery with a firearm or explosive device
010 = Robbery with a dangerous weapon
093 = Robbery without a weapon
016 = Kidnapping
023 = Extortion
015 = Taking indecent liberties with a minor
012 = Rape
013 = Sexual offense
014 = Sexual assault not involving rape or sexual offense
2.Threat and possession of a weapon
043 = Bomb threat
105 = Threat of physical attack with a firearm
106 = Threat of physical attack with a weapon
107 = Threat of physical attack without a weapon
019 = Communicating threats (G.S. 14-277.1)
008 = Possession of a firearm or powerful explosive
009 = Possession of a weapon (excluding firearms and explosives)
3.Disorderly conduct and harassment
022 = Disorderly conduct (G.S. 14-288.4(a)(6))
038 = Harassment - sexual
101 = Harassment - Racial
102 = Harassment - Disability
109 = Harassment - Sexual orientation
110 = Harassment - Religious affiliation
025 = Harassment - verbal
080 = Discrimination
4.Other violent behavior
027 = Aggressive behavior
021 = Affray (G.S. 14-33)
024 = Fighting
026 = Hazing
052 = Bullying
094 = Cyber-bullying
079 = Gang activity
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Offense Categories and Types ( Continue)
Drug
054 = Sale of controlled substance in violation of law - cocaine
055 = Sale of controlled substance in violation of law - marijuana
056 = Sale of controlled substance in violation of law - Ritalin
057 = Sale of controlled substance in violation of law - other
088 = Distribution of a prescription drug
049 = Use of controlled substances
048 = Use of alcoholic beverages
050 = Use of narcotics
070 = Use of tobacco
096 = Under the influence of controlled substances
095 = Under the influence of alcohol
005 = Possession of controlled substance in violation of law - cocaine
006 = Possession of controlled substance in violation of law - marijuana
007 = Possession of controlled substance in violation of law - Ritalin
017 = Possession of controlled substance in violation of law - other
020 = Alcohol Possession (G.S. 18B)
041 = Possession of tobacco
051 = Possession of chemical or drug paraphernalia
086 = Possession of student’s own prescription drug
087 = Possession of another person’s prescription drug
Disrespect
061 = UB: Disrespect of faculty/staff
032 = UB: Inappropriate language/disrespect
033 = UB: Insubordination
Property
053 = RO: Burning of a school building (G.S. 14-60)
036 = UB: Theft
039 = UB: Property damage
018 = UB: Unlawfully setting a fire (G.S. 14-277.1)
Truancy
075 = UB: Skipping school
030 = UB: Truancy
067 = UB: Leaving school without permission
074 = UB: Skipping class
066 = UB: Leaving class without permission
Other
1.Disruptive
042 = UB: Disruptive Behavior
2.Tardiness
064 = UB: Excessive tardiness
078 = UB: Late to class
3.Some other minor rule violations
028 = UB: Honor code violation
031 = UB: Dress code violation
060 = UB: Cell phone use
063 = UB: Excessive display of affection
068 = UB: Mutual sexual contact between two students
029 = UB: False fire alarm
035 = UB: Falsification of information
034 = UB: Gambling
059 = UB: Being in an unauthorized area
091 = UB: Misuse of school technology
040 = UB: Inappropriate items on school property
047 = UB: Use of counterfeit items
046 = UB: Possession of counterfeit items
065 = UB: No Immunization
4.Other
037 = UB: Bus misbehavior
077 = UB: Physical exam
114 = UB: Inappropriate Behavior
092 = UB: Repeat offender
058 = UB: Other School Defined Offense
069 = UB: Other
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Table A2: General and Specific Deterrence Effects for Second Offense
Offense OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS Sample Mean of
Category (or Type) &GFE &GFE Size Dependent Var.
Property
α21 -0.005 -0.003 -0.016 0.005 24420 0.13
(0.009) (0.009) (0.858) (0.560)
α22 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -1.307 -0.922
(0.005) (0.005) (2.767) (1.684)
Drug
α21 -0.009 -0.009 0.224 0.111 36487 0.2
(0.010) (0.010) (0.584) (0.426)
α22 -0.011∗ -0.009∗ -0.060 -0.123
(0.005) (0.005) (0.431) (0.351)
Fighting
α21 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.282 -0.175 133341 0.16
(0.006) (0.006) (3.387) (2.858)
α22 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 4.770 4.435
(0.004) (0.003) (8.614) (7.192)
Aggressive Behavior
α21 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -1.121 -1.478 117886 0.22
(0.006) (0.006) (2.822) (3.390)
α22 0.005∗ 0.001 1.166 1.552
(0.003) (0.003) (3.094) (3.715)
Disrespect to Faculty
α21 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ 1.043 0.650 122166 0.28
(0.006) (0.006) (1.279) (0.854)
α22 0.002 -0.004 -1.265 -0.797
(0.003) (0.003) (1.507) (1.017)
Insubordination
α21 -0.081∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 0.380 0.474 224651 0.37
(0.006) (0.006) (0.440) (0.451)
α22 0.002 -0.006∗∗ -0.619∗ -0.708∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.330) (0.331)
Inappropriate Language
α21 -0.011∗ -0.015∗∗∗ 0.204 0.071 166167 0.26
(0.005) (0.005) (0.357) (0.286)
α22 0.007∗∗ 0.001 -0.801 -0.437
(0.003) (0.003) (0.645) (0.514)
Skipping Class
α21 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.218 -0.211 124294 0.27
(0.007) (0.007) (0.219) (0.211)
α22 0.004 -0.003 0.339 0.181
(0.004) (0.004) (0.443) (0.430)
Disruptive Behavior
α21 -0.122∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.851∗∗ -0.697∗∗ 358033 0.40
(0.005) (0.005) (0.340) (0.335)
α22 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ 0.655 0.618
(0.002) (0.002) (0.502) (0.493)
Excessive Tardiness
α21 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -14.748 43.990 111400 0.45
(0.011) (0.011) (35.668) (442.025)
α22 -0.018∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ 18.460 -56.236
(0.008) (0.007) (44.752) (564.759)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates of the “general deterrence effect” (α21) and “the specific deterrence effect”
(α22) in equation 1.2 for different categories (or types) of misbehaviors, estimated separately. Columns 2-5 show
the results using different estimation methods. OLS: a model with all control variables and school fixed effects;
OLS&GFE: adds an additional control for student unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS: instruments the DPI variable
but does not include a control for student unobserved heterogeneity; 2SLS&GFE: instruments the DPI variable and
controls for student unobserved heterogeneity. The sample for each category does not include schools with less than
5 students’ first offense observations of the category or without second offense observations of the category in the
academic year. The mean of the dependent variable is reported in the last column. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the student level.
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Table A3: General Deterrence Effects for Second Offense by OSS Experience
Offense Sample with OSS Experience Sample without OSS Experience
Category (or Type) OLS & GFE 2SLS & GFE OLS & GFE 2SLS & GFE
Property 0.012 0.257 -0.017 -0.056
(0.013) (0.353) (0.013) (0.234)
12927 12927 11493 11493
Drug 0.006 0.110 -0.055∗∗∗ -0.247
(0.013) (0.749) (0.018) (0.452)
20907 20907 15580 15580
Fighting -0.025∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ 298.6
(0.007) (0.777) (0.014) (39616.6)
114579 114579 18762 18762
Aggressive Behavior 0.003 -0.282 -0.044∗∗∗ -0.108
(0.009) (0.213) (0.009) (0.323)
51729 51729 66157 66157
Disrespect to Faculty 0.013 0.263 -0.062∗∗∗ -0.079
(0.011) (0.227) (0.008) (0.137)
41403 41403 80763 80763
Insubordination -0.009 -0.113 -0.127∗∗∗ -0.423
(0.011) (0.251) (0.008) (0.297)
61334 61334 163317 163317
Inappropriate Language 0.021∗∗ -0.024 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.184∗
(0.009) (0.195) (0.007) (0.107)
59099 59099 107100 107100
Skipping Class 0.036∗∗ -0.212 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.087
(0.017) (0.309) (0.009) (0.141)
17558 17558 107881 107881
Disruptive Behavior -0.060∗∗∗ -0.556 -0.152∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.473) (0.007) (0.177)
83497 83497 278704 278704
Excessive Tardiness -0.115∗∗∗ 2.775 -0.062∗∗∗ 0.659∗
(0.033) (11.33) (0.015) (0.344)
9028 9028 102372 102372
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table reports estimates of α21 (general deterrence effects on students’ second offense) in equation 1.2
by separately using the student-observations that were out-of-school suspended for their first offenses (p1ist = 1)
and the student-observations that were not out-of-school suspended for their first offense (p1ist = 0). Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the student level. The third number in each cell is number of
observations.
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Table A4: First Stage Results for 2SLS&GFE Specification in Table 1.5
Offense All Offenses Violence Disrespect Truancy Drug Property
Coefficient on IV (γ11) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F-Statistic 5261.360 4139.040 9069.750 2588.320 3567.880 349.142
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table A5: First Stage Results for 2SLS&GFE Specification in Table 1.8
Offense Violence Disrespect Truancy
Dependent Variable: P˜2st (equation 1.4)
Coefficient on the first instrumental variable (γ21) −0.014∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Coefficient on the second instrumental variable (γ22) 0.092∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Dependent Variable: P1ist (equation 1.5)
Coefficient on the first instrumental variable (γ31) −0.019 0.017∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.001)
Coefficient on the second instrumental variable (γ31) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ −0.025∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.015)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table A6: First Stage Results for 2SLS&GFE Specifications in Table 1.10
End-of-Grade Math Dropout ACT Composite Score
Ever OSS First OSS Ever OSS First OSS Ever OSS First OSS
Coefficient on IV 0.051∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.030∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017)
F-Statistic 74.106 34.464 26.333 11.683 17.036 2.881
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table A7: First Stage Results for 2SLS&GFE Specification in Table 1.11
End-of-Grade Math Dropout ACT Composite Score
Grade 3-8 Grade 6-8
All No Record All No Record All No Record All No Record
Coefficient on IV 0.069∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004)
F-Statistic 3974.170 2108.690 924.528 750.942 764.660 559.193 722.402 689.602
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table A8: Comparison of Sample Means of Student Characteristics for Each Sample in Table 1.8
All Offenses Violence Disrespect Truancy Drug Property
Race
White 0.529 0.525 0.526 0.533 0.549 0.529
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.498) (0.499)
Black 0.282 0.286 0.289 0.289 0.278 0.286
(0.450) (0.452) (0.453) (0.453) (0.448) (0.452)
Hispanic 0.114 0.114 0.112 0.105 0.102 0.111
(0.318) (0.318) (0.315) (0.307) (0.302) (0.314)
Asian 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.026
(0.156) (0.157) (0.156) (0.154) (0.155) (0.160)
Multi-Racial 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.034
(0.185) (0.185) (0.183) (0.179) (0.176) (0.182)
American Indian 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.012
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.119) (0.108)
Other Race 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0244) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0248)
Disability
No Disability 0.861 0.861 0.864 0.870 0.872 0.866
(0.346) (0.345) (0.343) (0.337) (0.334) (0.340)
Physical Disability 0.060 0.059 0.057 0.050 0.048 0.054
(0.237) (0.236) (0.232) (0.218) (0.213) (0.226)
Intellectual Disability 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.080 0.080 0.079
(0.269) (0.270) (0.270) (0.272) (0.272) (0.270)
Other Dichotomous Characteristics
(omitted: alternative group)
Female 0.489 0.489 0.489 0.489 0.489 0.489
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Economically Disadvantaged 0.503 0.504 0.502 0.487 0.465 0.487
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
Limited English Proficiency 0.058 0.058 0.055 0.047 0.044 0.053
(0.233) (0.233) (0.227) (0.211) (0.206) (0.224)
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Reading 0.123 0.124 0.126 0.132 0.133 0.133
(0.329) (0.329) (0.332) (0.338) (0.339) (0.340)
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Math 0.134 0.135 0.137 0.142 0.142 0.145
(0.341) (0.341) (0.344) (0.349) (0.349) (0.352)
Old in the Grade 0.147 0.151 0.154 0.164 0.172 0.158
(0.354) (0.358) (0.361) (0.371) (0.377) (0.365)
Repeating Grade in the Academic Year 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.038 0.044 0.034
(0.171) (0.173) (0.177) (0.191) (0.205) (0.181)
Mean of Lagged Scores
Lagged Normalized Math Score 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.008
(0.896) (0.901) (0.905) (0.921) (0.910) (0.918)
Lagged Normalized Reading Score 0.025 0.023 0.027 0.035 0.048 0.035
(0.883) (0.886) (0.887) (0.898) (0.883) (0.896)
Lagged Score Missing Indicator 0.190 0.185 0.169 0.136 0.154 0.146
(0.392) (0.388) (0.375) (0.343) (0.361) (0.354)
Grade level
Grade 3 0.085 0.078 0.057 0.004 0.000 0.025
(0.280) (0.268) (0.232) (0.0621) (0.0212) (0.156)
Grade 4 0.087 0.079 0.059 0.005 0.001 0.027
(0.281) (0.271) (0.236) (0.0706) (0.0254) (0.161)
Grade 5 0.086 0.080 0.061 0.007 0.002 0.029
(0.281) (0.271) (0.239) (0.0861) (0.0406) (0.168)
Grade 6 0.108 0.111 0.118 0.124 0.081 0.134
(0.310) (0.315) (0.323) (0.330) (0.272) (0.340)
Grade 7 0.108 0.112 0.119 0.130 0.086 0.136
(0.310) (0.315) (0.324) (0.336) (0.281) (0.343)
Grade 8 0.108 0.111 0.119 0.130 0.087 0.136
(0.310) (0.315) (0.323) (0.336) (0.282) (0.343)
Grade 9 0.122 0.125 0.137 0.175 0.217 0.150
(0.327) (0.331) (0.343) (0.380) (0.412) (0.357)
Grade 10 0.107 0.110 0.120 0.154 0.191 0.132
(0.309) (0.313) (0.325) (0.361) (0.393) (0.339)
Grade 11 0.097 0.100 0.109 0.140 0.173 0.119
(0.297) (0.300) (0.311) (0.347) (0.378) (0.324)
Grade 12 0.091 0.094 0.102 0.131 0.162 0.112
(0.288) (0.291) (0.303) (0.338) (0.369) (0.315)
Sample Size 4545364 4372421 4003540 2984461 2321135 2870740
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
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Table A9: Other Estimation Results for Specification “All Offenses” in Table 1.5 (Part 1: βˆ12, βˆ13,
βˆ10)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
&GFE &GFE
Race (ref. white)
Black 0.092∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hispanic −0.013∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Asian −0.071∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Multi-Racial 0.042∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
American Indian 0.048∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Other Race 0.100∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Disability (ref. no disability)
Physical Disability 0.041∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Intellectual Disability 0.001 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Dichotomous Characteristics
Female −0.095∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economically Disadvantaged 0.081∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Limited English Proficiency −0.014∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Reading −0.029∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Math −0.045∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Old in the Grade 0.028∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Repeating Grade in the Academic Year 0.095∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Grade level (ref. grade 3)
Grade 4 0.048∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Grade 5 0.066∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Grade 6 0.110∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Grade 7 0.112∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Grade 8 0.115∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Grade 9 0.019∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Grade 10 0.019∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Grade 11 0.019∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Grade 12 −0.007∗ 0.000 −0.013∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Lagged Scores (βˆ12)
Lagged Normalized Math Score −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Normalized Reading Score 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Score Missing Indicator 0.026∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant (βˆ10) 0.904∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.041) (0.076) (0.057)
Sample Size 4545364 4545364 4545364 4545364
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A10: Other Estimation Results for Specification “All Offenses” in Table 1.5 (Part 2: βˆ11, βˆ15)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
&GFE &GFE
Offenses in Previous Year (βˆ11)
Lagged Frequency of Assault and Robbery 0.104∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Lagged Frequency of Threat and Weapon 0.108∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Lagged Frequency of Harassment 0.070∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged Frequency of Other Violence 0.112∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lagged Frequency of Drug 0.111∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged Frequency of Disrespect 0.054∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Frequency of Disruption 0.051∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Frequency of Truancy 0.061∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lagged Frequency of Tardiness 0.034∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Lagged Frequency of Property 0.098∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged Frequency of Minor Rule Violation 0.057∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lagged Frequency of Other Offense 0.063∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Same Grade Peers’ Observed Characteristics (βˆ15)
Ratio of Black Students 0.047∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ratio of Other Minority Students −0.030∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.038∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Ratio of Female Students −0.076∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Ratio of Exceptional Students −0.054∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ratio of AIG Students 0.031∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Ratio of Students with Limited English Proficiency −0.004 −0.022∗∗∗ 0.016∗ −0.013∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Ratio of Students Who Repeated Grades This Tear 0.185∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
Ratio of students Who Are Above the Typical Age In the Grade 0.150∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010)
Ratio of Economically Disadvantaged Students 0.042∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.014 0.068∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Mean of Last Year Math Standard Scores 0.003∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mean of Last Year Reading Standard Scores 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sample Size 4545364 4545364 4545364 4545364
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A11: Other Estimation Results for Specification “All Offenses” in Table 1.5 (Part 3: βˆ14)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
&GFE &GFE
Time Varying School Observables
Violent crime cases last year (N) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Students involved in misbehavior last year (N) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Students assigned OSS or expulsion last year (N) −0.000 −0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Assault, robbery or sexual offense cases (N 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Threat or possession of a weapon cases (N) 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disorderly conduct or harassment cases (N) −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other violent cases (N) −0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Drug related cases (N) 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ −0.000 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disrespect cases (N) −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disruptive behavior cases (N) −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Truancy cases (N) −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tardiness cases (N) −0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Property cases (N) −0.000∗∗ −0.000 −0.000∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other rule violation cases (N) −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other disciplinary infraction cases (N) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minor (average OSS days < 0.55) misbehavior cases (N) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Moderate ( 0.55 ≤ average OSS days ≤ 1 ) misbehavior cases (N) −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Major (average OSS days > 1 ) misbehavior cases (N) −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ratio of black students 0.087∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Ratio of Hispanic students −0.027∗∗∗ −0.017∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011)
Ratio of other minority students 0.096∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
School mean of normalized math score last year −0.008∗∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.004 −0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
School mean of normalized reading score last year −0.026∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Proportion of students – math scores 2 sd below state average last year −0.048∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Proportion of students – reading scores 2 sd below state average last year −0.044∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.077∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Title I eligible school −0.001 0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
School-wide title I −0.004∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Magnet School Indicator −0.030∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
PBIS - Green Ribbon School −0.007∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PBIS - Model School −0.006∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
PBIS - Exemplar School −0.015∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ratio of teachers licensed in the school for more than 5 years −0.017∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.032∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Ratio of female personnels 0.011∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.003 0.012∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Ratio of black personnels −0.065∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Ratio of non-white non-black personnels 0.091∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Total student number −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Students who are economically disadvantaged % −0.029∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Total full-time equivalent classroom teachers 0.000∗∗∗ −0.000 0.001∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fully licensed teachers % 0.028∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Teachers with experience 4-10 years % 0.025∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Teachers with experience more than 11 years % 0.019∗∗∗ 0.004 0.018∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Teachers with Advanced Degrees % −0.008 −0.011∗∗ −0.008 −0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Teacher Turnover Rate % 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Average daily school attendance % −1.049∗∗∗ −1.160∗∗∗ −1.262∗∗∗ −1.374∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.068) (0.052)
Students per Instructional Computer (N) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Books per Student (N) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average age of Books in library or media center 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Classes taught by highly qualified teachers −0.109∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Adequate yearly progress target met % −0.009∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Classrooms connected to the Internet % 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Total number of classroom teachers 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School Variable Missing Indicator 0.081∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sample Size 4545364 4545364 4545364 4545364
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A12: Selected Estimation Results (βˆ33, βˆ32, βˆ30) for Specification “OLS&GFE” for Equation 1.7
End of Grade Math Dropout ACT Composite Score
(Grade 3 -8) (Grade 9) (Grade 9 -10)
Race (ref. white)
Black −0.027∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −1.179∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.048)
Hispanic 0.001 −0.050∗∗∗ −0.476∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.054)
Asian 0.036∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.154)
Multi-Racial −0.007 −0.039∗∗∗ −0.334∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.070)
American Indian −0.010 −0.014 −0.655∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.011) (0.105)
Other Race −0.047 −0.037 −0.832
(0.040) (0.056) (0.575)
Disability (ref. no disability)
Physical Disability −0.258∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.334∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.053)
Intellectual Disability −0.360∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.046)
Other Dichotomous Characteristics
Female −0.007 −0.008∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.024)
Economically Disadvantaged −0.026∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ −0.385∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.068)
Limited English Proficiency 0.019∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ −1.220∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.070)
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Reading 0.000 −0.024∗∗∗ 2.417∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.076)
Academically and Intellectually Gifted - Math 0.028∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ 2.580∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.078)
Old in the Grade −0.056∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ −0.894∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.053)
Repeating Grade in the Academic Year 0.079∗∗∗
(0.008)
Grade level
(ref. grade 3 for End of Grade Math, grade 9 for ACT Composite Score)
Grade 4 −0.021
(0.014)
Grade 5 −0.017
(0.020)
Grade 6 0.014
(0.028)
Grade 7 0.017
(0.035)
Grade 8 0.028
(0.038)
Grade 10 0.225∗∗∗
(0.038)
Lagged Scores (βˆ32)
Lagged Normalized Math Score 0.691∗∗∗ −0.001 0.504∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.024)
Lagged Normalized Reading Score 0.110∗∗∗ −0.002 1.440∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.032)
Lagged Score Missing Indicator −0.149∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.037)
Constant (βˆ30) −0.586 1.260∗∗∗ 19.819∗∗∗
(0.703) (0.342) (3.116)
Sample Size 548893 114642 97419
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B1: Estimation Results: Black White Differences in OOS by
Offense Type
Offense Type Coeff. SE Sample
Fighting 0.012∗∗∗ (0.002) 167164
Inappropriate language/disrespect −0.009∗∗∗ (0.003) 242416
Insubordination 0.003 (0.002) 448476
Disruptive behavior 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 753039
Disrespect of faculty/staff −0.018∗∗∗ (0.003) 203359
Skipping Class 0.003 (0.002) 242792
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS regression results (with school-year fixed effects)
for being a black student (relative to a white student), separately estimated for dif-
ferent types of offenses. Only schools that reported all the listed types of offenses
in the academic year are used for the estimation. The dependent variable is the
out-of-school suspension indicator. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and clustered at the school-year level.
Table B2: Estimation Results: Black White Differences in OOS by
Offense Type
Offense Type Coeff. SE Sample
Fighting 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003) 96803
Dress code violation 0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) 61508
Inappropriate language/disrespect −0.009∗∗ (0.003) 163262
Insubordination 0.002 (0.002) 326865
Theft 0.031∗∗∗ (0.009) 21874
Disruptive behavior 0.007∗∗∗ (0.002) 514009
Disrespect of faculty/staff −0.020∗∗∗ (0.004) 136429
Leaving Class without permission −0.007 (0.005) 43145
Skipping Class 0.005 (0.003) 186840
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table reports OLS regression (with school-year fixed effects) results
for being a black student (relative to a white student), separately estimated for dif-
ferent types of offenses. Only schools that reported all the listed types of offenses
in the academic year are used for the estimation. The dependent variable is the
out-of-school suspension indicator. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and clustered at the school-year level.
130
APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
C.1. Likelihood Function
Under the equilibia selection assumption desscribed in Section 3.2.5, we have the following
conditional probability:
Pr(yit = 1 and yjt = 1|Ωit,Ωjt, µt) = Pr(it > −βa~Ωit − β1a and jt > −βb~Ωjt − β1b)
− (1− Pr(o = (1, 1)))
Pr(−βa~Ωit − β1a < it ≤ −βa~Ωit + β1a and − βb~Ωjt − β1b < jt ≤ −βb~Ωjt + β1b);
Pr(yit = −1 and yjt = −1|Ωit,Ωjt, µt) = Pr(it < −βa~Ωit + β1a and jt < −βb~Ωjt + β1b)
− Pr(o = (1, 1))
Pr(−βa~Ωit − β1a < it ≤ −βa~Ωit + β1a and − βb~Ωjt − β1b < jt ≤ −βb~Ωjt + β1b);
Pr(yit = 1 and yjt = −1|Ωit,Ωjt, µt) = Pr(it ≥ −βa~Ωit + β1a and jt ≤ −βb~Ωjt − β1b);
Pr(yit = −1 and yjt = 1|Ωit,Ωjt, µt) = Pr(it ≤ −βa~Ωit − β1a and jt ≥ −βb~Ωjt + β1b);
Suppose we treat µt (t= 1, 2 . . . , T ) as additional parameters to estimate without imposing a
distributional assumption (i.e., year indicators). Combined with equations 3.7 and 3.8, we have the
following conditional probability of observing smoking status and health states for individuals i
and j (here, we have ignored the mortality probability for simplicity of explanation):
Pr(yi0, yi1, . . . , yiT , yj0, yj1, . . . , yjT , Hi1, . . . , HiT , Hj1, . . . , HjT |Xi, Xj, ξi, ξj) =
T∏
t=0
Pr(yit, yjt|Ωit,Ωjt)
×
T∏
t=1
Pr(Hit|H lit, XHit , Ait, yjt−1, ξi)Pr(Hjt|H ljt, XHjt , Ajt, yit−1, ξj) (C.1)
where we define Ωit= {Ait, Hit, XSit , ξi}Ωjt= {Ajt, Hjt, XSjt, ξj} for t=1, . . . ,T, Ωi0= {XSi0, ξi},Ωj0=
{XSj0, ξj}, and Xi, Xj as all of the exogenous covariates for all the periods, and assume Hi0 =
131
Hj0 = 0 (i.e., we ignore the initial health state probability for simplicity of explanation).
Therefore, the likelihood function unconditional on the permanent individual unobserved het-
erogeneity, ξ, is:
Pr(yi0, yi1, . . . , yiT , yj0, yj1, . . . , yjT , Hi1, . . . , HiT , Hj1, . . . , HjT |Xi, Xj)
=
∫
supp(ξi,ξj)
Pr(yi0, yi1, . . . , yiT , yj0, yj1, . . . , yjT , Hi1, . . . , HiT , Hj1, . . . , HjT |Xi, Xj, ξi, ξj)
f(ξi, ξj|Xi, Xj)dξiξj (C.2)
where we apply the distributional assumptions introduced in Section 3.2.5 for ξi, ξj, i, j, hi , and
hj .
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Table C1: Estimation Results: Smoking and Health Probabilities for Friend Pairs
Coeff SE
Smoking at t (Equation 3.5)
Smoke in t− 1 1.046 0.032
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 0.430 0.042
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 −0.103 0.133
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 −0.062 0.054
Female 0.208 0.089
Married −0.157 0.063
(Age-19)/10 at t 0.204 0.084
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.049 0.012
No High School −0.094 0.112
Some High School 0.087 0.095
College −0.054 0.058
Post-College −0.036 0.089
Mode of Excluded Peers’ Smoking Status 0.265 0.058
Excluded Peers are Missing 0.017 0.094
Social Contact:
Smoke in t 0.082 0.030
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 −0.061 0.109
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.050 0.052
Female −0.093 0.087
Married −0.037 0.064
No High School −0.083 0.111
Some High School −0.050 0.092
College −0.098 0.057
Post-College −0.161 0.091
ρS −0.187 0.095
Constant 0.940 0.177
Cardiovascular Disease Event between t− 1 and t (Equation 3.6)
Smoke in t− 1 0.482 0.078
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 −0.009 0.061
Ever Cardiovascular Disease before t− 1 1.043 0.133
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.631 0.130
High-Normal Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.591 0.169
Female −0.819 0.118
Married 0.143 0.140
(Age-19)/10 at t 2.172 0.391
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.166 0.041
No High School 0.380 0.183
Some High School 0.356 0.164
College −0.049 0.129
Post-College −0.335 0.206
Social Contact: Smoke in t− 1 0.041 0.064
ρHa −0.188 0.113
Constant −9.259 0.938
Number of Pair-Exams: 4796
Note: The table provides selected estimated parameters from the smoking and health event probabilities as part
of a larger joint estimation of equations 3.5-3.9 for friend pairs. The specification normalizes one mass point
to zero (ξ1(i,j) = 0) and identifies another mass point, ξ
2
(i,j) = −2.225 with standard error 0.198. The joint
probabilities for the mass point combinations are P (ξi = 0, ξj = 0) = 0.547, P (ξi = −2.36, ξj = 0) = 0.164,
P (ξi = 0, ξj = −2.36) = 0.229, and P (ξi = −2.36, ξj = −2.36) = 0.06. Time-varying unobserved effects (µt
for t= 1, 2, 3, . . . , 8) are controlled for by including exam indicators. The estimated probability of equilibrium
(1,1) is Pr(o = (1, 1)) = 0.488.
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Table C2: Estimation Results: Smoking and Health Probabilities for Sibling Pairs
Coeff SE
Smoking at t (Equation 3.5)
Smoke in t− 1 0.708 0.017
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 0.314 0.026
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 −0.451 0.093
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 −0.145 0.039
Female 0.055 0.039
Married −0.230 0.037
(Age-19)/10 at t 0.012 0.045
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.041 0.007
No High School −0.071 0.109
Some High School 0.366 0.066
College −0.144 0.046
Post-College −0.600 0.067
Mode of Excluded Peers’ Smoking Status 0.296 0.038
Excluded Peers are Missing 0.085 0.040
Social Contact:
Smoke in t 0.022 0.016
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 0.132 0.080
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.051 0.038
Female −0.011 0.038
Married −0.008 0.038
No High School 0.233 0.100
Some High School 0.039 0.070
College −0.063 0.046
Post-College 0.044 0.062
ρS 0.282 0.029
Constant 1.967 0.096
Cardiovascular Disease Event between t− 1 and t (Equation 3.6)
Smoke in t− 1 0.523 0.073
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 −0.091 0.039
Ever Cardiovascular Disease before t− 1 1.379 0.079
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.823 0.081
High-Normal Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.578 0.103
Female −0.791 0.072
Married −0.108 0.076
(Age-19)/10 at t 1.659 0.200
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.135 0.022
No High School 0.134 0.130
Some High School −0.106 0.105
College −0.191 0.078
Post-College −0.761 0.143
Social Contact: Smoke in t− 1 0.052 0.040
ρHa −0.138 0.105
Constant −7.501 0.477
Number of Pair-Exams: 15346
Note: The table provides selected estimated parameters from the smoking and health event probabilities as part
of a larger joint estimation of equations 3.5-3.9 for sibling pairs. The specification normalizes one mass point
to zero (ξ1(i,j) = 0) and identifies another mass point, ξ
2
(i,j) = −1.843 with standard error 0.048. The joint
probabilities for the mass point combinations are P (ξi = 0, ξj = 0) = 0.106, P (ξi = −1.847, ξj = 0) = 0.164,
P (ξi = 0, ξj = −1.847) = 0.161, and P (ξi = −1.847, ξj = −1.847) = 0.569. Time-varying unobserved
effects (µt for t= 1, 2, 3, . . . , 8) are controlled for by including exam indicators. The estimated probability of
equilibrium (1,1) is Pr(o = (1, 1)) = 1.
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Table C3: Estimation Results: Smoking and Health Probabilities for Parent-Child Pairs
Child Equation SE Parent Equation SE
Smoking at t (Equation 3.5)
Smoke in t− 1 0.690 0.025 0.694 0.032
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 0.238 0.035 0.259 0.048
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 −0.194 0.467 −0.043 0.096
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 −0.119 0.079 −0.101 0.063
Female 0.007 0.060 0.258 0.073
Married −0.435 0.057 −0.252 0.081
(Age-19)/10 at t 0.093 0.085 −0.945 0.304
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.073 0.020 0.041 0.031
No High School or Some High School −0.392 0.416 −0.085 0.091
College −0.526 0.415 −0.033 0.102
Post-College −0.999 0.426 −0.537 0.213
Mode of Excluded Peers’ Smoking Status 0.029 0.065 0.416 0.075
Excluded Peers are Missing −0.044 0.056 0.141 0.068
Social Contact:
Smoke in t 0.003 0.014 0.107 0.037
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 0.058 0.067 0.209 0.300
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.089 0.050 −0.030 0.096
Female 0.053 0.064 0.022 0.068
Married −0.024 0.063 0.023 0.064
No High School or Some High School 0.052 0.082 −0.875 0.343
College −0.148 0.097 −0.933 0.345
Post-College −0.096 0.164 −0.860 0.349
ρS 0.403 0.044 0.147 0.052
Constant 2.654 0.456 5.625 0.858
Cardiovascular Disease Event between t− 1 and t (Equation 3.6)
Smoke in t− 1 0.452 0.320 0.441 0.083
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 −0.262 0.139 −0.088 0.041
Ever Cardiovascular Disease before t− 1 1.995 0.326 0.719 0.079
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.736 0.242 0.935 0.104
High Normal Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.487 0.289 0.712 0.132
Female −0.807 0.227 −0.403 0.080
Married −0.494 0.240 −0.249 0.083
(Age-19)/10 at t 2.220 0.752 −0.773 0.506
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.197 0.108 0.062 0.043
No High School or Some High School 0.117 0.795 0.072 0.088
College −0.164 0.805 −0.199 0.104
Post-College −0.558 0.867 0.243 0.172
Social Contact: Smoke in t− 1 0.257 0.144 0.051 0.037
ρHa 0.059 0.459 −0.368 0.120
Constant −8.261 1.861 −0.343 1.490
Number of Pair-Exams: 10044
Note: The table provides selected estimated parameters from the smoking and health event probabilities as part of a larger joint estimation of equations
3.5-3.9 for parent-child pairs. The specification normalizes one mass point to zero (ξ1(i,j) = 0) and identifies another mass point, ξ
2
(i,j) = −1.999 with
standard error 0.066. The joint probabilities for the mass point combinations are P (ξi = 0, ξj = 0) = 0.069, P (ξi = −2.008, ξj = 0) = 0.138,
P (ξi = 0, ξj = −2.008) = 0.174, and P (ξi = −2.008, ξj = −2.008) = 0.619. Time-varying unobserved effects (µt for t= 1, 2, . . . , 8) are controlled for
by including exam indicators. The estimated probability of equilibrium (1,1) is Pr(o = (1, 1)) = 0.563.
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Table C4: Additional Estimation Results: Initial Conditions and Attrition for Spouse Pairs
Husband Equation Wife Equation
Coeff SE Coeff SE
Initial Smoking
Constant −1.894 0.278 −1.215 0.128
No High School 0.041 0.145 −0.019 0.183
Some High School 0.165 0.127 0.240 0.142
College −0.424 0.081 −0.254 0.071
Post-College −0.785 0.105 −0.176 0.125
Proportion of Smokers Before 19 in Same Birth-year Same Sex Cohort 3.538 0.515 3.530 0.297
Initial Health
Constant −11.786 1.967 −19.434 6.339
(Age-19)/10 at t 4.343 1.122 7.526 3.388
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.531 0.160 −0.865 0.456
No High School 0.113 0.373 −0.240 0.689
Some High School −0.431 0.447 0.366 0.614
College 0.315 0.294 0.033 0.489
Post College 0.036 0.484 0.714 1.109
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 1.220 0.271 0.280 0.443
High-Normal Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.275 0.512 0.528 0.795
Smoke in t− 1 0.336 0.158 −0.020 0.285
Social Contact: Smoke in t− 1 −0.084 0.155 0.151 0.206
ρH0a −0.093 0.220 −0.086 0.335
Attrition (Death)
Constant −8.867 0.913 −8.563 1.225
(Age-19)/10 at t 1.522 0.373 1.387 0.502
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.037 0.038 −0.037 0.052
No High School −0.032 0.175 −0.293 0.286
Some High School 0.021 0.170 0.400 0.239
College 0.011 0.123 −0.169 0.170
Post-College −0.198 0.180 −0.114 0.359
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.263 0.106 0.383 0.157
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 0.863 0.130 1.011 0.221
Ever Cardiovascular Disease before t− 1 0.616 0.119 0.402 0.217
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 0.110 0.059 0.079 0.094
Smoke in t 0.359 0.081 0.006 0.162
Social Contact: Smoke in t 0.076 0.071 −0.064 0.114
ρDa 0.098 0.096 0.459 0.201
Note: The table provides estimated parameters from the initial condition and attrition equations (3.7, 3.8, and 3.9) as part of a larger joint
estimation of equations 3.5-3.9 for spouse pairs.
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Table C5: Additional Estimation Results: Initial Conditions and Attri-
tion for Friend Pairs
Coeff SE
Initial Smoking
Constant −1.599 0.138
Female 0.228 0.082
No High School −0.298 0.104
Some High School 0.125 0.085
College −0.123 0.053
Post-College −0.524 0.086
Social Contact: Female −0.097 0.069
Social Contact: No High School 0.075 0.097
Social Contact: Some High School 0.133 0.085
Social Contact: College −0.024 0.053
Social Contact: Post-College −0.044 0.083
Proportion of Smokers Before 19 2.761 0.228
in Same Birth-year Same Sex Cohort
Initial Health
Constant −13.430 3.241
Female −0.719 0.289
Married −0.120 0.350
(Age-19)/10 at t 4.472 1.644
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.468 0.211
No High School 0.844 0.351
Some High School 0.391 0.412
College 0.257 0.331
Post College 0.309 0.585
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.758 0.274
High-Normal Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.565 0.670
Smoke in t− 1 0.392 0.161
Social Contact: Smoke in t− 1 −0.065 0.140
ρH0a −0.356 0.283
Attrition (Death)
Constant −8.189 0.959
Female −0.643 0.124
Married −0.221 0.137
(Age-19)/10 at t 1.369 0.388
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.035 0.039
No High School 0.183 0.180
Some High School 0.445 0.174
College 0.152 0.138
Post-College 0.176 0.206
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.232 0.117
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 0.878 0.150
Ever Cardiovascular Disease before t− 1 0.750 0.149
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 0.113 0.060
Smoke in t 0.189 0.086
Social Contact: Smoke in t 0.076 0.075
ρDa 0.274 0.140
Note: The table provides estimated parameters from the initial condition and attrition
equations (3.7, 3.8, and 3.9) as part of a larger joint estimation of equations 3.5-3.9
for friend pairs.
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Table C6: Additional Estimation Results: Initial Conditions and Attri-
tion for Sibling Pairs
Coeff SE
Initial Smoking
Constant −1.133 0.118
Female −0.015 0.047
No High School 0.044 0.093
Some High School 0.110 0.066
College −0.282 0.043
Post-College −0.556 0.060
Social Contact: Female 0.006 0.035
Social Contact: No High School −0.025 0.091
Social Contact: Some High School 0.027 0.066
Social Contact: College 0.084 0.043
Social Contact: Post-College −0.140 0.061
Proportion of Smokers Before 19 3.395 0.204
in Same Birth-year Same Sex Cohort
Initial Health
Constant −13.595 1.976
Female −1.275 0.255
Married 0.167 0.296
(Age-19)/10 at t 4.615 1.080
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.466 0.150
No High School 0.189 0.284
Some High School −0.033 0.294
College −0.365 0.318
Post College −1.008 0.746
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.787 0.254
High-Normal Blood Pressure in t− 1 1.731 0.310
Smoke in t− 1 0.182 0.114
Social Contact: Smoke in t− 1 −0.107 0.117
ρH0a −0.134 0.212
Attrition (Death)
Constant −7.145 0.497
Female −0.304 0.080
Married −0.102 0.085
(Age-19)/10 at t 1.109 0.213
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.018 0.023
No High School −0.042 0.141
Some High School 0.497 0.111
College 0.108 0.093
Post-College −0.185 0.159
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.179 0.080
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 1.146 0.105
Ever Cardiovascular Disease before t− 1 0.532 0.100
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 0.096 0.042
Smoke in t −0.060 0.075
Social Contact: Smoke in t 0.055 0.050
ρDa 0.506 0.093
Note: The table provides estimated parameters from the initial condition and attrition
equations (3.7, 3.8, and 3.9) as part of a larger joint estimation of equations 3.5-3.9
for sibling pairs.
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Table C7: Additional Estimation Results: Initial Conditions and Attrition for Parent-Child Pairs
Child Equation Parent Equation
Coeff SE Coeff SE
Initial Smoking
Constant 0.064 0.452 −1.467 0.469
Female −0.040 0.068 0.219 0.140
No High School or Some High School −0.884 0.394 −0.066 0.078
College −1.250 0.394 0.048 0.089
Post-College −1.574 0.398 −0.233 0.153
Social Contact: Female 0.016 0.057 0.075 0.060
Social Contact: No High School or Some High School 0.105 0.071 −0.324 0.420
Social Contact: College 0.171 0.082 −0.330 0.419
Social Contact: Post-College 0.235 0.149 −0.448 0.423
Proportion of Smokers Before 19 3.143 0.449 4.476 0.487
in Same Birth-year Same Sex Cohort
Initial Health
Constant −8.327 4.338 −4.665 5.097
Female −1.275 1.060 −0.643 0.174
Married 0.15 1.252 −0.543 0.213
(Age-19)/10 at t −1.506 3.636 0.042 2.424
(Age-19)2/100 at t 1.254 0.838 0.079 0.287
No High School or Some High School −0.245 1.758 0.347 0.192
College 0.013 1.948 0.079 0.225
Post-College 0.599 2.100 0.554 0.375
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.473 1.270 0.956 0.174
Smoke in t− 1 −0.134 0.531 0.322 0.087
ρH0a 0.074 0.931 −0.486 0.178
Attrition (Death)
Constant −14.23 2.727 −9.602 1.296
Female −0.287 0.271 −0.104 0.065
Married −0.649 0.279 0.054 0.077
(Age-19)/10 at t 4.684 1.305 1.774 0.448
(Age-19)2/100 at t −0.493 0.187 −0.060 0.039
No High School or Some High School 0.461 1.075 −0.117 0.080
College 0.223 1.092 −0.107 0.091
Post-College 0.673 1.140 −0.082 0.167
High Blood Pressure in t− 1 0.067 0.291 0.004 0.070
Cardiovascular Disease Between t and t− 1 0.523 0.591 0.927 0.082
Ever Cardiovascular Disease before t− 1 1.474 0.457 0.793 0.075
Ever Regularly Smoked before t− 1 0.275 0.169 0.093 0.039
Smoke in t 0.512 0.405 0.071 0.089
Social Contact: Smoke in t 0.023 0.223 0.042 0.038
ρDa −0.156 0.525 0.248 0.100
Note: The table provides estimated parameters from the initial condition and attrition equations (3.7, 3.8, and 3.9) as part of
a larger joint estimation of equations 3.5-3.9 for parent-child pairs.
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Table C8: Marginal Effects: Alter’s Smoking Behavior on Ego’s Smoking Behav-
ior Unconditional on Ego’s Previous Smoking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wife’s (Effect on)→ Husband 0.076 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.042
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Husband’s (Effect on)→Wife 0.065 0.044 0.045 0.047 0.048
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Friends 0.030 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.020
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Siblings 0.033 0.021 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Parent’s (Effect on)→ Child 0.050 0.042 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.013) (0.263) (0.245) (0.294)
Child’s (Effect on)→ Parent 0.025 0.008 0.016 0.021 0.021
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Estimator addresses:
Simultaneity No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unobserved Heterogeneity No No Yes Yes Yes
Endogeneity of the Health Variable No No No Yes Yes
Attrition Due to Death No No No No Yes
Percent Change
Wife’s (Effect on)→ Husband 30.3 20.4 21.1 20.4 20.4
Husband’s (Effect on)→Wife 28.6 20.3 25.3 25.9 25.5
Friends 13.8 9.0 10.4 10.6 10.2
Siblings 13.7 9.1 3.4 3.4 3.3
Parent’s (Effect on)→ Child 16.6 14.2 0.6 0.4 0.3
Child’s (Effect on)→ Parent 17.6 6.4 14.5 18.9 18.2
Note: The marginal effects of social contacts’ smoking behavior on individual smoking behavior
are simulated at the observed explanatory variables (i.e., unconditional on ego’s previous smoking
behavior). For friends and siblings, the effects are assumed to be symmetric. Percentage point
changes are reported in the top panel. Standard errors are calculated using 500 random draws
from the variance-covariance matrix of estimated parameters. Percent changes are provided in the
bottom panel.
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